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

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



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Irving Howe

Suppose the Golem had been made, not of the clay that legend has it, but of plastic: what would have been his fate? Well, he might have been elected president and as he acquiesced in the engineering of a depression that has thrown millions out of work and cut off vast numbers of children from lunch programs, some people would still have said, "But he's a nice guy."

Why? Because he smilingly remembers one-liners from the days he made speeches for General Electric, one of the most anti-union corporations in the country?

He's not a nice guy; he's a rigid, hard-hearted, simplistic ideologue. And besides, how *can* he be a nice guy—in a country where, as the received wisdom has it, nice guys finish last?

□

In Paris, recently, the Salvation Army sent out a mobile soup kitchen to feed the hungry. No doubt, there are explanations: France, a second-rank power, suffers the tremors set off by the decline of the American economy, and even in the best of societies, which the French Socialists can hardly be expected to create in two years, there are bound to be neglected victims, the strays and the derelicts.

It's painful that this should have happened, but there is consolation in the fact that the Mitterrand government quickly announced a program of help and rehabilitation, apparently not content to wait for the mysterious workings of the Free Market.

- Moral #1: It makes a difference who is in office. The French Socialists recognize an obligation to help the homeless; Ronald Reagan blandly urges "every employer" to hire one more person.
- Moral #2: Even when our guys are in office, there's a need for criticism and complaint. Socialist governments need socialist critics, and from a distance I'd bet a nickel that there were socialists in Paris, some in and some out of the Socialist party, who made an uproar after the Salvation Army sent out its kitchen.

□

Why are so few American intellectuals raising cain? We have nearly 14 million unemployed, and very little protest. I'm talking about serious intellectuals who do care about the fate of other people: why the silence?

Perhaps for reasons not unrelated to those that cause the unemployed themselves to remain silent. The unemployed worker, losing his job, feels at first a shock of dislocation, then a hope that something will turn up soon, then a dazed refusal to believe this could be happening to *him*, and then perhaps a flutter of guilt that it's really his own fault, since in America such things don't happen . . .

That's how it was during the first year or two of the Great Depression. Only later did the unemployed start making themselves heard, and even then, *as unemployed*, only fitfully and with insufficient force. Being jobless doesn't build self-confidence.

Still, there was this difference: by 1931 or so, the American intellectuals were starting to speak out. Unemployment was of course much more severe then, and the intellectuals had channels of protest —some good, some not—we don't have today. There was a shared feeling that the social order had simply collapsed, and if we're to believe the testimony of men like Edmund Wilson and John Dos Passos this brought about a heady feeling of freedom, an end to the pieties of the Coolidge and Hoover years, a persuasion that people could now start thinking.

Today there is little shared understanding of what is happening. Among intellectuals the best responses so far have come from a handful of social and economic theorists who have disagreements among themselves but largely share the view that the present crisis is more than cyclical and that even if interest rates were to be lowered and a stimulus applied to the economy, we would continue to suffer severe unemployment. The crisis, they tell us, is "structural," though precisely what that means and how deeply it goes remains a question.

One reason intellectuals in the '30s were more articulate than those of today is that by 1933 there was an accumulated body of liberal-left thought

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that enabled a modest revival of the radical movements and contributed significantly to the New Deal improvisations. Today even friends ask, "Surely you socialists don't suppose you have all the answers." Of course not; nobody has. Had Reagan been a shade less precipitous in his failures we would have had more time to work on a liberal-left program for the immediate future. Still, it would be foolish to wait for "all the answers" (and self-defeating to be intimidated by calls for "fresh ideas"—as if supply-side economics weren't one of the oldest of capitalist notions: trickle-down with a beard).

Look back to the New Deal program of 1934 and you'll see that it consisted of a series of job-creating and relief-providing measures that by present-day standards seem pretty radical—at least more radical than anything proposed by the leading Democratic candidates.

True, our more intransigent left-wing analysts say that a mere repetition of the New Deal isn't going to be enough for getting us out of what is now politely called a recession (though it's not called that in Michigan or Ohio). The New Deal wasn't even enough in the 1930s. These analysts are probably right; but an equivalent of the 1934 New Deal measures would certainly constitute a strong beginning.

Meanwhile, isn't it intolerable that in 1983 the United Automobile Workers' Union should have to

(Continued on page 255)

Dwight Macdonald

Dwight Macdonald, who died last December at the age of seventy-six, was a radical critic and journalist very much in the American grain. Even though he was briefly a Stalinist, then a Trotskyist, a pacifist, and a somewhat conservative anarchist, he remained his own man always reserving his right to think otherwise. During his heyday in the 1940s and '50s he had hardly a peer as a radical iconoclast on the political and cultural scene.

Dwight was among the leading New York intellectuals who fought the good battle against Stalinists and their fellow travelers before, during, and after World War II; yet he resigned from the American Committee for Cultural Freedom when it failed to fight against McCarthyism with the same fervor that it fought against Stalin. During and after the War he brilliantly edited the magazine *Politics*, an influential radical magazine that served as an organ of oppositional thought for all those who refused to fall prey to the pieties of official wartime propaganda and "progressive" obfuscation.

As a brave and witty warrior against cultural cant and political obscurantism Dwight was superb. His slashing style, his ready and deadly repartee in political and cultural encounters were memorable. When he attacked Henry Wallace or James Gould Cozzens his sting was deadly. He fought with equal vigor the mass culture of his day and the infatuation of so-called Progressives with Stalin.

Dwight loved nothing better than the din and noise of political or cultural argument. Not much of a political speaker, he came alive when he could use his pen.

Politics used to run a column entitled "Ancestors" where Dwight printed reconsiderations of half-forgotten radical thinkers of the left. He probably didn't realize that he too would become such an "ancestor."

Many of those who have been associated with *Dissent*, this writer in particular, learned much from him. Like Randolph Bourne and George Orwell, both of whom he greatly admired, Dwight helped keep alive the radical tradition and the politics of hope in times of cultural corruption and political befuddlement. We shall miss him.

LEWIS COSER □

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131 AT FIRST GLANCE *by Irving Howe*

COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

135 REAGAN'S REACTIONARY BUDGET *by Luther Carpenter* . . . A GROWING BURDEN ON THE WORKERS *by H. Brand* . . . A TALK WITH VICTOR REUTHER . . . DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN THE MINERS' UNION *by Paul F. Clark* . . . BLACK POLITICS IN BROOKLYN *by Jim Sleeper* . . . REAGAN'S DISASTERS IN CENTRAL AMERICA *by Juan E. Corradi*

156 COPING WITH RECESSION
Gar Alperovitz, Kenneth J. Arrow, Douglas Fraser, Victor Gotbaum, Robert Heilbroner, Robert Lekachman, Leon Shull and Patricia Cohen, Gus Tyler

ARTICLES

165 MITTERRAND's FIRST TWO YEARS
by Lewis Coser

170 THE BISHOPS AND THE BOMB
by John C. Cort; Peter Steinfels

177 INDUSTRIALIZING OUR UNIVERSITIES
by Irwin Stark

183 AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY: ACT TWO
by Frank Hearn, Michael Mertens, Jamie Faricellia

190 EVE AND THE NEW JERUSALEM
by Barbara Taylor

199 SOME PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY
by Iring Fetscher

209 POLAND: MUST HISTORY REPEAT ITSELF?
by Lukacz Socha

217 THE AGONIES OF ABERTURA IN BRAZIL
by Mark J. Osiel

224 BREZHNEV: A BUREAUCRAT'S PROFILE
by Roy Medvedev

NOTEBOOK

234 GRAYING OF THE INTELLECTUALS *by Russell Jacoby* . . . WHO KILLED CARLO TRESCA? *by Emanuel Geltman* . . . REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE *by A. J. Liehm* . . . SOLIDARITY AT WORK IN PARIS *by Tony Levitas* . . . AFGHAN RESISTANCE *by Cheryl Benard*

COMMUNICATIONS

247 FEMINISM, COMMUNITY, FREEDOM
by Marshall Berman; Jean Bethke Elshtain Replies

BOOKS

256 REVIEWS *by Joseph Clark, Peter Gay, Murray Hausknecht, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein*

270 **LETTERS**

216 AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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Luther Carpenter

Reagan's Reactionary Budget

We are now in the middle of the battle over the 1984 budget. The president is browbeating us to "stay the course"; we have to derail him. Our job is not only to restore the services he would cut but to demand economic development, jobs, and the satisfaction of human needs.

Reagan's supporters have tried to create the impression that this budget is "realistic" and "reasonable." It is—but only if you compare it with the loony fantasies that had been floating around the White House, such as taxing unemployment benefits or eliminating corporate income taxes. As my father used to say, "Praise God for small mercies." From the standpoint of reducing unemployment or giving ordinary people a chance to get ahead and social services when they need them, the budget is ridiculous.

There are plenty of specific new horrors in this budget. There is the attack on several nutrition programs, including school lunches. There is the proposal to end AFDC payments when a child reaches 16. (Sure, states will be allowed to continue benefits for a child in secondary or trade school—*if* they can find the money. Big concession!) Has anyone at the White House even glanced at teenage and young adult unemployment? "Let 'em take to the streets" is the unmistakable message here.

If poor and marginal-income people still persist foolishly in trying to get ahead, they will run into another cut (which the budget disguises as an increase). Low-income students will have to lay out more money before qualifying for college tuition assistance. Those who do persist will get more money, if they go to more expensive (that is, private) colleges. It's good for those schools, and it reduces the numbers who can try to get ahead, thus cutting down the competition for good jobs.

We should also be angry at the effort, for the third year in a row, to shut down the Legal Services Corporation. Why should poor people know their rights? Public transportation, Food Stamps, Medicaid—the list goes on and on. By the time you read this, we will have discovered still more enormities hidden in the fine print.

Restoring what the Administration has cut will only begin to address the inhumanity of the budget. Like its predecessors, this budget is part of a grand design to build a Hollywood set of the 1920s: a triumphant plutocratic class, a harassed work force grateful for what it is allowed to get, and an underclass whose existence is a grim warning to the rest of us. The flip side of the vision—military supremacy—may also derive from Reagan's rose-colored memories: an America that doesn't have to relate to other countries as equals. To actualize these fantasies, the Administration continues to destroy the capacity of the federal government to meet human needs and stimulate balanced growth. It reduces progressive taxes and increases regressive ones, shifting the burden ever more from the property-owning to the working population. And it continues to transfer money from social spending to military overkill.

On the revenue side, we have the new horror of the standby taxes to resist. They are such a dangerous abdication of the powers of Congress that senatorial conservatives will probably block them.

Dissent Fund Drive

We are pleased to announce that the final tally for the biannual *Dissent* Fund Drive, now completed, is $51,312. This comes to some $11,000 more than our original goal. The increment will help us to improve the quality of the magazine and to extend its reach.

We thank our friends.

THE EDITORS

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Our real need is to block the third year of Reagan's tax cut. This should be possible; even Reagan's standby proposal for an income tax surcharge confesses that his tax cuts damaged the government without generating growth. In addition, we have to block any increases in Social Security tax rates, and all his efforts to shred the tax structure with new loopholes. This year's proposals include tuition tax credits and an IRA for educational expenses. If Reagan really wanted to aid education (instead of just giving a break to the wealthy and the middle class), an equivalent amount in direct assistance to schools would be more effective.

Next, we need to scale down the military budget. Congressman Ronald V. Dellums has shown us how to do it. He drafted an alternate military budget last year, HR 6696, which he plans to resubmit. Dellums's budget would eliminate most new weapons systems, including the MX and cruise missiles, the B-1 bomber, and new nuclear carriers. Since most military expenditures are personnel costs, Dellums proposed a 5 percent reduction in all U.S. military personnel.

Dellums estimated that his alternate military budget would have saved $50 billion in fiscal 1983; it would save more in fiscal 1984 because the big expansions of arms procurement are just beginning to show up in the budget. Add to that the savings from blocking the third year of the tax cut—some $76 billion, according to the Conference of Mayors—and there will be a sizable amount of money to transfer back to useful spending.

Simply blocking this year's cuts won't be enough. Previous cuts already have crippled state and local governments and injured people. Malnutrition is rising, old industrial areas continue to decay, and people who used educational facilities and Food Stamps to rise above poverty have been shoved back. The "recovery" that Reagan keeps prophesying won't begin to undo the damage even if it does occur; it will only benefit the fortunate. *Even the Administration predicts an average unemployment rate of 10.1 percent for fiscal 1984.*

IN AMENDING THIS BUDGET, we'll have to concentrate on those public expenditures that we can really increase. The Reaganites' control of the executive branch means that they will sabotage programs wherever possible. To gauge their obsessiveness, just look at Anne Gorsuch's refusal to spend money that Congress appropriated to clean up toxic wastes. For this reason, we may not be able to expand OSHA or many other valuable programs. Instead, our first priority must be to get extra funds to jurisdictions that the Reaganites don't control—state and local governments and entitlement programs.

The "emergency urban recovery" package put forth by the Conference of Mayors provides a good starting point. Totalling $31.5 billion, it includes $7.5 billion in general revenue-sharing. Liberals have preferred categorical grants that restricted funds to particular purposes, but the Reaganites just will refuse to pass along the funds from categorical grants administered by executive agencies. The mayors' package also included $2 billion in special financial assistance to cities with unemployment rates above 6 percent. Since most cities qualify for special financial assistance, a separate fund makes little sense. We should combine these funds and make unemployment rates and AFDC rates part of the criteria for allocating revenue-sharing, to concentrate the effect on the hardest-hit areas. It's important to make these amounts large enough to permit expansion of municipal hiring as well as to prevent the firings and job attrition that cities and states are planning to meet their own budget deficits—deficits caused by depression and by previous cuts in federal aid.

The Conference of Mayors asked for $5 billion for the Community Development Block Grant program and $10 billion for rebuilding streets, bridges, and water and sewer lines. The need for both is obvious, as direct creators of jobs and as prerequisites for maintaining and creating jobs in manufacturing and trade. There must be a requirement to hire minority workers in these programs.

Such proposals are pretty moderate. The Conference of Mayors stopped short of demanding the full rebuilding of cities, including restoring abandoned housing and public housing, but we should raise this issue again. And we certainly can't be satisfied with the Democratic leadership's even more modest proposal for public-service jobs. In the first account of this proposal, jobs were restricted to federal buildings and parks, and the amounts were small. The Democratic leadership's proposal could supplement the mayors' package; it can't substitute for it.

Many entitlement programs, such as AFDC and Food Stamps, are administered by state and local governments and could easily be expanded to alleviate hardship and increase purchasing power. It is especially important to set national minima for payments to individuals under these programs, since many states pay very little in AFDC, and to try to restore the working poor to their rolls. Another scandalous gap in an entitlement program is the fact that only 4 out of every 10 unemployed workers now receive unemployment benefits!

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YOU WILL HAVE NOTICED that I have not used the size of the federal deficit as a factor in making these recommendations. There are two real reasons for concerning ourselves with the size of the deficit. One is that it must be covered by borrowing, and that involves paying interest. The second is the Keynesian multiplier effect, which is a reason for having a large deficit in a stagnant economy. Yet even this point mustn't be emphasized too much. The job-creating effect of the federal budget depends as much on what (and where) federal money is spent (especially if it's spent on civilian jobs instead of on defense) as on the size of the deficit.

Most of the outcry over the deficit is spurious, manufactured by the Administration to conceal its assault on the American people. Reagan has created the deficit with his tax cuts, expanded it with his military expenditures, then whipped up the chorus of moaning financiers. In turn, we are supposed to appease the financiers with new social-service cuts and new taxes (levied, of course, mainly on working people). But a deficit of $189 billion or even $231 billion isn't inherently unreasonable when 12 million people are officially unemployed, and millions more discouraged from trying to find work. (In January 1983, unemployment declined by 500,000—but discouraged workers accounted for more than 300,000 of the decline! So I've continued to use the December 1982 figure.) Reagan doesn't find it unreasonable—as long as we don't use the deficit to finance human needs. Such a deficit won't "crowd out" productive investment, because corporations won't invest while more than 30 percent of their productive capacity is idle. If the deficit finally does provoke a Keynesian revival of the economy, then taxes will also revive, which will then cut the deficit so that "crowding out" won't occur. Therefore the Democrats should stop repeating this nonsense; they're just contributing to Reagan's invocation of magic numbers.

TO SUMMARIZE: We should try to save some $76 billion by canceling the third year of the tax cut; cut at least $50 billion from the military; and use this money to restore funds and increase aid to state and local governments and entitlement programs. This is an extremely moderate proposal, perhaps too moderate. At best, it will get us back to a budget like Carter's last one—hardly a radical document. In the infighting, we will also have to keep a close watch on the details of tax loopholes, program eligibilities, and formulas for distributing funds, to try to get this money to the depressed areas and victimized people that need it the most. □

H. Brand

A Growing Burden on the Workers

A central problem of the American economy has been its cyclical volatility. Swings of widening magnitude have dogged it since the mid-1960s. Industrial production—to take but one indicator—fell 12 percent in 1981–82, somewhat less than in 1974–75, but it persisted over a more extended period.

The drop repeated a steep if less extended decline in the spring of 1980. Furthermore, the cyclical peak in industrial production that was briefly reached in mid-1981 represented merely a short-lived recovery to levels last attained in early 1979. Whatever the "autonomous" sources of this volatility, it was primarily generated by monetary and financial policies, largely formulated by the Federal Reserve. Tightened credit was to bring about economic slowdown and raise unemployment, but political pressures eventually would induce stimulative fiscal and monetary measures, reinvigorating the economy and improving employment prospects. Thus there was a breach in the ruling consensus about economic policy. The Federal Reserve's premise in fighting inflation has always been that resources must be idled so as to deflate prices and wages. Congress, by taking expansionary action, would stymie the central bank's restrictive monetary measures, only to have such action undone by the bank. This breach in the consensus has been slowly bridged in the past two years. Cyclical volatility may therefore lessen, but a long span of

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stagnation, punctuated perhaps by minor business fluctuations, seems in the offing.

In the '70s it became ever more difficult to sustain these fluctuations of economic policy. Inasmuch as no attempt was made to control inflationary price rises administratively—except between 1971 and 1973—they have accelerated. Monetary policy was, of course, not designed to cope with the petroleum and feed-grain price hikes of those years. The banks rendered credit restrictions less effective by borrowing from international capital markets to finance domestic loans. Unemployment receded from its cyclical high in 1975 but was deliberately kept above 5 percent thereafter, and was allowed to rise in the late '70s and early '80s. This, too, failed to reduce the rate of inflation, notwithstanding much to-do about an "unemployment-inflation tradeoff."

Eventually, two developments strengthened the Federal Reserve's hand. One was the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, which virtually superseded the Employment Act of 1946 and in effect mandated that the fight against inflation be given priority over the creation of employment. The other was the growing size of the federal budget deficit in relation to the total supply of funds. This made it easier to put pressure on the banks' lending ability by simply not adjusting, or adjusting only partially, to the increased need for funds arising from the greater deficit. Because the Federal Reserve declined thus to "monetize" the debt, it "crowded out" business and households from the capital and money markets.

This "crowding-out" worries the Reagan administration, judging by its latest Economic Report (January 1983) and Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA). This worry is the main reason, says the Administration, for seeking to reduce the deficit, for "crowding-out" would retard the formation of new capital, depress living standards, and so on. The intention to strengthen capital formation has been at the core of President Reagan's economic program, and this has been the *raison d'être* for huge tax cuts and liberalized depreciation set-asides.

The Federal Reserve, however, has virtually dismissed this concern. According to H. C. Wallich, a senior member of the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors, "A study made by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board suggests that the present capital stock is not seriously inadequate and that a higher rate of saving and investment than has prevailed on average in the past would not yield large benefits." This finding sustains the Federal Reserve's intent not to "monetize" the federal debt, and to keep credit tight until price stability has been ensured. This position, of course, represents a source of potential dissension between the Reagan administration and the Federal Reserve.

Overriding this possible difference, however, is the Administration's endorsement of Federal Reserve policy as being in accord with "the fundamental guiding principle in an inflationary economy [of] a gradual reduction in the rate of growth of the money stock until the rate is consistent with price stability."

In judging the effectiveness of monetary policy, all we need to remember is that the dependence of government, business, and households upon external funding has greatly increased in recent decades and, as the "crowding-out" thesis also suggests, this has placed great power in the hands of the Federal Reserve. The Administration's endorsement of Federal Reserve policy is in harmony with its intention to reduce wage levels. This intention can be readily inferred from numerous actions and from many statements that occur in the Economic Report. The present CEA (which represents the official Administration view) associates inflation with a "threshold" rate of unemployment, estimating it to lie now between 6 percent and 7 percent. Below this threshold rate, it is said, inflationary wage claims would ensue, pushing up prices.

If, as the CEA writes, in recent months "the momentum of high inflation built over the past 15 years was broken, and inflation was reduced to its lowest rate in a decade," this simply demonstrates that inflation can indeed be broken if unemployment rises high enough, long enough. To avoid "an [economic] expansion so rapid as to lead to rapidly increasing inflation," the CEA would brake too rapid a decline in the unemployment rate—it would not permit unemployment to drop below 6 percent. This is indicated by its projections, according to which an unemployment rate in excess of 8 percent of the civilian labor force would prevail through 1986, and of well above 6 percent until 1988. These rates would be ensured by a restrictive monetary policy.

THE MAINTENANCE of unemployment rates above an assumed inflation threshold represents but one of a number of measures designed to moderate or even depress wage standards. It should be regarded as part of a broader program that includes, either explicitly or by implication, reductions in the minimum wage; reductions in unemployment insurance payments and a narrowing in eligibility standards; cuts in aid to workers hurt by imports (already enacted); and advocacy of free trade—meaning

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endorsement of unrestricted imports without, however, protecting workers or regions losing jobs and income, except by retraining efforts (which usually do not begin to meet older workers' needs).

The CEA speaks of both cyclical and structural unemployment. The former results from a cyclical decline in economic activity, and thus arises from identifiable social causes. Structural unemployment is defined as a residual that persists in periods of cyclical recovery. The CEA relates it to personal and demographic characteristics. For example, unemployment among youth is attributed to lack of work experience (also to the existence of the minimum wage), while long-term unemployment is laid to workers' frequent unwillingness to relocate and accept lower wages. The CEA's definition of structural unemployment obscures social causes. Among these would be job displacement from technological change, changes in product design, the lack of institutional bridges between school and work. These factors have remained unexamined since the Automation Commission's reports in the mid-'60s. Still, the concept of structural unemployment is of value despite the shallow definition the CEA gives it.

Both ends of the American political spectrum have had an interest in promoting a structural analysis of unemployment and policy approaches concerning unemployment. For the liberal left, such an analysis enables an emphasis on institutions that protect jobs or, failing that, workers' income and social status. Thus economic and industrial planning would be designed to alleviate structural unemployment. The conservative right, which has usually rejected such planning, views structural analysis as an aid in the effort to lighten the burden

Starving Our States and Cities

The following is taken from a first-rate, detailed report issued by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (Gerald McEntee, president) and the Public Employee Department, AFL-CIO (John Leyden, executive director):

State and local governments are facing a financial squeeze of a size and scope unknown since the Great Depression. The impact of the current recession on state and local revenues has been compounded by severe reductions in federal assistance to state and local governments.

THE RESULT: FISCAL CHAOS. . . .

- The National Governors' Association reports that states will run deficits totaling $2 billion by the end of this state Fiscal Year (June 30).
- The U.S. Conference of Mayors reports that its member-cities could meet no more than 43 percent of the overall demand for emergency services in FY '82.
- Congress's Joint Economic Committee reports that cities it surveyed realized only 60 percent of the spending they had budgeted for capital purposes in 1981.
- Data Resources, Inc. forecasts that construction spending by state and local governments will fall 5.5 percent in 1983, following declines of 9.4 percent and 8.6 percent in 1981 and 1982, respectively.

THIS REPORT documents for the first time the full extent of Reagan's cuts in federal aid to state and local governments for vital social programs:

- Since 1981 state and local governments have suffered *$57 billion* in federal cuts.
- Key programs such as employment and training, community services, Center for Disease Control, and economic development have been cut by more than 50 percent.
- Losses in federal aid have grown every year and by 1985, if current spending continues, federal aid to states will fall to pre-Great Society levels.

These cuts—plus higher federal deficits—are the price the Reagan administration has chosen to pay for huge tax cuts for the wealthy and an unprecedented peacetime military buildup. The lesson of the past two years is that this price is too high—in terms of both macroeconomic performance and the standards of living of millions of Americans. . . .

President Reagan is well on his way to achieving a historic shift of resources under the guise of New Federalism. His latest budget will show even more evidence of his plan to gradually end the federal role in a wide array of health, nutrition, education, training, income maintenance, social services, and infrastructure programs. All of this cutting, however, will not reduce the size of government by one iota—nor will it cut significantly into the deficit. Instead, it will be used to purchase military hardware and further line the pockets of the wealthy. □

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of macroeconomic policies and their inevitable inflationary impact when they address cyclical recovery—and as an aid in the effort to achieve less wage "rigidity" through increasing the supply of trained labor. The CEA's proposals are in line with such conservative thinking.

To begin with, the CEA opposes efforts to reduce cyclical unemployment through public works programs. It believes that "the only way" to relieve such unemployment is "to achieve a sound recovery from the recent recession." What it means by "sound" we have discussed above.

The CEA protests that it does not regard high-threshold unemployment rates—a large component of which it considers to be structural—as "desirable" or "inevitable." But how would it lower them? It favors more training programs, such as those being financed under the Job Training Partnership Act. How seriously this Act is taken by the Reagan people may be judged by the trivial amount allotted to it in the 1984 budget ($1.9 billion)—a cut of 22 percent from parallel expenditure in the current fiscal year. The CEA would also modify unemployment insurance so as to mitigate its supposed "disincentive" effects—which in practice would mean greater pressure on workers to accept lower-paying and unsuitable jobs. Unemployment compensation, writes the CEA, "seems to have increased the incidence and duration of unemployment" by producing "adverse incentive effects. Such payments reduce the economic pressure to find work immediately, encouraging a longer period of job search during which the unemployed worker hopes to find a more attractive job than might otherwise be found." This, of course, is written in an antagonistic spirit. The writers have forgotten that unemployment insurance is paid the worker as a matter of right, and is intended to sustain his dignity.

THE ECONOMIC REPORT contains a table showing that the median income of a family with both husband and wife working was $31,600 in 1981, but this was reduced to $23,000 if one of them became unemployed for less than 26 weeks and to $17,000 if unemployed for more than 26 weeks. The corresponding 1981 figures are $25,000 median income for a family in which only the husband works; but if he was unemployed for less than 26 weeks, income fell to $16,500 and if unemployed for more

Staying the Course with the Neocons

Like most people in this country who try to know what's going on, we get our news from the *New York Times*. Over a period of weeks, from late December 1982 to mid-January 1983, we clipped a few items:

December 28, 1982: Lead story on Bethlehem Steel closing its plant in Lackawanna, N.Y., leaving almost 8,000 workers jobless. A headline: "California Weighs End of Free College Education." Report from Patterson, N.J., that its entire library system has been closed down for lack of funds.

January 3, 1983: Report from Pittsburgh that Sheriff Eugene Coon of Allegheny County has withdrawn 42 private homes from a list of properties to be foreclosed. "I guess I'll be hearing from some banks," said the humane sheriff.

January 8, 1983: Dispatch from Detroit that the United Automobile Workers and General Motors have joined to provide food parcels for the unemployed.

January 10, 1983: Anthony Lewis writes: "Last year [1982] one million children from low-income families dropped out of the Federal School Lunch Program. Many could not afford the higher prices schools were forced to charge when the Reagan administration cut the federal contribution. Others, so poor that they could have had their lunches free, found that their schools had given up the program because of new federal Regulations."

January 16, 1983: Report from Jamestown, North Dakota: "All across the farm states, there is mounting alarm that the depressed state of the country's agricultural economy is going to reap a grave harvest of failures and foreclosures this year. As a result, farmers, state officials and legislators speak darkly of mounting anger, frustration and militancy among those who may be forced to sell out farmland that, in some cases, their families homesteaded a century ago."

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THESE ITEMS could be multiplied many times. They might lead a dispassionate observer to conclude that this country is in deep trouble. They might lead an *extremist* to conclude that American capitalism isn't working quite as well as its defenders claim.

But others know better. In *Commentary*, the magazine sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, we read in the January 1983 issue in an article by James Nuechterlein, a professor from Valparaiso University, that "If Reagan can keep his ideological instincts as his servant and not his master . . . he could become the most successful American President in half a century."

We rubbed our eyes: no, we hand't misread, that's what it says.

DISSENTER □

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than 26 weeks, to $10,200. Is this not sufficient evidence to make a mockery of the claim that unemployment payments create "disincentives" to work? In 1982 only about 44 percent of the average weekly wage paid by business was replaced, for the jobless, by unemployment insurance. Yet the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation has urged a replacement ratio of 66 percent. All of which suggests that the CEA remarks about "disincentives" are little more than a slur on American workers.

The downward pressure on wage levels that will in time result from these policies, together with ongoing and proposed reductions in income maintenance payments, will no doubt drive down labor costs. The rate of unit labor cost already has shrunk. Layoffs and labor-saving changes in the production process are bound to improve labor productivity—also now under way. However, tax cuts that were supposed to favor capital investment have yet to offset continued high interest rates, and it is doubtful that these cuts can be sustained in view of the high budget deficits. Capital investment will therefore continue to lag. More important, lowering wages stifles expansion of consumer spending, upon which at least three-fifths of the national product still depend. The deflationary policies of the Reagan administration greatly burden the American working people, and no fundamental relief from this burden seems in sight. □

A Talk with Victor Reuther

The Automobile Workers Union (UAW) will be holding its convention this May in Dallas; we expect to have a report in our next issue. Meanwhile, we print below excerpts from a conversation recently held in Washington, D.C., between Irving Howe and Victor Reuther, one of the pioneer leaders of the union. — EDS.

IRVING HOWE: The UAW seems to be approaching a major turning point. When Douglas Fraser retires as president this spring, it will mark the end of the immediate presence of what has come to be known as the Reuther group—that is, those who were around Walter Reuther in the days when he helped organize the UAW and later when he became president. What would you say has been the main characteristic or outlook of this group?

VICTOR REUTHER: The customary, and correct, answer is: a commitment to social unionism, a break with simple nickel-and-dime bargaining. From the early 1930s on it was clear to the UAW leadership that it had to become something more than just an agency for collective bargaining. It had to be a social force identifying itself with minority groups, it had to play an aggressive role in fighting for social legislation; it had to become a political force. In a sense, it had to turn the union movement into a segment of a larger, progressive movement. Both Doug Fraser and his likely successor, Owen Bieber, are committed to that outlook.

I.H.: Would you say that this outlook is as strong in the UAW today as it was some years back?

V.R.: To be honest, not at present, but potentially, yes! And the reason is that the UAW, as everyone knows, is simply overwhelmed with the difficulties caused by recession—in Michigan it's no recession, it's depression. The desperateness of the situation makes it hard to engage in the basic education that's required for keeping alive the early UAW tradition—people are scrambling for survival, and some sections of the union are succumbing to a crude protectionism. Mind you, there is a strong case for the "local contents bill" that the UAW is supporting; but I think it's bad when a UAW member in Flint publicly smashes up a Japanese car—or those bumper stickers that some auto workers are showing. . . . The truth is that the American auto industry, which refused for years to make small cars, is more responsible for the mess we're in than the Japanese.

The UAW leadership has been so overwhelmed and distracted by the current crisis, it hasn't, perhaps, presented its case to the public as forcefully as it could. I'm not trying to second-guess Doug Fraser, who is a fine and able man. But I think that if economic concessions are unavoidable, then efforts should be made to press for noneco-

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nomic gains that would enlarge the union's role in corporate decision-making, so as to protect our members from plant runaways and corporate investments overseas.

I.H.: I think you're suggesting that with the sheer passage of time, as a result of inevitable erosion and not because it's anyone's fault, there's been a weakening of the Reuther tradition?

V.R.: Yes, some of that is inevitable.

I.H.: It's happened?

V.R.: It's happened. And everyone anticipated that it would. You'll recall that when Doug was elected he said his main job would be to prepare a transition of leadership. But he was swamped by this terrible economic situation and couldn't give enough time to the inner life of the union. And I think Doug would be the first to admit that he had to yield in a number of situations to local pressures from regions of the union, and this has resulted in the kind of leadership that's called "noncontroversial," which means non-leadership.

A certain amount of the union's early idealism has been lost—inevitably. And it takes time to create a new secondary leadership: you don't acquire the kind of influence needed for leadership in such an enormous organization in just a few years.

So I'd say, yes, the tradition is still there, but special efforts will now have to be made to keep it alive and strong. It won't just survive on its own.

I.H.: You fellows—the Reuther brothers, Emil Mazey, George Edwards, other UAW leaders—left the socialist movement in the late 1930s; but it clearly marked your whole life. I mean, the way you talked and worked, the way Walter made a speech. . . .

V.R.: It was more than just a formative influence. While we may not have found much help from whatever little remained of the socialist movement in America, we were able to maintain strong contacts with the European social democrats, whose gains kept our hopes alive!

I.H.: The new UAW leaders seem to be good, serious, talented people. But they don't, they can't have your kind of background. Isn't there a loss? I don't mean to suggest that American socialism serves as a kind of prep school for people who then do things in unions and politics—well, of course, it *has* served as that; but I hope it's more than that. In any case, isn't there a loss, a certain narrowing-down of experience?

V.R.: Absolutely. I look back on my early involvement with the socialist youth movement as a tremendous training experience, a marvelous opportunity to open my eyes to broader social horizons. Still, there's the fact that when the current Spanish Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez came to the United States he was hosted by the UAW—this tells you that a certain framework of relations has been set. I expect Owen Bieber to get along well with the new social democratic leaders of Western Europe.

I.H.: The new UAW leadership faces terrible problems—I can almost imagine Doug Fraser is relieved to be getting out. There seems no way out of these new difficulties through traditional union strategies. . . .

V.R.: You can sweeten welfare-state provisions, but there's no substitute for a vigorous jobs program and meaningful tax reform programs to build up investments that would create new industries and jobs. But that requires a political movement with greater vision than either Republicans or Democrats are now showing. But the trade unions now are moving toward greater political effectiveness. The Solidarity Demonstration was a big step forward.

I.H.: So it looks as if the idea of social unionism has to be picked up again and given a stronger social democratic component.

V.R.: Yes! But we do not start from scratch. The labor movement is strong in numbers and material resources. But it needs clear ideas of how to cope with structural economic problems. This requires a much higher degree of socioeconomic planning (with, I hope, popular democratic controls) than most unionists conceived of in the past.

I.H.: One last question, maybe one that's a little irksome. Look, you fellows in the Reuther tendency began in the socialist movement. Now you, Victor, and some of the others have rejoined it—but only after retirement. But if that's the pattern, we're never going to get anywhere—socialism only for the young and the retired? It ought to be possible for good trade unionists publicly to be socialists as for many decades, from the time of Debs to the time of Norman Thomas, it was possible. I grant you that a kind of socialist sectarianism in the late '30s, when the Socialist party was trying to be "revolutionary," drove unionists out of the movement. And there were pressures from the top CIO leadership. But a new generation is coming along—with some socialist inclinations. Isn't there a way to establish harmony, or at least détente, between the democratic socialists and the progressive unionists?

V.R.: Progressive unionists today are not inclined to shy away from a democratic socialist relationship. The success of our union brothers in Canada in the New Democratic party (a socialist party),

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the victories of European socialists in France, Sweden, Austria, Spain, and Greece, plus the fact that a new generation of union leaders is searching for answers that they have not found in the old parties—all this creates a new and more favorable climate for a democratic socialist education. It would be good if a Brookwood labor college were on the scene today. . . .

I.H.: Yes, it was started pretty much by people on the left. . . .

V.R.: Yes, people from the garment and the mine workers' unions. And then its graduates went right into CIO organizing; they were valuable people. Such a school is badly needed by the unions. It would be a way of keeping the tradition alive and cementing new alliances between the democratic left and the unions. The money for it is there, all that's needed is someone to give it a push—a new center for training union leaders, for exchanging political and social ideas, for bringing unionists and intellectuals together—a center for broadcasting our political coalition, so essential for democratic political gains. . . . □

Paul F. Clark

Democratic Reform in the Miners' Union

On December 22, 1972, Arnold Miller and other members of the Miners For Democracy (MFD) reform slate were sworn in as new officers of the United Mine Workers of America (UMW). Exactly ten years later, on December 22, 1982, Richard Trumka and his slate of challengers took the same oath of office as elected leaders of the miners' union. Few leaders of the MFD movement were present and there was little talk of democratic reform or of giving the union back to the membership. The absence of these men was indeed an irony, since the election of Richard Trumka as president of the UMW is nothing less than the legacy of the democratic reform movement that swept through the mineworkers' union in the 1970s.

The UMW has a long and rich history dating back to its founding in 1890. It was not until the 1930s, however, that the UMW, under the leadership of John L. Lewis, became a significant force in the labor movement. During the 40 years of John L. Lewis's presidency, the UMW won significant gains for its members and Lewis became a revered figure among American coal miners. Many of today's miners still talk of growing up in households where pictures of the holy trinity—Jesus, FDR, and John L.—hung over the mantle. Lewis's achievements, however, were not without cost. UMW members surrendered a great deal of control over their union by gradually permitting Lewis to centralize power in his office. When Lewis stepped down in 1960, the far less capable men who succeeded him coveted and seized the same unchallenged power. Unfortunately, this power was used more effectively to enrich the leadership than to improve the lives of coal miners.

This abuse spawned a movement to return control of the union to the membership. The movement was initially led by former Lewis loyalist Jock Yablonski, who challenged Tony Boyle for the UMW presidency in 1969. In an election that would later be overturned by the Department of Labor because of massive irregularities committed by the incumbent, Yablonski was declared defeated. Twenty-two days later, on December 31, 1969, gunmen entered the Yablonski home in Clarksville, Pennsylvania, and murdered Jock Yablonski, his wife, and their daughter as they lay in their beds. An investigation would later confirm that the gunmen were hired by Tony Boyle.

At Yablonski's funeral, the miners who had worked with him formed the Miners For Democracy (MFD) to carry on the struggle he had begun. The MFD nominated a slate of candidates to oppose Boyle in a court-ordered election. Led by black-lung activist Arnold Miller, the MFD ticket defeated the incumbent Boyle and moved into UMW headquarters in December 1972. While the

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MFD election was indeed a significant achievement, the task it faced in rebuilding the UMW into a democratic labor organization was an even more formidable challenge.

The MFD ticket was elected on a reform platform that called for the reestablishment of democratic procedures that would return control of the union to the membership and force the leadership to be more responsive. In its early days in office, the reform administration moved to restore the right of UMW members to elect their district officials, a practice that had been largely discontinued when previous administrations placed the districts in trusteeships and appointed their officers. Now these district elections were conducted under new guidelines designed to insure miners a fair opportunity to elect their leaders. Supervision of elections by elected union tellers, equal use of the union's official publication by all candidates for International office, a bona fide appeals process, and voting at the mine site, all helped to make subsequent UMW elections legitimate exercises in union democracy.

The new leadership, recognizing that top-down reform was beyond a point inconsistent with the principles of democratic unionism, moved quickly to involve the rank and file in the reshaping of their union. The union's constitutional convention was seen as the mechanism that could best serve this function. The convention mechanism, which had been a largely orchestrated, pro-forma affair under John L. Lewis and Tony Boyle, was badly in need of reform. Toward this end, the delegate selection process, the convention committee system, and the rules by which the convention was governed were revamped to insure that the convention would truly be a representative forum. Given the opportunity, the delegates to the 1973 and 1976 conventions made significant changes in union structure and policy, laying the foundation for democratic unionism. Among the measures taken were provisions to place tight control over the International's power to bring a district or local under trusteeship; steps to insure honest elections at all levels of the union; and guidelines delineating the powers and responsibilities of elected union officials. Importantly, these changes were made by UMW members in what one veteran of UMW conventions testified were "the most open and democratic conventions I have ever attended."

Under previous administrations, the union leadership had bargained for and signed contracts with

A Few Words from Lane Kirkland

. . . The list of real national and human problems that were answered only when the federal government got "on our backs" could be extended at tedious length, but let it just be noted that while they profited handsomely from federal action, neither the states nor private industry rose to meet those occasions.

Over the years between then and now [from the 1930s till today], democratic government has safely steered this nation through social revolutions that no other nation has managed peacefully or so well. From a not-too-distant day of local lynch law and a pattern of racial apartheid every bit as brutal as that of South Africa, we have approached the goal of full and equal rights and opportunities. The American people should be proud, rather than contemptuous, of the role of their government in that achievement.

In those same years, the rise of free trade unionism has effected another quiet but profound revolution, one that has enhanced—in ways perhaps unrecognized—the lives of all of you here. The students of this college may well be part of the first generation in the history of man on earth for whom the necessity of working for somebody else will occupy the lesser part of your total lifespan.

I do not mean to scorn the work ethic or to suggest that it has waned. But let us not glorify it unduly. As a friend of mine in the Caribbean trade union movement once put it: "If hard work were really such a great thing, the rich would have kept it all to themselves."

Largely through trade union collective bargaining and legislative endeavors, working hours have been reduced, paid leisure time gained and expanded, family incomes raised, educational opportunities broadened, and earlier pensions gained. As a consequence, the average age of entry into the work force has been delayed significantly and the time of voluntary exit advanced.

The evolution of trade unionism in my lifetime has brought about the democratization of privilege—that is to say, of education, leisure, travel, good health care and housing, and other advantages for centuries reserved for the few—to an extent previously unknown in history. That process, in turn, has created new industries, services, markets and opportunities for enterprise.

Can anyone reasonably hold that these advances, these revolutions of our time, have impaired rather than enhanced the capacity of man

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little or no input from the membership. Lewis once justified this "imperial bargaining" arrangement by declaring that ". . . I [Lewis] know more about the problems of miners than anyone else." Few people argued the point. But Lewis's leadership had ended, and many had come to realize that if the union's bargaining strategies were going to reflect the sentiments of the rank and file, then the rank and file had to be involved in the process. The bargaining procedure created by the 1973 UMW convention embodied this thinking.

The procedure begins with rank-and-file miners electing representatives to a district bargaining conference that meets to transmit the sentiments of the membership to the next step in the procedure, the Bargaining Council. The Bargaining Council, which is composed of all district presidents and International Executive Board members, serves to advise the International officers and other members of the negotiating team on bargaining strategy. When an agreement is reached with the coal operators, the proposed contract starts back through the internal bargaining procedure—first requiring the approval of the Bargaining Council before being sent again to the district conferences for explanation and clarification.

The final step is ratification by all members covered by the agreement. This final step fulfills one of the basic promises of the MFD campaign by insuring that no miner would have to work under a contract he had not voted on. Although the results of this process have been mixed, the membership itself has made the hard decisions about whether a contract was acceptable or not. The UMW's bargaining procedure remains one of the most democratic in the American labor movement.

The transition to democratic unionism was not without problems. Not all of the membership, or leadership, supported the reform movement, and the new democratic framework, within which the union was governed, provided a forum for dissenters to openly make their case. In addition to the factionalism that resulted, the UMW experienced a dramatic increase in wildcat or unauthorized strikes during the reform administration's first term. These problems were compounded by the sometimes ineffective response of a still inexperienced leadership. Critics have fixed on these troubles as proof that democracy, as defined by the MFD, could not work in a union context, or that democratic reform had gone too far. In retrospect, these problems appear to be simply the growing

and woman to stand free and independent before the state or any other stronghold of power?

These are no mean achievements. They ought not to be undone. This is no time for retreat from the struggle for human betterment. Urgent new challenges and tasks await the prudent and measured invocation of the federal instrument.

Equal rights for women, especially those now so rapidly swelling the work force, is a goal whose time is long past due.

Concerted attention to the decaying infrastructure that supports our economic and community life must be organized and applied. Must active national concern await a string of tragedies? Must rotten bridges collapse under loaded school buses before work can begin?

If we are to preserve a measure of independence from coercion by foreign cartels and offer our youth brighter prospects than employment in the servicing of Atari games or the dispensing of junk food, the broad industrial base of this country must be reconstructed and modernized. The task must call for the cooperation of labor, management, and government in the development and execution of a sound national industrial policy.

If I have talked a little treason here, excuse me, but it goes with my territory.

Before I leave you in peace, let me address a canard that has dogged American labor for many years. It has found its way into textbooks, learned papers and baser prose, and may be no stranger here. It is the legend that our founder, Samuel Gompers, when asked what labor wanted, responded simply: "More." That has become a synonym for our alleged innocence of ideals, if not unbridled avarice, in the accepted wisdom.

A university group from the University of Maryland recently completed the task of copying and indexing all of Gompers' recorded papers and words. I asked them to find that quote and was informed that it did not exist. The only source from which it could have been derived was an item dated 1893, where Gompers declared:

> What does labor want? . . . We want more schoolhouses and less jails; more books and less arsenals; more learning and less vice; more constant work and less crime; more leisure and less greed; more justice and less revenge. . . .

On that, I am willing to stand.

— From an address by *Lane Kirkland*, AFL-CIO president, at Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H., October 4, 1982 □

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pains that any dramatic change is likely to entail. The process of learning significantly new roles could not be expected to proceed quickly or painlessly.

THE UMW IS GOING through a learning process. The union's 1982 elections, however, are evidence that substantial progress has been made. Most unions elect their top leadership at union conventions, thus denying the membership an opportunity to participate directly in choosing International officers. Even in the relatively few unions that conduct open membership elections for top union offices, challengers very often begin with an insurmountable disadvantage because the incumbent, in many cases, is able to mobilize the organization's resources on behalf of his reelection bid. These facts of life make serious efforts to unseat incumbent officers in major American unions rare events. The UMW election process was reshaped to provide opportunity for challenges to sitting officers.

The democratic process that allowed Richard Trumka to challenge and decisively defeat the incumbent UMW President Sam Church did not function without flaw. But it did provide UMW members with the opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with the existing leadership. The new leadership they chose, led by "a young, articulate miner-lawyer dressed in pinstripes, not overalls," captured the imagination of the media, which saw Trumka's image as incongruous with the stereotypical image of the coal miner. They missed the story. Without Jock Yablonski's initial challenge, without the MFD's election victory and, most important, without the democratic mechanisms put in place by the reform administration and the democratic consciousness raised in the process, the 1982 UMW elections would have been business as usual.

Richard Trumka's election challenge, his victory, and the opportunity he will have to head the UMW are the legacy of the reform movement that took control of the union exactly ten years earlier. It is a legacy that Trumka will be continually reminded of as UMW president. And it is a legacy that will insure that he will have lots of help in guiding the UMW through the difficult times ahead. □

Jim Sleeper

Black Politics in Brooklyn

Starker Choices, Higher Risks

Retiring Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm bowed out of central Brooklyn politics this winter for the halls of Mount Holyoke College, leaving behind the constituency of American and West Indian blacks whose "mother of the community" she'd been through 14 years of alternating hope and despair. The bitter, often violent campaign of the two state senators vying to succeed her marked the passing of an era; black Brooklyn in effect rejected the fiery yet ultimately accommodationist politics that had served Chisholm so well in the expanding but still fundamentally racist political economy of the '60s. The campaign drew national attention and its outcome has national implications, for neither Chisholm nor her more progressive successor Major Owens is without counterparts in black urban politics. Nor, alas, is there anything unique about Owens's formidably venal opponent, who was heavily favored to win and nearly stole the election.

Chisholm had lost touch with her constituents because her political persona had been molded in circumstances that no longer prevail. Among Brooklyn's 800,000 blacks, indicators of social distress—infant mortality, unemployment, welfare dependency, housing abandonment, truancy, alcoholism, drug addiction, crime—are edging upward again, both absolutely and in comparison with whites. Yet black demands for societal redress of deep collective hurts fall upon deaf ears. Instead,

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blacks hear exhortations to bootstrap responsibility and good behavior. Near the end of her tenure, Chisholm, too, found herself echoing such admonitions, although she knew them to be impolitic and empty for most of her constituents. Yet her own political language, steeped in the imagery of white guilt and moral passion, no longer had a receptive audience; stripped of the rhetoric of redress, she found herself with little to say.

There is another language Chisholm never learned—that of local black movements, tempered by past excesses, tackling concrete problems while reaching for electoral and economic coalitions across race lines. Under her nose, 42 churches in East Brooklyn hired Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation to build a "power organization" called, simply, East Brooklyn Churches. The group's extensive training efforts and early victories pried $12 million from parent church bodies and, through Brooklyn's Roman Catholic bishop, leveraged municipal aid to build 1,000 single-family row houses for lower- and moderate-income people on 15 abandoned blocks abutting viable schools, transit, and public housing in Brownsville and East New York. The churches' ability to organize 5,000 determined people outflanked Chisholm and other local politicians who'd clung to the white Democratic party machine of Brooklyn county leader Meade Esposito.

Whatever it may have done to politicize immigrant whites in days gone by, the Brooklyn Democratic organization has always expected its black and Hispanic politicians to keep their legislative seats and votes safe for the interests it serves. Its minority pols are to arouse as little passion as possible about realtors and other predators milking their communities with the machine's intimate connivance; in return, they're given patronage crumbs to sustain themselves in office amid general apathy. And the machine takes care of insurgencies through its control of the election apparatus, the courts, and (at times) the police.

Chisholm's unswerving if somewhat gloomy obeisance to the patronage/apathy model of political survival meant that she never seriously tackled her constituents' daily problems by challenging public agencies or patterns of private investment, as the churches are doing. Nor did she ever endorse a black reform candidate against a white machine favorite. And when Assemblyman Frank Barbaro's progressive coalition won broad black support against Ed Koch in the 1981 mayoral primary, Chisholm endorsed Koch at Esposito's behest, even though other Democratic organization blacks (including congressional colleague Charles Rangel) managed a discreet neutrality. Barbaro carried every black assembly district, winning a surprising 36 percent of the primary vote; the writing was on the wall, in the new language Chisholm hadn't mastered.

As an emissary to white liberal America, Chisholm did focus a rising moral ardor. Even in 1982 Brooklyn's blacks probably would have reelected, on a "Thanks for the Memories" ticket, the first black woman ever to run for president. But with white attention waning and new black voices rising, Chisholm couldn't translate her political past into a viable future. She'd mortgaged her political identity to the interests that had dammed the moral passion she'd once aroused; for the first time, the self-styled "mother of the community" stood accused of neglect and defeatism.

CHISHOLM'S UNDOING COINCIDED with setbacks for other urban black politicians—setbacks delivered, however, by white opponents and constituencies, as in the failed gubernatorial campaign of former Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley and in Carl McCall's dismal bid for lieutenant governor of the state of New York. Within black jurisdictions like Chisholm's, the question of how black politicians should respond to an apparently more hostile white society became a test of leadership.

The issue was joined in Brooklyn when State Senator Vander Beatty, the machine's choice to succeed Chisholm (she dutifully endorsed him), told the *New York Post* that his opponent and State Senate colleague Major Owens "talks black but sleeps white" (Owens's wife is white). Even when Beatty assured interracial audiences of his ability to "work with my friend Bishop Mugavero, with the Hasidim, and so on," his subtext for black listeners, embellished locally, was, in effect, Let me handle Whitey; you know he hates us, but I'll cop us what we need to get by.

Especially revealing were Beatty's denunciations of the "white power structure." When the press exposed his twelve-year reliance on vote fraud and misuse of state funds to further his career, he placed a full-page ad in the black weekly *Big Red*, proclaiming that "every time a strong-willed . . . not-for-sale Black leader arises, a white would-be 'nigger-breaker' [in this case the author of a press expose] is sent down from the 'big house' to break his will. . . . Now the neo-slavemasters have decreed that it is Senator Beatty's turn. . . ." The answer to charges of corruption was simple: first whites shut us out, push us into a corner; then they come after us, picking us over with their prissy morality, while we're hustling to survive.

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Beatty thus cast his net, using hurts and fears black voters knew well. "He appeals to a lot of people in our community with larceny in their hearts," commented black former State Senator Waldaba Stewart; "the message is that since white society can't be redeemed, it might as well be ripped off." With his silver-gray Mercedes, bulging billfolds, and impressive connections, Beatty got that message across.

The irony is that the racial polarization Beatty fomented left all dealings with "Whitey" to him; behind closed doors, he dropped his antiwhite posturing and was a servant of the machine and its allies. For example, in the complex struggle between advocates of "community control" of schools and defenders of what amounts to United Federation of Teachers control of school districts in black areas, the generally progressive union threw its support to Beatty, a useful buffer against organized parent interests (extraneous militants have long departed the scene). The UFT gave Beatty money, campaign workers, and phone banks because he'd seized control of two local school boards (through thuggery and vote fraud of which his wife and top aide were convicted in 1973 and 1978); Beatty's boards dutifully voted for hirings and promotions of school personnel designated by the UFT chapter chairmen despite frequent, often well-founded objections by parent groups.

Leaders of the Lubavitcher Hasidim of Crown Heights had allied themselves with Beatty through such notoriously corrupt antipoverty organizations as the Crown Heights Jewish Community Council since the 1960s; Beatty protected such operations in exchange for unwavering Hasidic support at the polls, and had several Hasidic leaders serve on his local school boards, though no Hasidic child attends public schools. In the '70s Beatty and Hasidic political leaders captured all federal housing rehabilitation funds for their area, and when some Hasidim were cited by the city and the federal government for harassing minority tenants, Beatty helped block a suspension of funds. Hasidic leaders enthusiastically supported Beatty for Congress.

Beatty also endeared himself to the sleazy slumlords and realtors who've done so much to immiserate blacks (and elderly Jews); he steered rehab work and low-interest loans to those real-estate entrepreneurs who were his heaviest contributors.

The New Alliance party, a pseudo-left group seeking the magical 50,000 statewide votes necessary for ballot status, gave Beatty its party designation and campaign workers. (NAP polled less than 5,000 votes statewide, owing partly to such

J. Edgar — They Led You Astray

After almost two years of sending letters to Army Intelligence, the FBI, and the State Department, requesting copies of whatever files they had about me under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act, I recently received a copy of a report addressed to "Honorable J. Edgar Hoover" by a G-2 (Army Intelligence) captain who interrogated me on my first day in the Army.

It is a curious report indeed. As I remember the day, the captain took so much time "interviewing" me that a call went out over the camp loudspeaker, "inductee Private Geltman is AWOL." The captain told me he was a professor of English, hence presumably able to take notes accurately. But there is such a loony mixture of fact and fancy that I'm inclined to believe the good captain was trying to introduce just enough "horror" to satisfy J. Edgar's lust without doing me any real harm. (Come to think of it, I never did get a promotion beyond Pfc., though I was put in for it several times. Can I ask for redress? Maybe become a post-hoc sergeant?)

The report reads: "Subject is well versed in his field, intelligent, and, strangely enough, not fanatical." (It's in there, and I'm not about to disagree.) It's also true that "this soldier began a remarkably active career in left activities while in New Utrecht High School." Also true, I opposed Stalin and Hitler, as he reports, and that when I was in the Socialist party I "advocated more radical views" (which, alas, we did in splitting the SP). It is not quite true that I worked for the weekly *Labor Action* for five years because *Labor Action* had been in existence less than three years at the time. My associate was one "Max Shankman," obviously Shachtman. He might also have been the "coeditor," except that the real one was Irving Howe. (The document has an unexplained asterisk here as in other places.)

Against all of which there is the invention that I was a member of the YCL in 1928; wrong, if for no other reason than that my application was rejected, with some threat of force, because I had been tainted with an early Trotskyist virus; nor did I organize a chapter of the American Student Union, if for no other reason than that the ASU wasn't organized until after I was out of college. And here's a howler: subject "speaks at peace demonstrations"—but not as a leader because the "Communists conducted them." He "was merely a

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strangely mixed "Third World" alliances as the one that aligned it with the Hasidim, the real estate community, Esposito, and the UFT.)

In short, to whites "needing" blacks, Beatty was "someone you can deal with." Where Chisholm had merely accommodated some special interests, Beatty actively melded them all into a juggernaut carrying him into the congressional race with $150,000 and (through Esposito) control of the election-day apparatus.

Beatty relied on white press apathy about the campaign—the common assumption that all "ghetto" politics is gutter politics. He also borrowed what he needed of militant separatist rhetoric to rally hard-pressed blacks, becoming the undisputed master of a hustle leading them away from enlightenment and empowerment. He was all execution, no program, a well-oiled gyroscope turning for any interest willing to cut a deal. "I care only that I have a *willing* candidate," said his campaign manager and Chisholm's mentor, Wesley MacD. Holder, the octagenarian dean of black machine politics in Brooklyn, "and I've never lost an election, never."

BEATTY, HOLDER, and their investors lost to a man who is virtually tone-deaf to the language of petty political reciprocity. Major Owens thinks "people have to get into the dirt of electoral politics" not only as candidates but as campaign workers and party activists. Although it's no substitute for more basic organizing, he maintains, formal democracy is "a critical weapon and shield. You have to organize the 51 percent who don't vote, not cater to the middle-class majority of those who do." To the dismay of his supporters, Owens isn't adept at "copping the little pieces." He thinks, rather, that as people learn to confront established power in staged, disciplined actions, they'll not only wrest more resources from its misspent wealth; they'll also wean themselves of the old dependencies Beatty and his backers manipulate so well. Owens carries these ideas with him a bit like a dusty preacher, stronger to bear witness than to execute.

Owens is an integrationist in the Martin Luther King tradition (he graduated from Morehouse College, King's alma mater, and is a librarian by profession). He wants a "monopoly tax" on powerful corporations and full development of cable television to provide jobs and programming for "a starved black audience." Undoubtedly, he will support Congressional Black Caucus budget intiatives.

The problem in a ghetto situation is that Beatty's kind of opportunism scrambles such principled

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silent participant." I speak and am silent. Now, anyone who knows me . . . well, ahem, knows how I tend to be "silent."

But here's the kicker, at the very end: "he believes that John L. Lewis's policies are justified and that the workers have a right to demand certain reforms at the expense of the war effort." That, my friends, was the heart of the interrogation, and a long one it was. About every 15 minutes, the captain would interrupt whatever he was questioning me about to ask, "Do you think the miners ought to strike?" I was taken aback the first time: "I'm not a coal miner. That's something for the miners to decide." So it went. While the captain took me through every year of my life since high school, he would stop, and again throw out the question about John L. Lewis. I gave, roughly, the same answer, sometimes sarcastically, sometimes humorously.

What's the relevance now? John L. is long gone; the miners and their union have had all manner of troubles. But how often the government and its agencies go hog wild in fear of a given union leader! Another time, it was Walter Reuther. In 1943, Lewis was the *bête noire*, and probably the man J. Edgar wanted to "get."

So, what's the moral? Several. Asked the same question today, I would have to give the same answer—union members have to make their own decisions. I now think I was dead wrong in opposing the war (hm, he doesn't record that, though I told him—being nice?), but I think I would say the same about the right to strike "for certain reforms."

And one further thought. Getting FBI, etc., files can be a waste of time. What do you do with them? Write a squib for *Dissent*? — E. G. □

P.S. Guess I have to be fair and report that I've since received a thick file from the FBI, covering a period from 1944, when I was still in the Army, to the end of the '50s, with 22 pages noted as withheld and more than half of the rest blacked out. I confess to a mild curiosity on what's blacked out, and a bit more about the cockroaches who served as "confidential informants." As for what I can read of the repetitive snoopery by the SAs (Special Agents), I have to laugh at their coup in getting four specimens of my handwriting; 20 wouldn't help them. In a frivolous moment I may return to this—for example, my "hostile and uncooperative" attitude. For now I must protest one outrage: I never, but never, used "Chubby" as an "alias." □

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thinking and is materially rewarded, undercutting broader-gauged efforts. "It's as if we're negotiating for a bakery for our community, and Vander Beatty marches in to demand a loaf of bread for himself," Owens reflects. The insult added to injury is that those holding out for longer-range coalitions and gains are "outside the system," "radicals." Even the *New York Times*, while endorsing Owens, called him "windy," while describing Beatty as "a pragmatic and successful politician" who, however, didn't quite have congressional stature. The irony is that Congress might have been more comfortable with Beatty.

Certainly, Owens offended Beatty's allies. As John Lindsay's antipoverty commissioner, he fought corruption in both the Hasidic and black communities. And as one of the more enlightened advocates of community control, he broke the UFT's grip on the Brownsville school board. Owens has fought slumlords as chair of Brooklyn CORE and organizer for the Metropolitan Council on Housing. He clearly prefers the East Brooklyn Churches' housing development plans to the lavishly subsidized schemes Beatty has brokered for realtors.

Not surprisingly, Beatty's allies made war on Owens, who found support mainly from liberals, public-service unions, and the black electoral Coalition for Empowerment that he and Assemblyman Albert Vann have been building since the '70s—a force credited with Barbaro's strong mayoral showing and Elizabeth Holtzman's victory over a machine candidate for Brooklyn District Attorney. But in the 1982 elections, Coalition members were divided, preoccupied with local candidacies. Some middle-class blacks and political pros in black Brooklyn's "better neighborhoods" even looked down on the "dreamer" from Brownsville and diverted their resources into Carl McCall's pointless bid for the symbolic post of lieutenant governor. Certainly, Owens's support was more than offset by the money, media time, and street power of Beatty's interests.

But press reports and talk shows exposed Beatty's record and brought the candidates together for debates, where Owens outshone his rival. And Congressman Charles Schumer, who'd represented many of the district's white voters before the recent reapportionment, helped win them (but not the Hasidim) for Owens.

And then, under pressure, Beatty overreached: he had Shirley Chisholm send a telegram to each voter claiming—falsely, as it turned out, though she would hardly have known it at the time—that Martin Luther King, Sr. had endorsed him. When the lie was exposed, an outraged John Conyers, founder of the Congressional Black Caucus, flew into town with Chicago colleague Gus Savage to campaign with Owens. Chisholm was disgraced, Beatty discredited. Even with machine loyalists presiding at the polls (which opened late in areas favorable to Owens), Owens won by 2,900 votes, a margin of 54-46 percent. A last-ditch effort by Beatty to overturn the election on the basis of fraud (his own forces had committed) was granted by Esposito's local judiciary—but blocked by the state's highest court only hours before a special rerun election was to have taken place.

WHAT ARE THE LESSONS of this watershed struggle?

- First, that it really isn't over. Owens faces a two-year struggle to secure his base against the inevitable machine challenge in 1984. After all, it was a court in Albany, a place Brooklynites will tell you is just this side of the moon, that rescued Owens. Back on earth, all the local officials who graciously accommodated Beatty's romp through the system in search of a rerun remain in the thrall of Esposito. They can be checked only by sustained mobilization of an informed constituency. (Beatty's indictment in late February for vote fraud in the congressional race does not impair the machine's ability to promote a less objectionable candidate to oppose Owens in two years.)
- This leads to a second lesson: we should have done with nostalgia for the putative blessings of urban political machines. In shrinking economies, they accelerate a logic of scarcity and submission, blighting democratic institutions and grinding people's expectations and breaking points to a smallness unimaginable to more fortunate outsiders. If they stay in power, they orchestrate governance and politics to benefit predatory interests; one survives only by playing along.
- Third, this perversion of political life feeds on racism. Through false messiahs like Beatty, it generates a reverse racism based on real resentments, beguiling blacks into a destructive isolation from any larger social agenda, an isolation mediated solely by the local leader through the machine. Beatty's victory would have brought a disastrous consolidation of the forces that foster division and darkness, a regression from even the tenuous mutuality Shirley Chisholm had tried to sustain in black-white relations.
- Fourth, Owens's victory, whatever he makes of it, is a profound tribute to the black electorate, which saw through the machine's encirclement and kept faith with the larger society. Blacks responded to a

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language that acknowledges their hurts in the deepest collective sense, but that also acknowledges a collective responsibility and need to reach beyond those hurts. Whether Owens can effectively focus that response in concrete efforts depends upon his ability to hire and retain talented staff; to learn the congressional ropes (as a minority member of the Democratic minority in the State Senate, he was legislatively powerless); and to establish working relationships with enlightened elements among the Hasidim and within the United Federation of Teachers, the real estate community, and other interest groups still active in the district.

Finally, the victory challenges whites to set aside warmed-over memories of Adam Clayton Powell and "battlin' Shirley from old Bed-Stuy" and to meet the new black coalition at least halfway. It's all too easy even for whites on the left to fall into Beatty's trap of seeing Owens as an "irresponsible radical" out of the '60s simply because Owens has told us some things we may not want to hear. We ought to listen. Black Brooklyn's repudiation of the patronage/apathy model of politics and of Beatty's formidably marketed appeals to real antisocial impulses was only a first step. But it was unprecedented at the congressional level in New York—and, given the odds, it was breathtaking. □

Juan E. Corradi

Reagan's Disasters in Central America

At mid-term, the bellicose momentum of the Reagan administration's policies toward Nicaragua, and toward Central America as a whole, has stalled. The reactionary impulse behind these policies (in the sense of an attempt to roll back change to the status quo ante) has never been disowned. To be sure, the charge that these policies are cruel, because they perpetuate and augment avoidable human suffering in little countries, does not disturb self-righteous officials and advisers; their values have not changed. What is beginning to give them pause is their own ineptness, the appearance of consequences they had not foreseen, the political impasse in which they have landed.

The world view that pervades this Administration in general, and the "theses" of Reagan's "latin-americanists" in particular, stand, under the pressure of events, exposed as a risky gamble. Regional and international realities have proved recalcitrant to their simplistic ideology. Political realities at home have changed significantly since 1981. Therefore there are reasons to expect that here, as in other domains, a pragmatic approach may be substituted for myth-making. Nevertheless, the danger of disaster still looms. First, because the realities may not suffice to dispel the myths, and second, because the commitment of massive resources to the wrong kind of policies may well trigger a process with its own dynamic.

Stemming the tide of insurrection in El Salvador and Guatemala, harassing the Sandinist regime in Nicaragua to the point of collapse were early concerns of Reagan's foreign policy. Central America and the Caribbean came to bear the burden of a new globalism defining world problems in terms of a confrontation between East and West—a contest the U.S. was likely to lose unless it reasserted its leadership. This meant trimming "social fat" and building "military muscle."

Foreign policy was made to serve the overriding goal of reasserting American dominance in the West and fighting the Communist threat everywhere. In the Hemisphere, the consequences of this new globalism were swift and nasty: a new willingness to befriend right-wing tyrannies; the replacement of human-rights rhetoric by the Georgetown newspeak; relaxation of controls over intelligence activities; larger transfers of hardware and know-how to the military establishments south of the border; the use of economic aid as a weapon; the dismissal of allied partnership in the formulation of global policies; plans for direct intervention in trouble spots. All these actions are dangerous corollaries of a Manichean outlook: they foster a trained

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incapacity to consider national situations in their own terms.

Reagan's latinamericanists have been mostly doctrinaires of the Kirkpatrick stripe with strong sympathies for authoritarian regimes. They believe hemispheric affairs are but a chapter in the general contest of the superpowers. They have chosen Central America and the Caribbean as a place for the U.S. to show who's boss. Toughness on the cheap, in one's own backyard, but with high symbolic yield worldwide, has been the centerpiece of Reagan's Hemispheric policy. As for the rest, U.S. interest in Latin America is construed as identical with easy access to strategic raw materials and business opportunity.

THE STRATEGIC MAP of Reagan's latinamericanists divides the region into three groups. First, the middle-range powers with sizable economic and military resources (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela). They are singled out for preferential ties, to realign them on the U.S. side in a new cold war. A second group consists of "loyal allies" that can be counted on either because of ideological and business ties (Chile, Jamaica) or simply because, their preferences notwithstanding (Ecuador, Panama), they will toe the line. The third group includes all "critical cases" in Central America and the Caribbean, defined as countries under siege (El Salvador and Guatemala) and others that could follow the same fate. It also includes countries considered "lost to the enemy" (Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua).

It follows that crucial attention should be focused on such countries as El Salvador, which are seen on the verge of "falling." It also follows that insurrection in one country must be linked to intervention from another, that peasant revolutions are a game of dominoes, that the regimes they produce are all identical, that Nicaragua equals Cuba, and Cuba is just a Soviet proxy. In one sweep, conflict in one country is seen as conflict in its region, and conflict in the region as conflict in the world. To solve it, we must destroy one party and its friends.

Amos Elon

Shame on the West Bank

The following is taken from an article by Amos Elon, the distinguished Israeli writer, which appeared on December 10, 1982 in Ha'aretz, *the liberal Israeli daily. What Elon writes is all the more notable, and alarming, because on the Israeli political spectrum he is far from being on the extreme left.* — EDS.

The massive settlement activity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip continues, and official spokesmen proudly claim that the situation there is already "irreversible"—i.e., that those territories (not their Arab inhabitants, however) are now an indivisible part of Israel.

That being the case, the question of the political, social, and moral regime in all parts of Eretz Israel becomes daily more acute. There is no more important question today and yet, out of fatalism or hypocrisy, shame or fear, intellectual sloth, political blindness, or insensitivity, we repress discussion of it.

The question will not go away, though, try as we may to forget it or cover it up; and it is a disturbing one, given its statistical implications and a political and human situation in which repression and terror feed and justify each other but fail to solve anything. Are we going to be another Rhodesia, which collapsed under the pressure? Or a South Africa—which is holding out, but has great natural resources that enable it to face isolation over a prolonged period? The very question comes up against a taboo—like sex or sweat in a Victorian novel. Many refuse to talk about it, while others find it difficult to admit its existence, in the spirit of the German saying that "what is forbidden could never happen." [Christian Morgenstern.]

Meanwhile, our lives in Greater Israel are already based on a "democracy of supremacy," controlling a large population of a different race that is without even the most elementary human rights. One part of the population lives in a parliamentary republic, while the other lives under absolute rule. One part lives in a more or less free state under the rule of law, while the other lives in a police state that operates by arbitrary orders against which there is usually no appeal and over which there is no parliamentary control.

Even today there are two systems of law and public administration. One is defined territorially, and applies to Israelis wherever they may be on either side of the Green Line. The other is personal, applying to the Arab citizens of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip alone. We enjoy freedom of speech, written expression, and publication; they do not. We can organize ourselves in parties and express our political views; they cannot. We reside and move freely all over Eretz Israel; they may not. They are confined to a "pale of settlement" as the Jews of Czarist Russia once were and the blacks of

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To fight them, we must enlist neighbors and outsiders. Finally, we must confront the "source" (read Cuba). And so the fight of peasants for something better than a miserable existence in a tiny corner of the planet is changed by the magic of this logic into a titanic contest between good and evil in which the power and prestige of the United States are at stake.

This reasoning reveals a mentality seriously out of focus. The contrast between the exaggerated fear of secondary conflicts in small countries and the cheery bravado with which the Administration responds to major threats such as economic collapse and thermonuclear war is disturbing. Perhaps it is not what happens in Central America that generates hysteria among the new cold warriors but secret doubts about the viability of the system they so loudly defend, an inner weakness, the lack of a serene vision befitting a great power. Vietnamizing El Salvador, attacking Nicaragua are like coming home to kick the cat.

Since 1981, policing Central America has meant military preparations to defeat guerrilla movements in El Salvador and Guatemala, the further isolation of Cuba, the destabilization of the Sandinist regime. It is difficult to gauge the extremes to which the Administration has been willing to go, to separate rhetoric from concrete steps, but it seems that the prospect of a "final assault" on Cuba caps its dreams. The intensification of the civil war in El Salvador over the past two years has added a sense of urgency to this strategy. In 1981 alone, the total amount of military and nonmilitary aid to that country's rulers was twice the size of its annual budget. The U.S. has orchestrated the coordination of military action among Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Hence the effort to step up the sale of weapons and the dispatch of advisers to these countries.

Where direct military aid has met legal obstacles on account of a bad human-rights record, these have been circumvented by recourse to third countries willing to intervene (Argentina and Israel). Thus U.S. policy promotes the internationalization

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South Africa are today. In exactly the same way, they may not work or remain outside their areas of residence. They are not allowed to buy property this side of the Green Line, while we may buy anywhere we wish, and most of our purchases are made with generous assistance from the government. Land is expropriated from them to be given to us, but never the other way round. According to the official doctrine, public land should routinely serve our social aims, but never theirs. We enjoy substantial allocations of public funds and freedom of instruction in our universities. They do not. They have to support their universities with contributions from abroad. Their universities are often closed by administrative orders against which there is no appeal, and their professors are required to sign a political commitment or will be expelled. Our daily lives are conducted, in most cases, within the framework of a reasonably liberal set of laws enacted by the Knesset we elected; they, by contrast, live almost constantly under a heavy burden of more or less arbitrary, and sometimes draconian, orders issued by military governors, operating by authority of a mandatory law once termed "Nazi" by Menachem Begin himself.

JEWS AND ARABS RECEIVE different punishments for the same offense: physical injury to an Arab is cheaper than to a Jew. We are punished only for what we do; they, for their "opinions" also. Only they are punished by exile to another town, house arrest, or deportation abroad. Only they can lose their right to return by remaining abroad for more than a year. Only they are tried in a closed military court and found guilty without knowing what they are accused of. Only they face collective punishment: fathers pay with their livelihood taken away; whole villages can be cut off from electricity and water supplies for no other reason than refusal to join an association of villages that the authorities wish to promote. Their inhabitants may be frightened out of bed in the middle of the night and made to wait outside in the cold and the rain, until dawn breaks or a man in uniform decides they have had their punishment.

I am not referring to the cases that the IDF terms "irregularities" but to the routine. The routine is becoming harsher year by year. It is today in the hands of a heartless, sometimes brutal, military bureaucracy, which is capable of thinking only in terms of bribery or violence. In the first years the routine was more humane, *inter alia* because it was believed that the occupation was a transitory phase. That illusion was shattered long ago. In its 16th year the occupation looks more permanent than ever. Every passing day brings us nearer to an apartheid state. The only wonder is that many are still affronted, quite genuinely, when you say this. "This is not apartheid, it is security," they say; or, "Let the Arabs agree to autonomy." But people who speak this way have usually not troubled to read what we actually offered to the Arabs in the autonomy proposal—even less than the South Africans have accorded to their Bantustans. . . . □

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of armed conflict in Central America. Besides the aid just mentioned, the Reagan administration has sponsored joint military operations between Honduras and El Salvador, and maneuvers involving U.S., NATO, and Inter-American Defense Treaty forces in the Caribbean.

With respect to Nicaragua, the Administration has set in motion the whole gamut of covert actions that proved effective in Chile between 1970 and 1973. They range from the infiltration of saboteurs to the denial of credit and loans. By themselves, these measures cannot topple the Sandinist regime, because they cannot count on an army that could be persuaded to stage a coup. The defenestration of the Sandinists therefore must come from the outside: at least it would depend on a foreign invasion spearheaded by exiles. Yet Nicaragua today is not like Guatemala in 1954, and the Bay of Pigs fiasco is still a searing reminder that things can go wrong.

Ultimately, only a regional war involving at least another national army could produce the results sought by this Administration. There are enough pieces of evidence to suggest that it has seriously entertained such a project. The Administration has fanned the flames of war along the Nicaragua-Honduras border, and it has stimulated tensions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Moreover, the U.S. has unilaterally ratified a treaty that recognizes Colombian sovereignty over the keys of Roncador, Quitasueno, and Serrana, also claimed by Nicaragua. The U.S. Navy has courted the approval of Honduras to establish a base in the Gulf of Fonseca, in waters where sovereignty is shared by Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These attempts must be construed as a concerted effort to provoke Nicaragua into war with its neighbors. They have been supplemented by active military diplomacy in Latin America at large, and by the development of a capability for direct U.S. military intervention in the area.

SEVERAL FACTORS add momentum to this fateful course of war. First, the interventionist rhetoric feeds upon itself. Military threats, once uttered, lose credibility unless followed by action. Other policy options are then likely to be thrown overboard. Second, the deterioration of the internal situation in El Salvador, the absence of an adequate political solution, and the impasse in the civil war exasperate trigger-happy hawks. Third, American plans to provide economic assistance as a security measure have been met by reluctance on the part of private investors, skepticism on the part of economic agencies within the U.S. government whose priorities are elsewhere, and strong opposition from foreign governments and regional organizations which do not like the military and political conditions attached to it and object to the exclusion of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada from the package. Fourth, the Administration has not found it easy to "contain communism" around the world, and would welcome a proof of prowess nearer home.

But there are countertrends that have checked full-scale intervention. Reagan's foreign policy team has never been the "happy family" that the President once mentioned. Constant squabbles have reduced the effectiveness of advisers. Moreover, whatever strategies Reagan's latinamericanists have agreed upon have often been resisted by career functionaries more prone to negotiation. Resistance from Capitol Hill kept mounting throughout the 97th Congress, which issued an order barring the Administration from providing for military activities "for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras." Such pressure will increase during the 98th Congress. Nor should we underestimate the moderating role played by lucid sectors of international business, the European allies, by dissident voices within organized labor and the churches, by intellectuals, and the elite press in the U.S. And Reagan got the same message in Brasilia and Bogota. If anything, American support for the

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We are pleased to announce these

New Members of Our Editorial Board:

JEAN L. COHEN, who teaches political sociology at Bennington College, is an associate editor of *Telos* and a member of the editorial groups of *Praxis International* and of *Kapitalismus*.

MARK LEVINSON, who has worked for *Dissent* over the past two years, is a graduate student in economics at the New School for Social Research, and teaches economics at SUNY, Old Westbury.

RONALD RADOSH, author of *Prophets on the Right*, and of *El Salvador: Central America in the New Cold War*, is teaching history at CUNY. His new book, *The Rosenberg File: A Search for the Truth*, will be published this fall.

JAMES B. RULE taught at Oxford and Bordeaux before coming to SUNY, Stony Brook, where he is teaching sociology. He is the author of *Insight and Betterment*, and of *The Politics of Privacy*. □

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"contras" has won the Nicaraguan regime support abroad.

Throughout 1982, many significant events have underscored the difficulties faced by Reagan's intransigent policy. In Honduras, the victory of the Liberal party in elections gave the executive a measure of autonomy vis-à-vis the armed forces and the U.S. State Department. In Guatemala, the coup of General Rios Montt brought a new rhetoric to politics. The resounding fiasco of the Salvadoran elections reminded U.S. policy-makers of their inability to steer a political process at whim. Against the background of these events, some initiatives were taken by a number of Latin American and European politicians and office-holders, including elements of the non-Somozista opposition to the Nicaraguan government, to explore alternatives to the clear failure of Reagan's strategy.

But it was the South Atlantic War of May–June '82 that gave this strategy the greatest jolt. It showed Reagan's obsession with East-West conflict as utterly inadequate to cope with North-South crises. It rendered U.S. reliance on Southern Cone dictatorships ineffective. It showed the inter-American defense structure as a fig leaf for U.S. designs. It disrupted the network of military collaboration in Central America. At war's end the Administration stood as the main loser in a contest that did not require any Cuban or Soviet meddling to weaken American influence in the Hemisphere. In the bickering that ensued, Reagan's advisers came to an open admission of their bungling amateurism.

A RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE to present policies requires undoing every one of the assumptions of Reagan's strategy: a willingness to pursue North-South negotiations, the demilitarization of Central America, the search for political solutions, the acceptance of the Nicaraguan revolution as an irreversible process, the acknowledgment that Nicaragua is not another Cuba, and the retrieval of Cuba, in the long run, into the Latin American community. The overall objective should be the decoupling of Hemispheric affairs from East-West conflict. None of these steps requires condoning totalitarian practices in Cuba or the drift toward Leninization in Managua. But they do require an alternative vision of U.S. and Latin American interests, and political skill. I do not have any illusions that this Administration will reverse its course drastically or even less dramatically. Right-wing ideologues are deaf to liberal advice. But there is a glimmer of a ghost of a chance that they might heed, by default, Talleyrand's caveat: "This is worse than a crime; it's a mistake." □

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Coping with Recession

We asked our respondents the following questions: Suppose—what is unlikely—that you were in a position crucially to influence domestic social-economic policies during the next immediate period. Suppose you could propose, say, three legislative items for coping, not with the basic problems of our time, but with the present crisis—plants closing down, industries collapsing, large-scale unemployment, etc. What would you suggest? — EDS.

Gar Alperovitz

Economist, Director of the National Center for Economic Alternatives

We need a plan for sustained full production—the halfway house between a jobs "program" and national economic planning. Its elements:

- A coordinated five-year investment effort that begins with short-term, low-skilled jobs in (for instance) energy conservation and watershed maintenance—then phases these down as longer-term infrastructure, housing, and industrial investments come on-stream.
- Such a plan must be large in scale, minimally initially double the 1976 Carter administration's two-year stimulus package of $35 billion—which was put forward with 7.5 percent unemployment in a $2 trillion economy (compared with 10.4 percent unemployment in our current $3 trillion GNP).
- It should be targeted to—and based upon—plans developed in local communities. A nationwide standard of minimum "community full employment" should set 4 percent local adult unemployment as the reference point to guide and target investment planning.
- Reductions in military spending, closing tax loopholes, and capping benefits for upper income groups should develop more than adequate financing in out-year revenue flows.
- A sectoral policy to "prevent another round of 1970s type inflation" should maintain grain reserves, expand energy reserves, and provide for standby controls and rationing to curtail price explosions when short-term gluts in both areas are eliminated (or if military events in the Middle East, or bad harvests, force disruptions). Expanding the supply (and subsidizing the cost) of low- and moderate-income housing together with a community-based national health service is needed to lower costs in these sectors.
- The package of necessity-related anti-inflation sectoral plans should be part of an incomes-policy deal to maintain wages, prices, and profits in reasonable ranges—in exchange for full employment and greater stability in the nonlabor components of food, energy, housing, and other major consumption expenditures.
- The Federal Reserve Board should be put within the Executive Branch (probably in

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the Department of the Treasury) and be required to accommodate a serious expansion.

- Industrial policy loans and other assistance should be integrated with overall macro-planning—with the provision that help for both basic- and high-technology industries be targeted to communities with major unemployment and conditioned upon expansion of worker participation, ownership, and co-ownership of facilities with community and neighborhood groups.
- Technical assistance, training funds, and other assistance should steadily build up a capacity, locally, for true citizen-based planning efforts. □

Kenneth J. Arrow

Nobel Laureate in Economics

There are today, as there have been for the past five or six years, two dominating short-term problems in the economy: unemployment and inflation. Not only are they themselves vital questions for the well-being of the people but their existence sours the ambient society and creates legitimate anxieties that inhibit generosity toward others. We see this in the protectionist movement that now, as in the past, frequently operates against imports from struggling poor countries abroad. We see this even more strongly in the new niggardliness with respect to welfare and Medicaid and even that old pet of middle-class generosity, education.

It was inflation rather than unemployment that was responsible for the tax revolt whose crippling effects on local and state governments are just beginning to be seen. Inflation disorganizes the economy in a number of ways but does not do the direct damage inflicted by unemployment. The purpose of an economy, after all, is to produce goods—public or private as the case may be. Unemployment means that goods that could be produced are not. Therefore, even from the purely economic viewpoint, unemployment is a more serious issue than inflation.

In any case, inflation has been at least partially contained, though by what is apparently the only technique available to a capitalist economy—massive unemployment, which has reached levels unapproached since the Great Depression. Reducing unemployment must certainly take precedence at this time. To achieve this end, certain steps are needed now.

1. First is an increase in the rate of monetary growth. The money supply should not be taken as a goal in itself, as the monetarists have argued. The real rate of interest (interest rate adjusted for inflation) should also be a target, as should the level of gross national product. This step is indispensable.

2. Contrary to a lot of opinion among liberals, we should be in no hurry to reduce the federal budgetary deficit. At a time of deep depression, government spending helps sustain the economy, and tax collections take away private purchasing power. As the economy expands, we will have to be concerned about an excessive diversion of savings away from private investment to purchasing government bonds. But this is not a current problem, only a potential future one.

3. Laws to require notice of plant closings and some severance pay are just and proper to enable workers and localities to make better adjustments. They will, however, benefit few workers and will do nothing to help general economic conditions, which are far more im-

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portant in maintaining and improving worker welfare.

4. A WPA-type program with small, easily startable, and easily terminable projects would make a good deal of sense, though it must be undertaken frankly with an increase in the deficit, not out of tax increases that would largely frustrate its employment goals. The pay would have to be kept low. □

Douglas Fraser

President, United
Automobile Workers Union

Strategies for coping with the immediate crisis should focus first on individuals, then on markets, and finally on large economic entities.

Many voices call for new strategies to deal with joblessness, but I see no reason not to consider an old strategy that served us well in the past. Within months of its creation, the New Deal's Works Progress Administration put 3 million to work on constructive projects of all kinds. Given the growth in the total labor force, a similar effort today would need to employ 6 million jobless people. God knows there's work to be done, and the public works jobs now slated by Congress won't be nearly enough to do it.

The sources of personal income—payroll checks and government assistance—have all but disappeared in sections of the Upper Midwest and Northeast. Not only are people suffering hunger and deprivation, but small businesses and local tax bases are collapsing in turn.

The only way to prevent these areas from bleeding to death is to assure continuing unemployment benefits to those whose benefits have run out. Such action would significantly boost personal income, since over half of the currently unemployed workforce is *not* receiving UI benefits.

There must also be an extension of basic health-care benefits for laid-off workers and their families along with large-scale employment and training programs to supply both short-term income and long-term skills for so-called structurally unemployed workers.

It is common knowledge that two of the nation's biggest industries—housing and auto—are on the ropes as a direct consequence of credit restrictions. Special financing plans provided by homebuilders and by automakers and auto dealers have yielded a tiny rebound in sales, but massive action by the central banking system is required to put these industries back on their feet. Since the Federal Reserve's Mr. Volcker insists on staying a catastrophic monetarist course, Congress should enact special legislation to allocate credit for the purchase of homes and autos. The need for such targeted stimulus programs is especially evident in view of the failure of "real" interest rates to drop in relation to the prime rate. When the private banking system doesn't work, the government must act as the banker of last resort.

Reviving existing depressed markets is, of course, only part of a total recovery strategy. Along with allocating consumer credit, we must begin to think seriously about allocating investment capital to modernize existing industries and to create whole new industries along socially productive lines.

Establishing a measure of public control of capital could take several forms. Labor and other progressive groups are in general agreement on the need for a national development bank whose investment decisions are guided by

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a representative board. This new source of finance could make loans on favorable terms to both public and private concerns that undertook useful projects and promised long-term employment opportunities. A second way of transferring investment decisions to public control would be to modify the rules governing investments by both public and private pension funds. As currently managed by bankers and investment houses, these funds are often directed in ways that destroy the jobs of their contributors.

Finally, Congress should follow the lead of certain progressive states and enact legislation that mandates some form of public accountability for capital decisions. Leaving major capital decisions wholly in private hands has proven to be a socially bankrupt policy. Moving toward social control of the investment process would be a welcome change. □

Victor Gotbaum

Executive Director, District Council 37, AFSCME

You have seen it; I have seen it; even the *Wall Street Journal* has noticed it. The rich are getting richer and the poor, who are everywhere, are poorer. It is not hard to understand why. This economy is simply not producing enough jobs.

Our inability to provide jobs—for a generation of minority adults who have never experienced productive employment; for blue-collar workers affected by both recession and structural changes in their industries of long-time employment; for minority youths; for women returning to and students entering the labor market for a meaningful career—is a societal and human tragedy. As a result, we are experiencing increased inequality—both of opportunity and of income and wealth—as well as a hardening of the spirit. Daily we hear a litany of the economic ruins: increased alcoholism; homelessness; wife-beating; child abuse; and even deaths, such as the unemployed Chicago couple found in the car they had moved into after eviction from their home.

What can be done about it?

• First must come the recognition that Reaganomics has failed and is responsible for much of the pain. With that recognition will come a change in the mix of monetary and fiscal policy. The huge losses in federal tax revenues generated by Reagan's giveaways will cease. In short, there will have to be a tax increase to return the federal budget to sanity. That will have two effects. It will lower interest rates and allow them to remain lower this year, thus spurring economic recovery. It will also generate revenues that the federal government can use to deal with unemployment-related problems. I won't try to guess exactly what form these tax increases will take. But I will push to levy them on those who received the largest benefits from the Reagan cuts. In addition to new revenues, there must also be a substantial shift in budget expenditures from defense to job creation, training, and aid to states and localities.

But we must recognize that the expanding economy that will result from the changed mix of monetary and fiscal policy is not going to be enough to get everyone back to work.

• So, second, there must be a new program of targeted job training, retraining, and placement for America's work force. This, the world's largest developed economy, currently has no meaningful job training program in place. The irony can hardly escape notice, even

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by the president, who acknowledges that the country's economy is undergoing major structural changes. It is not that such programs don't work. We have ample evidence both here and abroad that job-training programs do work. But they are expensive. They require a level of business-labor-government cooperation that is time-consuming but necessary to the results. The present crisis requires even greater attention to detail because the workers' and the economy's needs are so varied.

The unemployed are a mixture of those without skills; those with skills, but without job experience; those without either; and those with long experience in industries to which they will not return. Each requires a different approach to both training and to job placement. And each deserves that.

• The third immediate need is for a series of measures at the national level to lower the burden of unemployment for those who experience it. During the past decade, the level and the duration of unemployment have steadily risen. With that rise comes the increasing probability of any individual worker suffering a bout of unemployment. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is forecasting that 1983 unemployment in the U.S. will average 10½ percent, or more than 11½ million people. Assuming an average duration of unemployment to be between four and six months, then a maximum of almost 35 million Americans may experience unemployment this year.

Yet we are the only major developed country where unemployment benefits expire after six months. Because of this, only 40 percent of those currently unemployed are receiving benefits. A national job scarcity deserves a national solution, including nationally provided longer unemployment benefits, rather than state and local welfare payments. States and localities, already hard-pressed by the impact of slowing revenues and bound by constitutionally mandated balanced budgets, cannot provide the necessary income or services to the unemployed. So the federal government must provide some targeted fiscal relief to those states and localities hardest pressed by unemployment.

IN SUM, I am proposing that we put back some tax revenues and use them and make military spending cuts to provide better for the unemployed, to put the economy back to work through much needed repairs of roads, bridges, sewers and other public structures, and to target meaningful job training and job placement for our workers. And, after we start moving along that road, we can work on a complete agenda to insure that this doesn't happen again. □

Robert Heilbroner

Professor of Economics,
New School for Social Research

I am offended by the question put to me by the editors of *Dissent*. "Suppose," they write, "—what is unlikely—that you were in a position crucially to influence domestic socioeconomic policies during the next immediate period." Suppose, indeed! I *am* in close touch with subversive elements within the Reagan administration, although bound by honor not to divulge my channels of contact. My advice to the Reagan government is to proceed full-steam ahead. It is vital to maintain a basic posture of minimal government intervention. It is of great importance that taxes be as regressive as possible, in order to stimulate "savings

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and investment." All efforts to implement a nationally coordinated policy of government-guided and financed modernization should be resisted. A policy of free trade (with suitable exceptions for automobiles and steel) must be declared the inviolable principle governing foreign trade. The deficit must be depicted as a monstrous thing, which weighs down any chances for recovery: hence welfare spending must be further trimmed. The military budget needs all the support it can get, because it generates economic advance as well as national security. Above all, faith must be kept alive in the natural capacity of a free-enterprise economy to generate spontaneous growth.

THIS IS THE BEST POLICY I can think of for assuring the ignominious exit of the Republican party and the political and economic education of the American people. Meanwhile, it may provide time for educating the country for new departures. These should take achievements in other capitalist nations as the near-term goals for the U.S.: subways as modern as Toronto's, a health system as laudable as that of the Dutch, an old-age retirement plan as generous as the Germans', an unemployment compensation and retraining scheme as complete as Sweden's, a degree of government-industrial cooperation as flexible and effective as the Japanese. This may not seem sufficiently innovative. But this does not seem to be a time for America to lead. The creative impulse must come in adapting means that have already proved feasible in other capitalisms to the particularities of America's cumbersome framework of government, the constraints of American conservative ideology, and the capabilities of America's backward economic institutions. □

Robert Lekachman

Professor of Economics,
City University of New York

Three wishes for 1983? I can fill twice or three times that quota. Still, I must abide by the editors' instructions. First priority is jobs. Last year, in its embarrassing special session, Congress haggled endlessly over a five-cent gasoline tax and a minute job creation measure. Not that it much mattered, the first was enacted and the second perished. A sensible response to the present emergency starts at $40 billion in direct job creation, still an amount comparatively much smaller than New Deal expenditures upon the WPA, CCC, PWA, and NYA.

• The economy now operates at about two-thirds of its capacity. The steel industry limps along at less than 30 percent of maximum output. The automakers could double output without straining. Nevertheless, these and other industries are so organized that at the slightest hint of recovery their masters push prices up, stimulate wage demands from unions, and use them as justification for further price hikes. This is to say that wherever concentrated market power is present, inflation tends to take off long before real pressure upon human and nonhuman resources is felt. My second wish, accordingly, is for a sensible incomes policy. Such a policy, contrary to conservative wisdom, should focus upon prices in concentrated industries rather than wages, which for several years have been lagging behind a rising cost of living. The realities of

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market organization require that these controls be permanent, so that even should they be temporarily suspended they can be swiftly reimposed as necessity requires.

• Then there is the Federal Reserve, that ostensibly independent agency, which between elections plays its role as scapegoat for whatever goes amiss in presidential and congressional economic policy and during election years suddenly cooperates with the current occupant of the White House. More than coincidence induced Paul Volcker and his dour colleagues suddenly to relax monetary policy, allow interest rates to subside, and unleash a wild Wall Street boom just in time to improve Republican prospects in the November elections. To fix responsibility where it properly belongs and to identify preelection monetary games, I suggest a simple solution: empower the secretary of the treasury in the name of the president to issue instructions to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System exactly as, since 1946, any English chancellor of the exchequer can determine Bank of England lending and monetary-creation policy.

• I shouldn't object to eliminating the MX, B-1 bomber, and similar military boondoggles. I'd rejoice at tax reforms that restored progression in personal income taxes and liberated heirs from the burdens of their riches. But I have begun to cheat on my three wishes and must here stop. □

Leon Shull and Patricia Cohen

National Director, and the 1983 Eugene M. Lang Fellow, Americans for Democratic Action

We need a coordinated social and economic strategy designed to deal with the related problems of increasing unemployment and a stagnating economy. Until we institute democratic national and regional economic planning directed toward the goal of full employment, we will have to take individual emergency measures to deal with each immediate crisis.

A jobs program is the first measure. This would propose a $41 billion plan with three basic components:

(a) Job creation—over 3 million jobs could be produced through public works and community service projects. Repairing our deteriorating infrastructure, maintaining public parks and forests, and building up our dwindling housing inventory would employ people while meeting essential needs.

(b) Training and education—if the economy is to adjust to changing demands and advancing technology, an investment in human capital is essential. Job training combined with support for public and higher education will ensure that new, inexperienced, and low-wage earners (such as women and minorities) will be taught skills that are now in demand while older dislocated workers are given incentives to retrain and develop their experience in other fields.

(c) Jobless benefits—less than half of those who are out of work are receiving unemployment insurance either because they were never covered or have exhausted their benefits. Emergency benefits must be provided until a job is found or supplied.

The second step toward turning around the economy is an equitable tax reduction. Under Reagan's three-year tax cut, the majority of taxpayers (80 percent) received no net tax savings, while the richest 20 percent gained

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$36 billion. Such a disparity cannot be defended on grounds of compassion or economics. The fact is, spending stimulates the economy, and low- and middle-income earners are most likely to spend. Unlike people in a high-income bracket who have a low marginal propensity to use extra money, lower wage-earners do not have the choice of saving or spending. They will use the additional income because they need to. John Kenneth Galbraith points out that "compassion and fairness have a strongly functional aspect. They guide income to the people who can be counted on to make economically effective use of it."

A third key to halting economic stagnation is to rein in interest rates. The tight monetary policy currently pursued by the Federal Reserve Board and supported by the Reagan administration is choking off investment, especially in such markets as autos and housing. Without a renaissance in these major U.S. industries, any type of recovery is impossible.

Although the Fed has recently altered its policy somewhat, causing nominal interest rates to decline, the real rate has remained high. Lower interest rates not only contribute to U.S. prosperity, they are essential if Third World nations are to revive their own economies and pay off the debts owed to U.S. creditors. U.S. recovery is linked to global recovery. As the Depression of the 1930s illustrated, the American economy cannot insulate itself from a worldwide downturn.

The Federal Reserve should be compelled to operate within broad guidelines aimed at lowering interest rates and restricting purely speculative financial activities. These transactions drain credit from productive capital investment and drive up interest rates.

- Stimulating investment and creating employment opportunities require a shift in income from the affluent to low- and middle-income earners, and a shift in spending from the military to the civilian sector. Unless we take control of the economy and reverse these fiscal and monetary patterns, we will not reverse the economic decline. □

Gus Tyler

Assistant President, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union

Given three wishes, my first would be a law that would impose stiff penalties on the president of the United States and all other public officials who continue to ignore the Employment Act of 1946 and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act. These two pieces of legislation commit the United States to full employment and provide a machinery for national planning.

Administrations have violated both the letter and the spirit of the legislation. They have promoted unemployment on the shabby theory that a recession is necessary to check inflation. They have also failed to activate the mechanisms of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act to pursue a policy of balanced growth. Instead, they have ad hoc'ed their blundering way toward unbalanced nongrowth.

They are violating the law of the land. They ought to be indicted and convicted. So we need legislation to put teeth into existing legislation.

My second proposal would be reform of the tax law to redistribute and retarget America's income and wealth. The 1981 Tax Act should be rewritten to void all those tax benefits for

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families with an income of more than $50,000 and the added revenue should be used to provide greater tax relief to those making less than $50,000, with the greatest benefits going to those in the lowest income categories.

Such a use of the taxing power to redistribute income would provide the necessary market for our market economy. It is not possible to have a "consumer-led recovery" if national policy shifts national income from the mass of consumers—wage and salaried employees—into the pockets of investors who don't invest in productive enterprises.

The same tax law would penalize the "capitalists" who are using their capital to play crap on Wall Street instead of modernizing productive facilities. How? If money (capital) is used productively, especially to reinvigorate an industry that is vital for our national survival and prosperity, the investor should get a fair break in taxes. But, if the money is used just to buy and sell pieces of paper to yield quickie profits, those capital gains should be taxed at something close to 100 percent.

MY THIRD piece of legislation would seek global approaches to unemployment. It is useless to apply Keynesian methods to stimulate the economy domestically if increased buying power is used to buy goods and services from other lands. It is also impossible for any major nation to seal itself off from world trade, world changes in currency, world flow of capital. Hence we need legislation that would empower the United States to meet with other countries to work out a planetary New Deal and that would commit the United States, if it fails to reach global growth strategies, to regulate imports, currency, and capital flow to maintain and strengthen the American economy. □

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Lewis Coser

Mitterrand's First Two Years

An Advanced Welfare State in One Country?

After François Mitterrand was elected president of France in May 1981, and the legislative elections of June 1981 gave the Socialist party a solid majority in the National Assembly, a sense of euphoria spread through the French left, both inside and outside the new government. Everything seemed possible. In its first year in office the new regime attempted nothing less than a fundamental transformation not only of the economy but of the whole fabric of French society.

The Socialist government nationalized virtually all private banks. A number of key industrial enterprises in the high-technology sector, such as telecommunications, aerospace, data processing, and electrical equipment, also were nationalized. Certain older industrial sectors, such as steel or building materials, were taken over by the government. The working week was reduced from 40 to 39 hours, the retirement age was reduced to 60; paid vacations were extended; a law was passed that for the first time securely institutionalized the right of French workers to engage in annual plant-level collective bargaining; the powers of elected factory councils were enlarged; the legal protection of workers in regard to working conditions and to the arbitrary exercise of managerial authority was reinforced.

In the political sphere, the government announced an ambitious plan of administrative decentralization that broke with the centralizing tradition of France dating from the days of Richelieu, the Jacobins, and Napoleon. It promised a major devolution of political decision-making to local and regional levels.

During the first year in power, the government abolished the death penalty, did away with military tribunals and the exceptional courts that previous governments had created to insure "the security of the state." A number of profeminist laws also were passed: medical abortions for those who could not afford them were to be paid by the government, tax statements can no longer be signed by husbands alone but also need the signature of their wives. The wives of artisans and small businessmen received protection of their economic and patrimonial rights against abusive actions by their husbands. One could go on. Mark Kesselman has dealt with these measures in the last issue of *Dissent*; so there is no need here to go into further particulars.

The general euphoria and activism stalled, however, after the government's first year in power. The local elections of March 1982 showed gains by the right. Socialists not only began to wonder what had caused this setback after so short a period in power, but some among them also began to have doubts about administrative decentralization that, so it seemed, might strengthen the powers of the right on lower levels of the administrative structure while the Mitterrand government continued to hold the levers of power on the national level. Yet the major change of policy, a "pause" in the reforming zeal of the government, came on the economic, not the political, front.

The government's initial projects were predicated on the idea that enlarged purchasing power as well as vastly increased investments in the nationalized and private sectors would restimulate French industry. They calculated that the international depression had about run its course so that French industry, powerfully

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stimulated by state and private investments, would pull itself by its own bootstraps out of the long stagnation that had marked the last years of the presidency of Giscard. But by May 1982 it became clear that this policy was near collapse. Increase of purchasing power led to rising imports rather than to a revival of French industry. The newly nationalized sectors piled up large deficits and were burdened by new social charges and rising wage bills.

Compensation payments to the previous owners of nationalized industries proved to be a heavy burden on the state budget, and new private investments failed to materialize. As a result, the unemployment rate, far from falling, increased slightly so that there are now around 2 million unemployed. France now has roughly as many unemployed as there are farmers!

The deteriorating balance of trade as well as ballooning budget deficits and an annual growth rate lower in 1982 than even that of Britain all indicated that the initial plans had failed. The franc had to be devalued twice during one year. The economic program was in shambles. And so, by the middle of 1982 the government had to reverse course and proclaim a period of austerity and restraints.

The economic failure of the first period of Mitterrand's regime must be put into perspective: the previous government had not succeeded either in slowing down unemployment or in stimulating investment. More important, however, is that the economic failure of the first optimistic year of Mitterrand's government was caused to a large extent by the continued depression in the rest of the world.

Socialists agreed after the Russian disaster that it is impossible to build "socialism in one country." The French situation now leads one to raise the question whether it is even possible to build an advanced welfare state in one country. Nationalizations, the tighter hold of the state on the remaining private sector, and even huge new investments in supposed growth industries may be unable to provide the basis for an extended welfare state within the context of the deteriorating world market.

Rising production costs on the home market caused by progressive welfare policies made French industry less competitive on the world market and led to a continued weakening of the franc and huge adverse trade balances. In October 1982 the French were forced to conclude an agreement with an international consortium of banks for a $4 billion standby credit to defend the franc. More recently they negotiated a large line of credit with the Saudis. Even so, the franc is still in a precarious position. As the *Nouvel Observateur*, a progovernment magazine, noted last December, the franc has lost creditability on international monetary markets and, once received, is quickly converted into other currencies.

A period of austerity became imperative. Wages and prices were frozen for four months in the second part of 1982, and they continued to be tightly controlled even after the original freeze was lifted. But the international balance of trade continues to show huge deficits. The rate of inflation last year was 9.7 percent, which looks like a considerable improvement over the 14 percent of the previous year; but that was largely caused by the temporary wage and price freeze.

Nobody seems to know whether the inflation rate will again increase in 1983. The French labor force grows by around 200,000 each year and unemployment stubbornly continues to hover around 2 million. *Le Monde*, the most respected of all French newspapers and basically favorable to the Mitterrand government, has recently calculated that France's total foreign currency debt has nearly doubled to $45 billion since the Socialists came to power. At current rates of borrowing, some $10 billion to $15 billion a year, France in a few years could reach international debts approaching those of Brazil or Argentina . . . ! The government is resolved not to permit such a state of affairs, hence the current politics of austerity.

The most revealing statement I came across during a recent visit to France was made by the powerful minister of economic and financial affairs, Jacques Delors. Said he: "There can be no expensive reforms in 1983 or 1984." The president of the national assembly, Louis Mermaz, echoed him, though in more careful terms, when he recently said: "The principal issues in the next few years will be 'cultural';

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we now have to concentrate on bringing about changes in the daily lives of people." In other words, attempts will be made to ameliorate daily existence, but only if such projects don't cost much.

Improvement of the quality of life is on the agenda independently of austerity and it may upon occasion even work against it. One example is that of educational reform. The Ministry of Education recently published two tentative plans for changing the character of the educational system. Secondary education is to be revamped to make it more democratic and to increase access to postelementary education for boys and girls from previously disadvantaged strata. This projected law foresees the introduction, on the high school level, of a tutorial system that would give special attention to students coming from a background lacking cultural endowments (what the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls "symbolic capital"). The trouble is that this would mean hiring some 40,000 or 50,000 new teachers and might well encounter the veto of those responsible for closing the vast budgetary gap. Indeed, this projected law foresees an increase in teaching hours for certain categories of teachers, and their union has already protested and asked for financial compensation.

The second project of the Ministry of Education envisages a closer integration of the private (that is, Catholic) system of education with the public system. Even though the private school would maintain a measure of autonomy, its teaching personnel would become state employees and be treated in the same way as those now in the public system. The obstacles here are not financial but political. The Catholic teaching establishment reacted violently and stated that they were not even willing to discuss the project with the Ministry of Education. In consequence, the whole matter has been postponed until after the forthcoming municipal elections in March 1983. That it was introduced just before those elections indicates the imperfect relations between various ministries. It surely was foolish to antagonize Catholic voters just before they went to the polls.

Despite obstacles of various sorts, there will be a number of innovative laws passed by the Mitterrand government in the coming years, but it is hard to believe that it will soon revert to the enthusiastic and innovative zeal of its first year in power.

Quite apart from the economic crisis, there are a number of other factors that create obstacles in the government's path. To begin with, the Socialist party and governmental circles are often torn between the centralizing, Jacobin-Napoleonic tendencies inherited from the French past, and newer decentralizing tendencies that have roots in ideas first propounded during the Resistance and by elements of the Catholic left.

While nationalizations were enthusiastically pushed forward by the majority in the government, the socialist current represented by Michel Rocard, once leader of the left-wing Parti Socialiste Unifié, expressed doubts about the program from the beginning. This group claimed that it was more important to emphasize workers' participation in industrial enterprises and decentralized decision-making on the administrative level. Rocard, often seen as the only serious contender for power on the left after Mitterrand, has at present been put into a ministerial position that gives him no real influence; but Rocardian tendencies still persist within and outside the government. The administrative decentralization measures—especially the reduction of the power of the Paris-appointed prefects and the projected election of regional assemblies that would take away much of the powers of the prefects—have been proposed and partly instituted by Minister of the Interior Gaston Deferre, who is by no means a Rocardian. Yet even these reforms tend to be less radical than they appear at first view. For example, it is foreseen that if the central government disagrees with decisions taken by elected regional assemblies it can appeal to the administrative courts—and such procedure can drag on for years.

The present governmental elite is composed of two divergent elements. Many of the members have come through the ranks of the Socialist party. They belong to the professional and white-collar strata in which the party for a long time has had a considerable influence. Of the Socialist parliamentary faction almost half

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(132) are teachers, and 94 of these elementary teachers. On the other hand, a considerable number of the government's influentials have been recruited from graduates of the Ecole nationale d'administration, the elite school that has furnished a high proportion of both political leaders and top bureaucrats since the days of de Gaulle. The top civil service staff is largely dominated by this administrative elite. They are essentially technocratic in their orientation and tend to value efficiency over and above self-management or decentralization. There are fewer in government posts under Mitterrand than were under his predecessors, but they continue to carry considerable weight.

Some circulation of elites has surely taken place. Left-wing teachers, journalists, writers, and other party faithful have entered the decision-making circles. But both in the newly nationalized industries and in many governmental offices technocrats still tend to have a decisive voice, often simply because they are more competent than the newcomers. It may be, as I have heard, that key positions often have been taken not by the first-rate technocrats, who largely manned such positions ever since de Gaulle, but by those heretofore in second-rank position; but even these men and women often have competencies far exceeding those of the newcomers. It seems likely, moreover, that they will gain influence in the present climate of austerity, when many projects dear to the hearts of the militants have to be postponed for lack of money.

What strikes the observer even after only a limited number of interviews with unattached left-wing intellectuals is the absence of political criticism on the left. As one cynical observer put it in regard to the left-wing intellectuals, "some of them have found niches in the government, and others hope to find such niches." Be that as it may, there is a surprising lack of serious policy discussion among Parisian intellectuals. They are much more likely to talk about Afghanistan or Foucault than about the newest governmental decree. One has the feeling that the relative unity of left-wing intellectuals, partly forged in the fight against the Algerian war and reinforced both over Vietnam and the May 1968 events, has been broken. The Communist party has lost all serious influence among intellectuals. The recently deceased Louis Aragon was the last major man of letters to remain among the faithful. After a long delay, French intellectuals have now ended their decades of love affairs with the Soviets.

Right now, independent left intellectuals have not found new common grounds. They tend to be tentative in their judgments, prudent in their opinions, and generally disinclined to engage themselves deeply one way or another. There is little criticism of the government, but there is also little fervent enthusiasm outside the Socialist party and its fringes. As one of them put it to me: "The Socialists are now in a period where they have to go through a long apprenticeship, and maybe we have to do that too." This is why so many of them stay on the sidelines even though they are vaguely in favor of Mitterrand's government. This may also be the reason one hears so much gossip in coffee houses and research offices about the incompetence and foibles of this or that minister. Gossip about individual failings allows one to avoid taking principled stands on larger issues. As a director of research put it to me, "The Giscard elite was arrogant, the new elite is often incompetent. But I can still work with the latter."

The trade union movement is also, by and large, fairly quiescent. There have been very few major strikes. The Communist-led CGT, even though it has protested against the austerity measures, has not attempted to create mass opposition to governmental policy, perhaps because it does not want to risk the ouster of the Communist members of the government who will be kept on only as long as they behave themselves.

The CGT remains the strongest among the unions. It receives about 43 percent of the votes in factory-council elections throughout the country. But the CFDT (Confédération Française du Travail), which evolved out of the former Christian union movement, is challenging it effectively in a number of regions—not only in regions where the Church has been traditionally strong but elsewhere too. The

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CFDT now has a majority in the former CP and CGT citadel, the Parisian Renault auto works. All in all, it gathers about 25 percent of the total vote in the nation's factory councils. The third major union, Force Ouvrière, largely apolitical and in many ways similar to American unions, has a total support of some 18 percent, very largely of white-collar workers and more particularly civil servants. But one must always keep in mind that the French union movement as a whole is weak compared to, say, its British or German counterparts. Only about 20 percent of all workers are unionized. As a result, the government cannot use the unions as extra-parliamentary supports in the way previous governments used employers' organizations.

Most independent leftists with whom I spoke tend to think of the CFDT as the most hopeful organization. It is less hidebound, and willing to discuss such questions as workers' participation with the government. It has ties to the decentralizing elements around Rocard, and it seems generally receptive to innovative ideas. On the other hand, just because it has closer ties to the government, it may also be more cautious when there looms a danger of antagonizing the powers that be.

When it comes to dressing up a balance sheet of the Mitterrand government's first two years in power, one is tempted to be as evasive as I found most Parisian intellectuals. But I shall resist this temptation. In regard to what we in America call liberal measures, the record of the government is decidedly positive. The abolition of the death penalty and of special tribunals, the improvements in the rights of women and of immigrant workers, the attempts to lift the deadweight of the Napoleonic tradition in public administration, the institutionalization of collective bargaining, the improvement in social welfare, and many other measures, all represent an advance that is highly impressive.

When it comes to the economy, one cannot, alas, be as positive. Here things still hang very much in the balance and the economic future looks bleak, at least for the immediate future. Voters tend to be most sensitive to economic conditions. The united SP-CP lists in the municipal election of March 1983 will probably register some losses, less perhaps through gains of the right than through abstention of dissatisfied voters. The parliamentary elections, however, will take place only in 1986 and presidential elections not until 1988. If the international economic situation improves in the years to come, the French economic experiment might well succeed beyond what now seems likely. If the worldwide slump continues, all bets are off.

So it is too early to voice a strong opinion on whether there can be an advanced welfare state in one country. All one can say is that the French Socialists have the occasion and a long period in which to learn the skills of running a state. After a very long period of exclusion and peripheral existence, they are now at the center of the political establishment. They act; and the right, still short of a real alternative, can only react. That in itself is a most positive development. But, in the meantime, there are as many unemployed as there are farmers in France. □

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The Bishops and the Bomb

1. John C. Cort

The Bishops' Nuclear Heresy

An intriguing question remains among those raised by the last election, namely, how much did the Catholic bishops' support for a nuclear freeze, released in draft form just a few days before the voting, influence the outcome in those eight states (out of nine) that voted for the freeze?

Nobody knows the answer, but the probability that it was a factor is one reason why friends of Ronald Reagan have been belching fire and brimstone at the bishops ever since.

Those eminent theologians, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, found a parallel in the "fourth-century dispute between the Athanasians and the Arians over the nature of Christ" and concluded that "this struggle pits a heretical hierarchy against the traditionalist laity." They called the bishops' stand "the nuclear heresy," but stopped short of excommunication.

The notion that the Catholic laity is pitted against the hierarchy on this issue is only one of the more fanciful fictions of Evans and Novak. Gallup has revealed that *82 percent of U.S. Catholics back their bishops on a bilateral freeze*, with 13 percent opposed and 5 undecided. Pitted laity did predictably include such conservatives as William Buckley ("political opportunism") and the other Novak, Michael ("a soft and romantic reading of Christian theology . . . an outrage"), plus Catholic members of the Reagan administration such as William Clark, national security adviser ("fundamental misreadings of American policies").

Of course, 82 percent of the Catholic laity could be just as ignorant of what constitutes heresy as they are of what Athanasius or Arius thought about the nature of Christ. An examination of the bishops' reasoning and, almost as significant, the manner of their reasoning might therefore be useful.

The process started in July 1981 and included a first draft drawn up by a committee of five bishops representing every major shade of opinion. They listened to 35 "expert" witnesses from an even wider spectrum and studied several hundred pages of comments from fellow bishops and over a hundred consultants. Arguments were clarified and some conclusions sharpened. The question of deterrence—the possession of nuclear bombs as a threat against the use of nuclear bombs—was faced more candidly, but the second draft stops short of "unequivocal condemnation." Archbishop Joseph Bernardin (he has since been named a cardinal), chairman of the committee, acknowledged that "we are not totally satisfied with the theoretical argument" in a display of modesty, evident elsewhere in the pastoral, that is a refreshing contrast to previous statements by Catholic prelates.

There were, however, more than enough unequivocal condemnations to satisfy most antinuclear partisans and to infuriate most champions of current Administration policy. For example:

- "We are sure of one moral imperative we should declare: a rejection of nuclear war."
- "There should be a clear public resistance to

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the rhetoric of 'winnable' nuclear wars, 'surviving' nuclear exchanges, and strategies of 'protracted nuclear war.' "

• "We do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare, on however restrained a scale, can be morally justified." In short, no first strike, no limited theater for the use of nuclear weapons. This position has, according to rumor, alarmed both lay and clerical leaders in Western Europe, some of whom want the threat of a first strike as a shield against attack from the East by more conventional weaponry.

• "We have judged immoral even the threat to use nuclear weapons." This statement, together with the lack of "unequivocal condemnation" of deterrence, was the basis for Bernardin's modesty about the argumentation and for most of the criticism that has since come from the religious left.

• "No Christian can rightfully carry out orders or policies deliberately aimed at killing noncombatants." This is almost a more explosive position than the antinuclear statements. It challenges military discipline directly. If all pilots and bombardiers accepted it, there could be no bombing of urban populations, even by old-fashioned TNT. Although they acknowledge disagreement among moralists on the question, the bishops oppose "a policy of attacking [military] targets which lie so close to concentrations of population that destruction of the target would devastate the nearby population centers."

The draft does remain, at this point, a draft. There was overwhelming support for its general drift, but a final vote will not be taken until a meeting in Chicago on May 2-3. A table vote on the first day of the November 15-18 meeting showed that 195 out of 278 bishops in attendance were "in basic agreement," 71 had "major reservations," and 12 were "in basic disagreement."

The few quotes given above should indicate that we have here a pretty radical statement from what is generally considered a pretty conservative body. Is it, as Evans and Novak so clumsily suggested, inconsistent with Catholic, or Judeo-Christian, tradition? The letter is long, maybe too long, but those who can stay the course will find a thorough and on the whole successful effort to tie the positions taken to both scripture and tradition.

Despite the occasional bloodthirstiness of Old Testament history and some indifference to the fate of noncombatants, the bishops prefer to emphasize the Hebrew prophets' recurring cry for a time when "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (Isaiah 2:4). The pacifist strain in the New Testament is stronger but ambiguous. Christ's recommendation to "turn the other cheek" clearly did not extend to turning one's neighbor's cheek if the neighbor did not want to turn it. Also, Christ himself used a whip to drive the money changers from the Temple, thereby repelling an invasion of God's territory. Although more obscure theologians of antiquity, such as Tertullian and Origen, criticized military service on the ground that it involved killing, such larger figures as Augustine and Ambrose laid the groundwork for what has come to be known as "the just war theory," which has been the dominant position of the Catholic Church ever since. This is how the bishops word the nub of that theory: "Faced with the fact of attack on the innocent, the presumption that we [should] do no harm, even to our enemy, yielded to the command of love understood as the need to restrain an enemy who would injure the innocent." Thomas Aquinas added self-defense as a legitimate excuse for the use of lethal force.

Quakers, Mennonites, and a few other sects have maintained the extreme pacifist position, and in modern times many Catholics (Dorothy Day is the best-known example) have embraced it. In 1965 Vatican Council II raised it for the first time to the level of an acceptable Catholic option. The bishops' draft repeats that approval.

Over 20 percent of the bishops (57 by the last count) belong to Pax Christi, an international peace movement committed to the idea that "Christian non-violence must become a central concern of both the churches and the international community." Pax Christi, however, includes members whose concern for peace is entirely consistent with the just war

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theory, which certainly remains the favored stance of the majority of the bishops.

THE JUST WAR THEORY, after all, provides solid ground for the condemnation of nuclear warfare. In defining it the bishops cite seven criteria:

(1) *Competent authority* must declare war, not private individuals or groups. Under this heading the bishops add a note of interest to Christian socialists and liberation theologians of Latin America: "Historically, the just war tradition has been open to a 'just revolution' position, recognizing that an oppressive government may lose its claim to legitimacy. Insufficient analytical attention has been given to the moral issues of revolutionary or unconventional warfare. A just war framework for conflicts of this nature is sorely needed." For example, is there a "competent authority" to declare revolution?

The statement is a significant reflection of the fact that throughout most of its history the Church has been more concerned with discouraging revolution than defining the conditions of its justification. Now, for perhaps the first time, large numbers of Catholics, both lay and cleric, find themselves in sympathy with if not active support for revolutionary movements. The Church realizes that it must respond.

(2) *Just cause*: "war may be employed only to confront a 'real and certain injury' " or threat to innocent life, basic human rights, etc.

(3) *Right intention* requires some genuine interest in pursuit of peace and reconciliation, avoiding demands for unconditional surrender.

(4) *Last resort*: "all other reasonable means of redress have been pursued."

(5) *Probability of success*: Jesus himself defined this, "What king, going to encounter another king in war, will not sit down first and take counsel whether he is able with ten thousand to meet him who comes against him with twenty thousand?" The bishops do, however, recognize that "at times defense of key values, even against great odds, may be a 'proportionate' witness." Some ambiguity here.

(6) *Proportionality*: "the damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by war must be proportionate to the good expected." A tough one. In 1971, somewhat late, the bishops decided that this condition ruled out further support of the Vietnam War. It is a key factor in evaluating the morality of nuclear war and closely related to the final and even more key condition—

(7) *Just means* "prohibits all actions directly intending to take the lives of civilians or non-combatants." Recognizing the problem of this distinction in modern war, the bishops nevertheless insist, "There is always a difference between soldiers and innocent children or hospital patients. The elderly, farmers, the average industrial worker producing objects not directly related to military purposes, cannot rationally be considered combatants even by the broadest definition. Justice demands that those who do not make war not have war made upon them. . . . The fateful passage into the nuclear age as a military reality began with the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, events described by Paul VI as 'a butchery of untold magnitude.' " The bishops also quote Vatican II: "Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their populations is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation."

THE CONDEMNATION therefore is retroactive, back before Nagasaki and Hiroshima to Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Tokyo. Even the butchery and destruction of the Nazis cannot justify these. The nuclear bomb now multiplies this tendency of modern warfare to the point where it "threatens the obliteration of human life on a scale previously not imaginable." It was this realization, evident to all but those who occupy the seats of power in Washington and Moscow, that led Paul VI to cry out before the United Nations Assembly in 1965, "No more war! War never again!"

Small wonder then that Reagan's attempt to make an end run around the bishops by dispatching General Vernon Walters to intercede with John Paul II has had no visible effect and has, from all reports, only stiffened the bishops' resolve.

John Paul's opinions on nuclear war duplicate the bishops', but in one respect he has been useful to the advocates of deterrence. In

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his message to the United Nations in June 1982 he said, "In current conditions 'deterrence' based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable." Elsewhere in the same message, however, he called this balance "a balance of terror" and warned of the danger of its setting off "the arms race in an even more dangerous way."

One of the bishops suggested the words "morally tolerable," but whether it be "tolerable" or "acceptable," the dilemma remains. Deterrence means nothing if not a threat to use the bomb if an enemy uses it first. But how can you threaten, or approve threatening, to do something that you have just condemned as morally unacceptable? On the simplest level, two wrongs don't make a right. And on the other hand, how can you ask America, in the absence of an enforceable agreement, to destroy its nuclear bombs or to declare its intention never to use them, relying on old-style bombs or on Russia not to use its bombs or on Russia not to believe our declaration not to use ours?

Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle, addressing the bishops, answered the first question, "You can't" and the second, in effect, "You must if you are really Christian." He clearly did not agree with John Paul II as he called for an amendment that would state that "nuclear deterrence is idolatry, and that, far from deterring the evil of nuclear war, living out the rationale of deterrence is actually engaging in that evil."

The argument did not appear to convince most of the bishops, who were humble enough to admit the moral dilemma and their inability to suggest a satisfactory solution. Hunthausen, meanwhile, cannot be accused of failure to put his money, or not put his money, where his mouth is. He has refused to pay half his income taxes on the ground that it would go toward the immoral purpose of preparing for nuclear war. So far he is the only one to go that far, but a number of lower clergy and laity have followed suit.

The bishops have one escape hatch from the dilemma, namely, is or is not deterrence being used by Reagan as "a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament"? Most of the umbrage expressed in William Clark's counter-pastoral to the bishops centered on the fact that the draft contained a deafening silence on the alleged efforts of the Administration to promote "progressive disarmament." The bishops are obviously skeptical about the sincerity, or even reality, of any such efforts.

Left-wing Catholics also have criticized the pastoral on the ground that the bishops did not express this skepticism more positively or did not conclude that in the absence of positive efforts the policy of deterrence was clearly immoral. Such criticism, it seems to this observer, is an effort to force the bishops to justify Michael Novak's unjustified charge that the bishops "are suffering from hubris, taking on vocations that aren't theirs." Their competence is in stating moral principles and making moral judgments based on those principles, not in evaluating the alleged efforts of Reagan & Co. to come to some agreement with the Russians. Besides, any child can evaluate those efforts without their help. This is a question of fact, not of morality.

In the final paragraphs of their extended discussion of deterrence the bishops acknowledge that "there are many strong voices within our own episcopal ranks and within the wider Catholic community in the U.S. that challenge the strategy of deterrence as an adequate response to the arms race today. They highlight the historical evidence that deterrence has not, in fact, set in motion the process of disarmament. On the contrary, under its impulse, there has been almost unlimited acceleration in building arms."

Nevertheless, the bishops finally opt for a more conservative, or at least middle-ground position, which does go beyond the mere statement of moral judgments to some specific proposals:

> In support of the concept of "sufficiency" as an adequate deterrent, and in the light of the present size and composition of both the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals, *we recommend*:
>
> (1) support for immediate, bilateral, verifiable agreements to halt the testing, production and deployment of new strategic weapons;

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(2) support for negotiated bilateral deep cuts in the arsenals of both superpowers, particularly of those weapons systems which have destabilizing characteristics;

(3) support for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;

(4) removal by all parties of nuclear weapons from border areas and the strengthening of command and control over tactical nuclear weapons to prevent inadvertent and unauthorized use.

[The bishops conclude:] These judgments are meant to exemplify how a lack of unequivocal condemnation of deterrence is meant only to be an attempt to acknowledge the role attributed to deterrence, but not to support its extension beyond the prevention of use of nuclear weapons. The need to rethink the deterrence policy of our nation, to make the revisions necessary to reduce the possibility of nuclear war and to move toward a more stable system of national and international security will demand a substantial intellectual, political and moral effort.

To this all parties should be able, if not eager, to say, "Amen."

One aspect that has been neglected in most of the comments is the bishops' reaction to the obscenity of diverting vast sums to the arms race that should be devoted to the poor. I think the bishops can perhaps be faulted for not devoting enough space to it, but they do emphasize the point repeatedly. And indeed, the conservative Cardinal John Krol of Philadelphia was the one who suggested that "in treating the diversion of our resources from the poor, it would help to mention that the military budget of the world is approximately $600 billion a year, which is about half of what the poorest half of the world earns."

On this score it is reassuring to know that Cardinal Bernardin, Archbishop of Chicago, the chairman of the draft committee, is the author of an article that appeared in *Commonweal* last September 24 entitled *Poverty: America's Social Sin.* Bernardin, a former president of the Bishops' Conference, continues to distinguish himself as one of the most promising personalities on the American scene.

"When Bernardin makes waves, they're always smooth waves," a friend has said of him. The point is that he does make waves, and the waves are so well made that they produce results. The word is that the bishops' next pastoral will be on the subject of capitalism. Bernardin may not play as crucial a role in the development of that one, but the odds are that his expanding influence will make itself felt.

In that area the American bishops have not said anything really memorable since 1919, when John A. Ryan wrote for them a program that was later made into law by Roosevelt and the New Deal almost lock, stock, and Wagner Act. With Bernardin's protegé Father J. Bryan Hehir again doing the writing for the bishops' staff, that letter could begin to herald the kind of dawn in the religious community of America, if not in the country itself, that shines through the words of Isaiah quoted toward the end of this historic letter on *The Challenge of Peace:*

Is not this the sort of fast that pleases me,
to break unjust fetters,
and undo the thongs of the yoke,
to let the oppressed go free
and break every yoke,
to share your bread with the hungry,
and shelter the homeless poor,
to clothe the person you see to be naked
and not turn from your own kin?
Then will your light shine like the dawn
and your wound be quickly healed over.
If you do away with the yoke,
the clenched fist, the wicked word,
if you give your bread to the hungry
and relief to the oppressed,
then shall your light arise in the darkness,
and your shadows become like noon.

The bishops of the Catholic Church in

Coming
In Our Next Issue:

On Failed Totalitarianism

by Michael Watlzer

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America have for too long dwelled in the shadows—shadows in good part of their own making, in good part made for them by the time in which we live. If they display the same courage and intelligence on the subject of capitalism that they have displayed on the subject of nuclear destruction, we could all be in for an interesting sunrise. □

2. Peter Steinfels

How the Bishops Spoke With Care

Obviously, not many people—not even many Catholics, not even many readers of *Dissent*—are going to read the American Catholic bishops' letter on war and nuclear weaponry in its entirety. It is already a complicated document; in its final form, it may be more complicated still. The letter treats of biblical teachings on war and peace, of the revelation of Jesus, of the witness of the early church, of the emergence and development of just-war doctrine, of the consensus at Vatican II. The bishops carefully consider their different responsibilities—as teachers and pastors for fellow Catholics, but also as citizens and participants in the public debates of a pluralistic society. In their moral reflections, the bishops confront the "unique challenge" of nuclear warfare, the decades-old paradox of deterrence, the theories of limited nuclear war, and the latest doctrines of nuclear war-fighting. They search for principles that might define a just world order, and they suggest specific steps to reduce the chances of war.

Neither the press nor the politicians are very interested in all of this. They care about the specifics: the bishops' position on the nuclear freeze or the MX missile or—and this is already a quantum jump in sophistication—on no-first-use in Europe. They want the dramatic juxtapositions: bishops versus White House, bishops of today versus those of yesteryear. Public debate, even at its best, almost inevitably requires that the bishops' message be reduced to a handful of propositions that are apt to be framed according to whatever most astonishes, pleases, or outrages the framer.

Yet a full and accurate picture of what the bishops have said cannot be conveyed apart from some sense of *how* they have said it, some sense of the process that led to this document and of its tone.

From the beginning, the bishops recognized the seriousness and difficulty of their undertaking. By appointing to the drafting committee an outspoken pacifist (Bishop Thomas Gumbleton from Detroit) as well as the churchman in charge of Catholic military chaplains (Bishop John J. O'Connor from New York), the national conference of bishops assured a thorough and open investigation. For the better part of a year, the committee met regularly, listening to and questioning, among others, Harold Brown, James Schlesinger, Gerard Smith, Helmut Sonnenfeld, Roger Molander, Herbert Scoville, as well as Caspar W. Weinberger, Eugene Rostow, and General Edward Rowny. Both defenders and critics of deterrence and the recent arms buildup were included among the moral theologians and ethicists the bishops consulted. One wonders whether the current secretary of state has consulted as widely, to say nothing of the current president. Few criticisms of the bishops are more misplaced than the charge that they are poorly informed.

The same awareness of both the terrible reality of nuclear war and the genuine complexities of preventing it is reflected in the tone of the document. It has its instances of rhetorical excess and convenient cloudiness. But by and large this is not a morally pleasing declaration that floats above the knotty details, nor is it a self-righteous judgment by men who believe they possess some divine instruction man-

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ual for resolving all political problems. The bishops admit their own perplexity at certain points, invite dialogue, and distinguish between their firm insistence on basic moral principles and their necessarily more subjective judgments about the concrete circumstances in which these principles are to be applied. In all this, the bishops have shown more restraint and modesty than many of their critics.

DIFFICULTIES REMAIN. It is said that the bishops have failed to put the problem of nuclear weapons into the context of the struggle with Soviet power and totalitarianism. That is not entirely true, but I think they could strengthen the document by saying more on this subject. In the final version they probably will. What at least some of their critics want, however, is for the urgency of resisting the Soviets simply to engulf or dissolve all moral questions about the means we employ for that resistance. The bishops will not follow that line of thought—as Archbishop Bernardin has made clear in a reply to 24 Catholic congressmen who challenged the draft statement.

The bishops have refused to give nuclear deterrence either the unequivocal condemnation demanded by pacifists or the ringing affirmation sought by policy-makers. They have offered good reasons for not taking either of those positions, but the moral reasoning undergirding their own position of conditional, temporary acceptance of nuclear deterrence is far from satisfactory—as the drafting committee itself has acknowledged. If the morality of deterrence is conditioned on its serving as "a step toward progressive disarmament," deterrence would become clearly immoral once progress toward disarmament is definitively foreclosed. But when would that be? If, to take a not entirely hypothetical example, an American administration treated disarmament with contempt, would we be morally obliged to abandon our deterrent despite the possibility that an administration favorably inclined toward disarmament might assume power in four or eight years? If the Soviet Union should prove so intractable as to rule out all "progressive disarmament," is the U.S. morally obliged to abandon the deterrent? What if both superpowers are equally entangled in a knot of recalcitrance—is the one in which moral pressures are most likely to be exerted obliged to dismantle its deterrent?

Attitudes toward the bishops' betwixt-and-between conclusions about deterrence depend, as they will so often, on views about the context in which they speak. If you see the world rushing headlong toward holocaust, with the U.S. in the lead, then the bishops are guilty of one more failure of moral nerve. If you see the West desperately at bay in the contest with totalitarianism, then they are foolishly adding to American demoralization. If you see us slipping slowly toward the binrk, with the only chance of rescue lying in calm, multilateral action, then the bishops' position seems intuitively sound if not logically neat.

There is, of course, the fear that the bishops' statement, whether they so intend it or not, is part of a religiously led or religiously legitimated movement toward unilateral nuclear disarmament, a movement that could be at once disastrous for the West and for international stability. It would be wrong to deny all grounds for this fear. Among the American bishops as a whole, there are a number of principled nuclear pacifists whose rejection of deterrence is absolute and quite beyond further calculations of international consequences. There are also bishops who are satisfied with formulas like "War never solves any real problems." Moreover, in parts of Europe there is strong church support for unilateralism, prompting the London *Economist* to declare it "high time that some churchmen's recent statements about nuclear weapons should be challenged by a vigorous Christian counterattack." Yet the likelihood that American and European Christians might be swept away on a tide of unilateralism is far less than the likelihood that discussion of these fateful questions will deteriorate amid slogans and propaganda. The American bishops have admirably resisted any such deterioration. Their careful, measured, and open-minded document will legitimate unilateralism only if the American government and foreign-policy elites stubbornly fail to respond to the points the bishops have made. □

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Irwin Stark

Industrializing Our Universities

Big Business Tests Academic Autonomy

"The learned and imaginative life is a way of living and is not an article of commerce," wrote the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead in 1929. Fifty years later, in commending an industrial associates program to the Yale faculty, A. Bartlett Giamatti, the university's president, declared that educational institutions, "an integral part of the private sector," must promote their "natural alliances" with the business community.

The difference between these views illustrates the scope of what is happening to American higher education. With the dramatic growth of the university-industrial connection, a fundamental transformation is radically altering the conduct of the sciences, threatening the status of other academic disciplines, and endangering the autonomy of the university itself. At stake is, above all, the university's intellectual capital. Who will control it and whom will it serve—society or the national and multinational corporations?

Hoechst, A.G., the giant German pharmaceutical combine, recently has given $50 million to the Massachusetts General Hospital, a Harvard affiliate; in return the corporation will be allowed to market any discoveries made in Harvard's Department of Molecular Biology, which Hoechst's largesse has created. Monsanto has signed comparable $23 million contracts with the Harvard Medical School and Washington University. The Celanese Corporation is funding $1.1 million in enzyme research at Yale, in exchange for exclusive rights to resulting patents. Exxon is underwriting an $8 million combustion project at M.I.T. and will obtain irrevocable, worldwide, nonexclusive, royalty-free license to ensuing inventions. Sixteen corporations—including GE, TRW, IBM, IT&T, Honeywell, and Texas Instruments—all have bought into Stanford's Center for Integrated Systems, at a cost of $750,000 each. Purdue is working on computers for Control Data, Carnegie-Mellon on robotics for Westinghouse, and Rensselaer Polytech on automation for IBM, GE, Grumman, Lockheed, and Bethlehem Steel. Approximately 300 other firms are spending millions on the application of bioengineering to agriculture and plant breeding. In fact, almost every major university, from coast to coast, now is engaged in some form of research for industry.

Although the magnitude of these ventures is unprecedented, the university-industrial connection is rooted in the nascent capitalism of the 19th century. David F. Noble's *America by Design* has traced it back to the establishment of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1849 and the introduction of engineering courses at West Point shortly thereafter.

By the turn of the century, engineering was the country's most populous profession, and industry was explicitly influencing science and engineering curricula while availing itself of the trained personnel universities placed at its disposal. By 1909 the president of the American Society of Civil Engineers warned that the engineer was "becoming a tool of those whose aim it is to control men and profit from their knowledge." But it was AT&T's chief engineer, J. C. Carty, who spoke for the vast majority of the profession when he enunciated company policy: "The criterion which we apply to the work conducted in these labs is that of practical utility. . . . The practical question is, 'Does this kind of scientific research pay?' " The schools rapidly adapted themselves to this view.

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This utilitarian emphasis assumed, writes Noble, "particular forms molded by the specific, historical needs of private industry, by particular firms intent upon increasing their profit margins and powers." It affected "what kinds of questions would be asked . . . which problems would be investigated, what sorts of solutions would be sought, what conclusions would be drawn. Science had indeed been pressed into the service of capital."

The nation's universities now are severely burdened by steadily mounting financial pressures and an overall decline in federal support, and by the need to replace obsolescent equipment with costly modern machines to keep pace with the explosion in scientific instrumentation. As Harvard's general counsel told the faculty in the course of a widely publicized debate on the proposed commercialization of DNA research, ". . . if we are to continue to meet rising expenses and to maintain scientific research of high quality, we need to explore ways of sharing in the financial rewards that come from the application of the new knowledge discovered in the University." President Bok subsequently noted that in the universities the accumulated shortfall in equipment alone exceeds $300 million. If the fiscal squeeze vexes Harvard with its $1.6 billion endowment, less affluent institutions surely are feeling the pinch even more acutely. The plight of academia happens to mesh with that of American business. In the words of "Industry and the Universities," a 1980 report of the National Commission on Research (NCR),*

> There is widespread and serious concern among leaders in government, the universities and industry over the erosion of U.S. hegemony in science, technology and rates of production. Much of this concern focuses on the idea that the U.S. has not maintained the innovative characteristics which fueled its earlier scientific and economic success.

Confirming this assessment, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development now ranks the United States merely tenth among industrial nations in per-capita gross national product. No wonder demands have increased for speeding the transfer of scientific knowledge to the marketplace, so that new products and industries can restore the country's mercantile preeminence.

This convergence of economic interests, bolstered by the potentially lucrative advances in high technology and biogenetic engineering, has impelled university and corporation to effect a closer, more permanent relationship than the comparatively casual dalliance of previous decades. But is a marriage possible—or are the two partners so constitutionally antipathetic that connubial bliss seems unlikely?

"Universities represent important values in our society," writes Gilbert S. Omenn in the prestigious *New England Journal of Medicine*. "These include free and open communication, respect for individual views, insistence on excellence, disinterested objectivity, fastidiousness and honesty in the reporting of research results, and dedication through education and research to enhancing the state of knowledge about ourselves and the world around us."

In the same journal Barbara J. Culliton, an editor of *Science*, supplements this picture with a perceptive discussion of academic research. She refers to the norms that govern, according to sociologist Robert K. Merton, the social structure of science and would appear to encompass the university as a whole: universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. "Communism, defined in the nontechnical and extended sense of common ownership of goods," Culliton writes, "places great value on researchers' freely sharing what they learn." She quotes Merton:

> The substantive findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are assigned to the community. Property rights in science are whittled down to a bare minimum by the rationale of the scientific ethic. . . . The institutional concept of science as part of the public domain is linked with the imperative for communication of findings. Secrecy is the antithesis of this norm, full and open communication its enactment.

* The NCR is supported by private foundations. Its membership comes from the university hierarchy, several professional associations, and industry, the latter represented by the president of Exxon Research and Engineering and by the senior vice-president of Monsanto.

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Culliton offers the example of Cesar Milstein, who with a colleague was credited with the invention of monoclonal antibodies and who in sharing the cells with others asked that they not seek patents. "The scientific ethos," Culliton concludes, "is compatible with the definition of technology as private property."

Omenn, Culliton, and Merton speak for the traditional conception of the university as an institution embodying disinterested teaching, research, and public service. Honoring these ideals has frequently been easier than observing them. The flouting of academic freedom, subversion of objectivity in times of war, the feeble response to the "red" hysteria after World War I and in the witch-hunts of the McCarthy era, the resistance to affirmative action, the doctoring of research and the occasional lapses from excellence—such aberrations underscore how fragile is the myth that would insulate the ivory tower from the real world. Yet on balance the American university is one of the few institutions relatively free of intellectual bias and corruption. Few would disagree with the NCR that as a research center the university in the U.S. "is an institution of unsurpassed performance, a model eagerly emulated by other nations."

What of the other party? The business of business is making money and goods. Until the last decade, with the exception of the Great Depression and periodic recessions, it has performed well enough to out-produce the rest of the world and provide us with a standard of living that, for all the mixed blessings of our material possessions, no other nation could match. The concomitant wealth has laid the economic foundation of Social Security, unemployment insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, and public welfare. Moreover, our political freedoms have survived—too often in spite of corporate power—and upward social mobility has not completely vanished. In the face of soaring unemployment, American workers evidently still believe they have more to lose than their chains.

These social dividends, however, are extrinsic to the nature of capitalism, be it the primitive 19th-century variety with its iron law of wages or the "enlightened" present-day variety with its runaway shops and recourse to cheap, nonunionized foreign labor. After all, corporate ethics are seldom any better than they have to be.

Contemplating the corporate image, the NCR notes that "the seeming [sic] insensitivity of industry to the common good alienated a newly aware generation of students—and many of their professors." The NCR therefore admonishes industry to perform its productive function "in a socially responsible manner *with public health and safety as prime considerations*" (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the lamentable record of industry's indifference to workers, consumers, and the environment leaves little room for optimism about its response to this challenge. The record was familiar long before Henry Demarest Lloyd's *Wealth Against Commonwealth* and the muckraking studies that succeeded it.

Nor has the proliferation in the past two decades of public-interest groups and government agencies charged with shielding us from the more predatory inclinations of business signaled a discernible abatement of historic practices. In the five-year period after the passage of air and pollution laws, the EPA referred 130 violations to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution, a procedure drastically curtailed under the agency's incumbent Reaganaut, Anne Gorsuch.

WE NOW HAVE WITNESSED: million-dollar damage suits stemming from dangerously defective car design;

- the legacy of Love Canal and thousands of waste dumps leaking into wells and streams while the Chemical Manufacturers' Association successfully lobbied Congress to reduce the toxic-waste "superfund" from $4.2 billion to $1.6 billion and emasculate its liability provisions;
- the high incidence of brain tumors among petrochemical workers at Dow Chemical and Union Carbide plants and of bladder cancer among DuPont workers;
- the $100,000 fine levied in December 1980 against the nation's largest independent coal producer for falsifying coal-dust samples submitted for inspection;

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• the "miracle-drug" Clofibrate that Ayerst continued to sell as a heart-attack preventive when solid evidence had demonstrated it to be ineffective and hazardous;
• the failure of Ely Lilly & Company to disclose the scores of deaths linked to Oraflex when requesting government approval to market the drug;
• OSHA's 1980 report, labeled one of the ten "best-censored" stories of the year by Project Censored, that over 100,000 workers die each year and more than 300,000 are disabled as a consequence of occupational diseases attributed to chemicals in industrial products and processes;
• the scandal of Johns-Manville, which censored an unfavorable study of asbestosis prior to publication and fought desperately to prevent disclosure until its behavior could no longer be hidden.

These instances of industry's social responsibility "with public health and safety as prime considerations" could be multiplied a hundredfold. They are obviously common practices and not confined to the isolated, industrial malefactor: they are endemic to the system. If so, how can the solemn commitment of the university (and of science) to the public weal be reconciled with industry's obsessive drive for ever greater profit?

EVEN ASSUMING industry were above reproach, the problems of its relationship with the university still would be enormous. Perhaps the most intractable may be the problem of secrecy. An invention that becomes common property can prove of only minimal value to a corporation intent on securing a competitive edge or to a researcher or university eager to collect patent royalties. The difficulty arises less from the patent per se, though how it is exploited may be crucial, than from concealment during the prior research. Such concealment runs counter to the concept of science as part of the public domain and to the imperative for communication of findings. "Secrecy," to quote Merton again, "is the antithesis of this norm, full and open communication its enactment." But as M.I.T. geneticist Jonathan King has explained,

> [there is] a conflict of interest between the university's duty to gather and disseminate knowledge in an unbiased fashion and the university using its faculty in a profit-making enterprise serving a different master: maximum return on investment. . . . [Once upon a time,] one of the strengths of American biomedical science was the free exchange of materials, strains of organisms and information. . . . now if you sanction and institutionalize private gain and the patenting of microorganisms, then you don't send out your strains because you don't want them in the public sector. That's already happening. . . . The whole thing has been poisoned."

"The business concepts of secretiveness and proprietary control," says the director of the NCR, "are anathema to the academic environment." But that will not be so if the experience at Harvard becomes typical. For years its patent policy required that any health-related discoveries made in its labs be dedicated to the public. In 1974, however, the university accepted $23 million from Monsanto for research on the tumor-angiogenesis factor (TAF) in cancer therapy, agreeing to assign the company the rights to a TAF blocking agent should one be developed. The patent policy was then revised. While reiterating that "the public benefit should take precedence over profit making," it emphasized the idea that patents should henceforth be aggressively sought. "Gone were the days," Culliton remarks of this new dispensation, "when Harvard would stand in the way of profit making from patented research discoveries."

A related problem is the kind of research that universities should undertake. The NCR believes that the university's greatest strength lies in its capacity for basic research. Industry, however, has invariably concentrated on—and endowed—applied research with its fairly rapid payoff. "By 1978," NCR data indicate, "direct industrial support for university basic research had become almost minuscule as a percentage factor," and there is no reason to think this figure has changed appreciably. The danger here is that if universities accommodate the industrial sponsor and increasingly engage in applied research to the detriment of basic research, they will restrict and possibly destroy

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the freedom of scholars to choose the subjects of their investigations.

Gabriel Kolko's observations in *Government and University in America* regarding military research are equally pertinent to industrial research:

> No one opposes the free choice of subjects for inquiry, but the critical question is whether such choice begins with the scholar, who is then free to explore unpredicted but promising dimensions of his study, or whether external agencies designate for him the subject matter and even the research data. Academic freedom is inherently incompatible with military research . . . because the essence of freedom and creativity is the ability of the scholar to decide in the manner, place and time of his own choosing what research to do and how to release the product of his effort.

Furthermore, by succumbing to the temptation of cashing in on industrial contracts and giving financial priority to "productive" departments while starving or eliminating the "nonproductive," universities may crush this freedom entirely. At the University of Michigan, for example, a recent report alleges that "A new era is underway. . . . U. of M. is cutting programs which serve broad social needs and opening its doors to business and the military." The cuts—"selective discontinuance" in administrative jargon—are apparently aimed at the Schools of Art, Education, and Natural Resources, with the Geography Department slated for elimination.

Another knotty problem is the intrusion of the cash nexus into the traditional governance of the university. In the heated debate over the commercialization of DNA research, Harvard's general counsel stated that "when considering the promotion of junior faculty whose work might offer considerable commercial promise, the possibility of financial return must not prejudice or seem to prejudice the academic decision on promotion." But, retorted Professor of Zoology, Richard C. Lewontin, "The prospect of the University treating with an even hand and without the slightest prejudice a professor in whom it has already invested $200,000 in a joint financial venture is ludicrous."

Similar objections were voiced in a discussion at M.I.T.'s Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, which is a gift from Edwin C. Whitehead, the founder of Technicon and Revlon's largest single shareholder. The institute is to be operated in conjunction with M.I.T., which will designate several candidates for the self-perpetuating 14-member board including three of Whitehead's children, who will comprise a majority of the key finance committee. The Whitehead Institute will appoint up to 20 professors of the M.I.T. Biology Department. "This plan threatens to change the nature of higher education," contends Biology Professor Sheldon Penman. "It promises to open the door to people coming in with a lot of money to throw around. . . . We lose control over our faculty appointments, we lose control over our graduate students, we lose control over the direction of our research." These are risks the M.I.T. faculty voted overwhelmingly to take—together with $20 million for building the nonprofit institute, $7.5 million for general purposes, $5 million a year for staff, and a permanent endowment of $100 million.

The intimate working association of graduate students and professors in projects affiliated with industry poses a particularly delicate problem. Stanford's Graduate Student Academic Affairs Committee has identified a number of distressing practices arising from this conflict of interest—such as the use of a student's ideas in industrial patents without recognition of that student's contribution; deliberate attempts by faculty to channel student research into areas of lesser academic merit but of potential benefit to commercial enterprises; faculty suppression of information (normally available to colleagues and students) to advance the competitive position of a firm. "These faculty-industrial ties," the committee asserts, "blur the traditional distinction between research sponsor and researchers and make it difficult for faculty to adequately protect the interests of their students working on sponsored research. . . ."

Finally, there is an issue that, perhaps because of embarrassing political ramifications, the NCR report touches upon rather gingerly: "The less basic the research, the more difficult becomes the determination of whether the use of public funds for university-industrial re-

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search relationships is proper." The NCR's assumption seems to be that applied research is too directly tied to private profit to justify the use of public funds, whereas basic research is sufficiently removed to make it palatable. But this is a vacuous distinction. Basic research necessarily precedes applied research and is therefore inextricably linked with whatever marketable products eventuate. And since most universities today are either public or quasi-public institutions by virtue of their tax-exempt status and their receipt of large government grants, the public has an interest in what is being investigated and the fruits thereof. Since the universities constitute "a substantial social investment, one made over many years by generations of tax-payers, scholars, contractors, workers, scientists and the like," writes David Noble, they "are an inherited resource that rightfully belongs to all of us."

Yet, "the firm has in essence transformed a part of a public-sector social resource into a private-sector preserve with little public scrutiny or accountability over its use of the facility." Ironically, having paid for the labs, the instrumentation, and often the salaries of research personnel, the public will pay again when the corporation retails the product, frequently under long-term, exclusive license that permits the company to charge what the market will bear.

The absence of public representation is especially deplorable in the schools of agriculture, where applications of biotechnology could lead to a profound restructuring of farming. "The determining influence," a bulletin from Cornell's Department of Rural Sociology tells us, "will no doubt be the large multinational corporations because [they] will be in the best position to control the allocation of capital to biotechnology research and to the . . . commercialized biotechnology substances." Pointing to the millions of dollars in federal support for recombinant DNA research and the more recent investments of the multinationals, the Cornell bulletin echoes Noble: "Clearly the research underpinning [of] the earliest biotechnological products has . . . been underwritten by public funds. . . . Thus, what has largely been a 30-year social investment is suddenly a private windfall brought about by . . . university-corporate agreements."

Most of the problems relevant to academic freedom are being debated within or on the periphery of the academic community. The March 1982 Pajaro Dunes Conference of university presidents and corporation executives, the ACLU, the Association of American Universities, and the Association of American University Professors, all have proposed or soon will propose a series of guidelines to deal with these problems. But to dwell on academic-freedom issues alone is to overlook the forest for the trees, however endangered that freedom may be. The paramount issue remains: who is to control the university's intellectual capital—society, to serve the public interests—or national and multinational corporations, to serve theirs? It is a question that our democratic polity must resolve sooner or later if it wishes to secure the social benefits to which it is entitled.

"What we want is to get pregnant without really losing our virginity," quipped one administrator, speaking of the university-industrial connection and its implications. Alas, this is a miracle unlikely to recur, especially in the academic setting. □

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Frank Hearn, Michael Mertens, Jamie Faricellia

An American Tragedy: Act Two

Smith-Corona, the typewriter manufacturer, has been in the Cortland, New York, area for over 60 years. On June 30, 1982, SCM Corporation, the parent company, announced its intention to shut down one of its five area plants within the next 18 months and relocate its operations to an existing Singapore facility. The closing means that at least 400 of the more than 900 workers at the plant will lose their jobs and the remaining work force will be retained at other plants. These reductions are part of a trend that began in December 1981, when SCM announced, with short notice, the elimination of more than 500 jobs. In April '82 another 200 jobs were abolished with less than one week's notice. With the plant closing, Smith-Corona's entire labor force will be reduced to 2,800. If the past is any guide, the majority of those still with jobs will suffer substantial losses in wages and benefits.

The response to SCM's decision to close the plant and thus continue its prodigious contribution to a local unemployment rate hovering around 13 percent is instructive to those of us searching for silver linings in the cloud of Reaganomics. "I think that they are doing the responsible thing," declared Cortland's mayor, whose observation in the aftermath of the December job loss—"the people of Cortland are used to being laid off"—implied that there is little to worry about. The local newspaper attributed SCM's plight to high taxes, government regulations, and the Department of Commerce's failure to enforce antidumping legislation regarding import goods. (SCM strives diligently, with the assistance of Senators Moynihan and D'Amato, to make the Japanese the scapegoat in this affair, despite a government study, carried out in response to SCM's charges, which determined that Japanese dumping of typewriters on the American market amounted to less than 0.5 percent of the dumping margin). Finally, a group of Smith-Corona workers, after having requested and received permission from management, launched a petition drive aimed at having the federal government agree to purchase more American (that is, SCM) typewriters. To date, this has been the workers' only collective response to the loss of their jobs, the diminution of their income, and the threatened destruction of their community.

"IT SEEMED so truly a story of what life does to the individual—and how impotent the individual is against such forces," Theodore Dreiser wrote about *An American Tragedy* in 1927, two years after its publication. In the novel, Dreiser tells the story of Clyde Griffiths, a man driven to murder by the dream of upward mobility, social acceptance, money, and success. Dreiser's tale of Clyde Griffiths is a fictionalized account of the well-publicized 1906 Chester Gillette murder case. Gillette, a poor-relation minor official in his uncle's prosperous Cortland shirt factory, began courting the daughter of one of the town's socially prominent families and soon regarded marriage to her as essential to his rise to the top of Cortland's elite. But there was one problem—

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Grace Brown, an impoverished mill hand pregnant with his child. Gillette disposed of this "problem" by drowning the woman. He soon was caught and tried, and in 1908 he was executed.

Through Dreiser's pen, Grace Brown's murder comes to represent the uncontrollable destructiveness unleashed in the pursuit of the American dream. Dreiser cuts through the shallowness of that American dream and takes us to turn-of-the-century Cortland to see the dark side of the spectacle of America on the make. Today, of course, America is no longer on the make. Yet the American dream, in all its tragic dimensions, continues to be sustained in end-of-the-century Cortland. Located in the geographical center of the state, Cortland has undergone only superficial changes since Dreiser's visit in 1925. Settled amidst rolling farmland, Cortland remains small, rural, antiunion, and politically conservative. The shirt factory no longer exists. SCM now is the largest employer. Ranked the 200th largest corporation by *Fortune*, SCM reported a 1981 profit of close to $57 million. In addition to Smith-Corona, it holds controlling interest in Glidden Paints, Proctor-Silex, and Durkee Foods, to name a few of its subsidiaries. This large, profitable, highly diversified multinational corporation started in the Cortland area. How much longer it will remain in the area is not at all certain.

SCM's plant-closing announcement in June '82 was no surprise. For one thing, the company had eliminated over 700 jobs since December. For another, in February the local newspaper had reported the boast of Paul Elicker, the firm's chairman and president: "Since I have been chief executive of SCM, we have terminated some three dozen operations, and I can assure you we will not hesitate to do so in the future if it is necessary and appropriate." What was surprising, given SCM's well-known custom of informing affected workers (here some with 10 or more years seniority), only hours or days prior to layoffs and job losses, was the 18-months advance notice that was eventually provided by the company. In taking this action, SCM was responding to a small but well-publicized community movement to hold it accountable for the consequences of its investment decisions.

In the aftermath of the first wave of job losses, a small group of Cortland residents formed a grass-roots organization calling itself the Cortland Community Interest Campaign (CCIC). None of the organizers were workers at SCM, but concern for the survival of their community and the plight of the workers led to their attempt to put pressure on local politicians to take responsibility in meeting the crisis that faced the people of Cortland.

The CCIC attempted to organize its efforts around the issue of prenotification, focusing on a bill currently alive in the state senate. The proposed law calls for one year's notification before the closing of a firm employing more than 500 people and includes provisions for severance pay, continuation of health benefits, retraining programs, and a community assistance fund from which low-interest loans could be drawn by individuals and small businesses to help cope with the problems created by the loss of a major employer. The group's first step was to petition the city council to consider supporting the prenotification bill. In less than a week, 2,000 area residents endorsed the petition and organizers gained confidence that the issue would at least be considered on the local level. However, the local newspaper editorialized that the idea of prenotification is "unreasonable and unrealistic," and the mayor, local business leaders, and the Chamber of Commerce quickly and vehemently recorded their opposition to it. In this context, CCIC organizers could gather little support from wary and confused workers. Not even the clergy, the Democratic party, or any popular "liberal" personalities offered active support when approached by the group. Finally, when calls for a city-council sponsored public hearing to discuss the feasibility of prenotification were met with silence or refusal, the CCIC organized its own public meeting for that purpose.

The meeting, held on March 1, attracted approximately 120 people. It included presentations by two local organizers, a representative from the United Brotherhood of Electrical Workers' local in Buffalo, and by long-time activist Paul O'Dwyer. Statements of support

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from Senator Martin Conner and Assemblyman Frank Barbaro, chief sponsors of the prenotification bills in the state legislature, also were presented. One of the several Smith-Corona executives in attendance joined with the head of the Cortland County Industrial Development Agency to oppose the concept of prenotification on the now familiar but mistaken grounds that it is not feasible, restrictive of free enterprise, and a disincentive to industry. He went on to give the unmistakable impression that SCM had stabilized its Cortland work force and that further cutbacks were not anticipated. (Yet two weeks later, 200 more workers were notified one week in advance of the elimination of their jobs.)

The meeting received extensive television, radio, and press coverage in and around Cortland. In its aftermath, the local newspaper significantly qualified its outright opposition to prenotification in an editorial that urged the city council and the county legislature to hold public hearings for the purpose of opening and fully considering the proposal. Similarly, the leader of the minority party in the county legislature publicly pledged to canvas his Democratic colleagues in an effort to get them at last involved in the issue. Although the council and legislature persisted in their refusal to give the proponents of prenotification a hearing, these small signs of minimal support along with the successful petition drive and the negative publicity SCM received as a consequence of the meeting pressured the company to act in a more responsible manner. The 18-month advance notice provided by SCM in its latest announcement is the result of this pressure.

Up to the point of the meeting, not one SCM worker could be persuaded to actively assist in the effort to mitigate the company's abuses. Despite the growing respectability and legitimacy accorded the campaign after the meeting and the continuation of massive layoffs, job terminations, and pay reductions induced by the ensuing bumping, the complete inactivity of SCM workers continued. Conversations with these workers reveal a web of coercion and control that effectively prevents them from organizing or making their complaints heard. One woman told of how managers would disperse small groups that congregated during lunch or coffee breaks in the weeks after the prenotification issue emerged, fearing they would be discussing the matter. Another noted that she was threatened for circulating a petition in support of a non-smoking area in the cafeteria. Workers on the assembly line, most of whom are women, tell stories of intimidation and harassment, of noisy and hazardous work conditions. In the bars they frequent, the layoffs are described as maternity leaves, the result of getting "fucked" too often by SCM. In living rooms and bars, outside supermarkets and the unemployment office, many SCM workers expressed hostility toward the company and support for the prenotification effort. Yet for fear of losing a job or jeopardizing the jobs of family members at SCM, none actively participated and all but a few refused to endorse the petition. This response, much like the more general response of the community, to SCM's reprehensible and destructive behavior—passive acceptance founded on inchoate anger, fear, and frustration—has its roots in Cortland's history of labor-capital relations.

Cortland's birth as an industrial community dates back to the 1870s and the success of Chester and Theodore Wickwire, natives of the city whose small hardware business spawned the development of a $3 million conglomerate that was to produce a quarter of the world's wire cloth by 1928. The circumstances surrounding that birth illustrate a rather typical scenario, which greeted many industrial pioneers in the late 19th century. A rural community relatively sheltered from the effects of America's "industrial revolution," Cortland welcomed with pride the sudden success of the new enterprise and accepted the Wickwire family as harbinger of a new and modern era. By 1915, Wickwire Bros., Inc., had expanded to include a plant for drawing and weaving wire, a rod-rolling mill, an open-hearth steel mill, and a blooming mill. The company employed more than 1,500 people and its physical plant covered a 36-acre area on the south side of the city of Cortland.

Presenting themselves as philanthropists and public benefactors, the Wickwires focused attention on their numerous contributions to the

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community. Donations to the local hospital and park, art exhibits from their priceless collection, the visible splendor of their mansions, and the mere presence of their "high society" made Cortland a place to be noticed. Moreover, their apparent regard for the work force, reflected in job-safety programs, the existence of emergency hospital services at the plants, and "gifts" such as a $7.50 bonus to employees in 1935 were acknowledged by many in the community. In this setting, Cortland became a company town whose workers stood ready to obey, respect, and trust their generous benefactors. Such visible indicators of the company's generosity, however, obscure the narrow scope of its benefits to its workers and the community.

The consequences of Wickwire's paternalistic grip were harshly experienced by those who tried to challenge the company for the unsatisfactory working conditions, poor treatment of workers, and low wages that prevailed beneath the veneer of social responsibility. Throughout the century of Wickwire reign, numerous labor struggles and attempts to unionize were either thwarted or contained. Several years before the company closed down in 1971, United Steel Workers' Local 2371 gained a foothold in the plant but was unable to achieve significant gains. After announcing a decision to strike for higher wages in July 1968, Frank Lorenzo, the president of Local 2371, complained to the local paper that Wickwire was "20 years behind the times in wages," paying an average of $2.18 per hour. According to Lorenzo, many Wickwire workers had to "moonlight" in order to earn enough to live, while some collected welfare to supplement their low wages.

Two specific instances of conflict in Cortland's recent past shed much light on how the paternalism instituted by Wickwire, with its consequent paralysis of the work force, has permeated the social, political, and economic fabric of Cortland life. Both instances illustrate the forces at work that have prevented effective change in the past and live on to make the present conflict with SCM profoundly difficult.

• The first incident involved Smith-Corona itself in the late 1950s, when the corporation merged with Marchant Calculators, Inc., to form the present SCM. With the expansion in ownership and management came the conversion from bench-assembly to assembly-line production. During the labor trouble that resulted from the ensuing reduction of pay and the shorter, more rigidly scheduled work breaks, the International Union of Electricians attempted three times to bring their organization into the SCM plants. According to John Mack, an SCM employee from 1952 to 1968, the IUE won the support of many workers but ultimately was voted down. During that period, SCM attempted to quell labor turmoil by setting up a committee system whereby each work area (about 100 people) elected individuals to represent it before the management. Mack, who said he supported the changes ushered in by assembly-line conversion on the grounds that such cost-effective measures were necessary if SCM was to continue to compete in the portable-typewriter market, was appointed by management as president of the committee system.

By-laws were set up according to traditional union procedures, and the new "company union" was allowed to meet on company time. Mack, who had openly condemned the wildcat strikes attempted before the committee system was established, said he believed grievances were finally being answered under the new system. Though the committee system "worked smoothly" for over a year, the National Labor Relations Board, at the request of the IUE, declared it unlawful since it was not initiated by the workers themselves. Soon after the committee system was dissolved, SCM management appointed Mack the official liaison between management and all SCM workers in the five Cortland area plants. According to Mack, this new arrangement worked for a couple of years.

Mack said he feels SCM workers rejected the IUE because "they didn't really understand what the union was." The bottom line, he said, was that most people were reluctant to take money from their wages to pay union dues. After the controversy around assembly-line conversion abated, Mack noted, "people gradually accepted that this is the way it's going to be."

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• The second, more recent instance of labor conflict concerns the shutdown of the Brockway Truck assembly plant in 1977; it, too, illustrates the constraints placed on Cortland workers. Brockway, a subsidiary of Mack Trucks of Allentown, Pa., had brought fame to Cortland as producer of the "Huskie Dog," known to many as the Cadillac of tractor trailers. Its decision to close in the spring of 1977 spurred a conflict that divided the community and pitted worker against worker, resurrecting deep-seated jealousies and misapprehensions that have continually undermined attempts to unify the Cortland work force.

Rumors that Mack Truck might terminate operations at Brockway began circulating in November 1976. During this time, Local 68 of the UAW was in the process of negotiating a new contract with management. After rejecting management's proposed cost-reduction plan, which included a two-year wage freeze, more management discretion in assignment of work, and exclusion of Brockway bargaining units from all master agreements between Mack Truck and the UAW, the UAW attempted to reach a compromise between Local 68 and Mack. According to Edward Wingenbach, then president of Local 68, Mack Truck issued a "letter of understanding," proposing that workers accept a moratorium on wages, holidays, and vacations in return for a new contract at the end of 1977 and retroactive to the beginning of the year. In addition, the proposal included provisions for severance pay, and transfer with seniority to any of the six Mack plants in the Mack council of the UAW. The Local rejected this compromise and engaged in an unauthorized strike on January 20, 1977. By April 4, 1977, the plant was closed, the workers had no contract and, according to management, the unauthorized strike voided any previous agreements regarding severance pay and transfer rights. For the 500 former Brockway workers, years of working for future security were as good as lost.

In addition to the financial hardships endured by the Brockway workers after the closing, the community's response to their plight was disturbing. Workers at other Cortland plants virtually gloated over the closing and accused their Brockway counterparts of "driving the company away" by "asking for too much." Moreover, attempts by the Local to save the plant were met with scorn and disdain. According to Wingenbach, the union sought help from local as well as state officials, but to no avail. More distressing was the systematic blacklisting of Brockway workers after the closing (see Aronson and McKersie, "Economic Consequences of Plant Shutdowns In New York State," New York State Employment and Training Council, 1980). Firms such as SCM and Pall Trinity Micro "wouldn't touch Brockway workers," exclaimed Wingenbach. The community's seeming support for such punitive action, sometimes blatantly expressed in letters to the editor in the local newspaper, testified to a competition among neighbors that has served to inhibit effective labor organization in Cortland. Five years after the shutdown the scars remain. When asked to sign a petition in support of prenotification for Smith-Corona workers, a former Brockway employee refused, saying "they didn't support us when we were in trouble, why should we support them!"

In Wingenbach's view, the Brockway workers' failure to settle on a contract before the closing stemmed from their refusal to believe that the company would ever leave. There was no indication that business was suffering; orders were plentiful, profits were good. Wingenbach said he believes that the decision to close probably resulted from the relative uselessness of the Cortland plant, which was small and outdated, for Mack's larger operation. By not accepting a contract, he said, "we played right into the company's hands." In any event, the legacy of passive acceptance, which underlies the community's toleration of corporate irresponsibility, was strengthened by the abusive treatment accorded the Brockway workers. We find in such passive acceptance ground for the American tragedy.

The Gillette murder case was far from uncommon in Dreiser's day. Dreiser examined about a dozen similar murders before selecting it as the basis of *An American Tragedy*. Our story is equally common. Cortland is like most other

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communities in the United States: we have no socialist legislators, no effective wide-based community and neighborhood organizations, no rebellious workers. Cortland's story may be far more significant than Santa Monica's; it's a story suggesting that, so far, Reagan's policy and the exacerbation of corporate irresponsibility it fosters do little to promote conditions for a revitalization of our democratic spirit.

Dreiser's primary concern, Irving Howe has written, was with the "tragedy of human waste: energies, talents, affections all unused." Much of this human waste results from continued adherence to conventional solutions that long ago lost their capacity for resolve.

During his imprisonment and while awaiting his execution, Dreiser's character Clyde Griffiths receives two books, *Robinson Crusoe* and *Arabian Nights*—the first celebrating the self-reliant man who in difficult circumstances and with nothing but his own resources fashions a decent life for himself, the second portraying an imaginary world where wishes are fulfilled and aspirations met by a magical genie. Dreiser's point is obvious enough: the ideology of self-reliance guides the pursuit of the American dream, especially in rough times; but the dream can be realized only with the assistance of a genie who will secure for us what is beyond our reach. American self-reliance issues from passivity. Clyde Griffiths had two genies, a long-lost rich uncle and a wealthy girlfriend, through whom he hoped to rise from poverty to small-town elite.

Cortland today has one genie, the large corporation. Keep that genie comfortable and he will do it for us, fulfill our every wish. Maintaining the proper business climate becomes the solution to the problem. Accordingly, the head of the country's Industrial Development Agency, armed with tax abatements and low-interest loans, warns the community that support for a modest prenotification bill will frighten the industry genie away; and Cortland's mayor applauds a plant closing while the other politicians remain silent bystanders, the local newspaper urges the slashing of taxes and regulations, and the county legislature begins its deliberations on the plight of Cortland with the testimony of a local teen-ager who has recently returned from Disney World. "Ya Gotta Believe" is her message, and if we do, Cortland will become as prosperous as Orlando. Self-reliance of this type is simply passivity dressed up as a welcome to the corporate genie.

The tragedy, of course—and in this case it is a peculiarly American tragedy—is the insistence on seeing a solution where none exists any more. In important respects, Cortland's business climate, given the present realities of American society, is probably as good as it can be. Friendly politicians, a supportive press, and an extraordinarily docile work force combine to make Cortland a fertile American ground for corporate investment—but it's not nearly as attractive as Honduras, Costa Rica, Brazil, and Singapore, where SCM now does much of its investing. Eroding the local tax base in order to establish the proper business climate—the road generally taken by self-reliance—is no longer a solution. Clyde Griffiths is as much victim as victimizer in Dreiser's characterization. Dreiser relieves Clyde of responsibility for his act, portraying him as caught up in forces and moved by events over which he has no control. In Clyde's story, Dreiser wants us to see the boundless capacity for suffering that makes the persistence of the American dream possible, and he wants us to recognize, too, that "sometimes even the mediocre and the inefficient attain to a classic stature when dignified by pain." In Cortland, the capacity for suffering at this point does appear endless; signs of pain-wrought dignity, however, are difficult to come by. Perhaps they are hidden from view by the large billboard recently erected by the city council as a key element in its $30,000 "let's pull ourselves up by our bootstraps" campaign to attract new industry. The billboard reads: "Business and Industry Wanted: Plentiful Labor, Land, Water, Accessibility. Cortland County: A Great Area to Grow With." It stands unobtrusively on the outskirts of Cortland, on Route 81, as an invitation—a plea, really—to genies passing by on the road from Syracuse to Binghamton to save the town from execution.

THE OLD GENIES, long-lost rich uncles and profit-making corporations, once fulfilled wishes and expected little more than deference

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in return. Now rich uncles are in short supply and corporations demand, in addition to deference, cheap labor costs on the order of the 97 cents an hour that is the average pay in Singapore. Comic effect often results when people persist today in calling for the genies and in waiting humbly for a reply. But as the comic relief dissipates, the American tragedy is revealed. And as Dreiser discovered 60 years ago, this tragedy plays well in Cortland. Neither the community at large nor its workers in particular show any willingness to deploy defensive measures, never mind an interest in creating an innovative response to corporate and political insensibility. Morale is rapidly deteriorating; pride has long since gone. Reaganomics will continue to be met with little resistance. For workers in Cortland and in the many places like it throughout the country, the 1980s promise to be grim. □

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

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Barbara Taylor

Eve and the New Jerusalem

Imaginings of a utopian, or utopian socialist, future can be traced from chapters in Scripture to present-day works. The 19th century was particularly fruitful in this respect; it not only produced works of literary imagination but abounded in significant, organized movements in Europe, some of them exported to this country, aiming to mobilize communities on egalitarian principles. But as it concerns the liberation of women, none was more energetic than that of the Owenites in England (who were among those roundly condemned as "unscientific" by Friedrich Engels). They were founded by Robert Owen, a Welsh manufacturer who first experimented with a kind of anticapitalist "social engineering" in his own mills, then turned to organizing a general movement for the betterment of men and *women—and to this Barbara Taylor directs her primary interest in a richly detailed book,* Eve and the New Jerusalem, *from which we excerpt a brief section below.*

Feminism and socialism were not always partners but they did come together, the author argues, in the Owenite movement. She writes: "One hundred and fifty years later, however, it is precisely this aspect of Owenism—its theoretical and practical commitment to women's liberation—which is least remembered. . . . To Robert Owen and his followers, particularly his feminist followers, socialism represented a struggle to achieve 'perfect equality and perfect freedom at every level of social existence.' " In this book, Barbara Taylor has rectified a gap in historical scholarship, including that of the left. We have had to delete numerous footnotes that provide evidence in support of her contentions.—EDS.

The drive for collective self-improvement was a keynote of Socialist life. A puritan zeal for personal reform, combined with a burning thirst for "useful knowledge" and social respectability, were typical of the upper working class in general and of radical workers in particular, whose radicalism almost invariably implied an overt rejection of the more debasing features of popular culture. In the Owenites' case, all these impulses were further stiffened by their faith in the revolutionary power of Correct Character Formation. To make Socialism, it was emphasized, it was first necessary to make Socialists, and nearly every item on the movement's internal agenda was geared to this task of cultural "elevation": a collective bootstrap-pulling operation on a grand scale.

This project, it should be noted, was in sharp contrast to the integrationist and disciplinarian goals of other would-be "improvers" of the working class in the same period, although the means employed were often strikingly similar. Teetotalism, educational reform, and "rational recreation" were campaigns that engaged both Socialist and bourgeois-philanthropic energies in the 1830s and 1840s. But whereas most Owenites saw these reformist endeavors as "stepping stones to a New Social System," their competitors fervently hoped they would lead working people into sober, industrious

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behavior within the existing system—a difference in political emphasis that led to numerous clashes between, for example, Socialist temperance advocates (who urged that the money saved through abstinence from alcohol should be invested in communities) and Evangelical temperance advocates (who banned Socialists from their meetings and tore up their temperance tracts). In town after town, Owenites invaded local agencies of moral improvement in an attempt to convert them into vehicles for Social Regeneration, and in town after town this led to acrimonious meetings, the expulsion of Socialist agitators, and often the establishment of Owenite counter-institutions, such as the Halls of Science, which were founded as radical alternatives to the bourgeois-sponsored Mechanics Institutes. The improving spirit, in other words, could take many directions, and in the Owenites' case the route chosen was usually fiercely independent, democratic, and class-conscious: a style of working-class respectability that soon became as detestable to its upper-class opponents as the cries of an angry rabble. A letter from Sir Charles Shaw to Lord Ashley, written in 1843 in response to his lordship's request for information on the state of the lower orders, informed him that the "best legally conducted people" to be found in the working population were "the Socialists, who are all teetotalists and readers" yet no less abhorrent for that: "all know their morals to be bad for society. . . ."

ONE OF THE TWO MAJOR PRONGS of this Owenite improving campaign was a drive to create a new style of working-class recreation; the second was the development of an alternative educational program. Let us begin with the recreation issue.

With the collapse of the Consolidated Union in 1834 "the area to which first principles could be applied in [Socialist] branch life was narrowed from everyday working life" to "leisure-time . . . alone" where Socialist activities competed with a host of other, less edifying recreations available to working people. "When we see how the leisure hours are employed . . . by the masses of people . . . it is lamentable enough," one Cambridgeshire Owenite sighed in a letter to a community newspaper there. He went on to list "alehouses, race courses and skittle alleys" as a few of the "low and debasing" amusements that absorbed the time and money of workers—or rather of working men, since none of these were female pleasures. The alternative to these masculine entertainments that he and others urged was a sober, gentle, family-oriented social life that allowed for the maximum participation of women and children. This was the philosophy behind the multifunctional Social Institutions established in most branches whose aim, in the words of the prospectus for the Worcester Social Institution, was to provide "large public rooms wherein the working class might assemble with their wives and children to acquire and communicate useful knowledge, and wherein they might have innocent recreation and rational amusement at so trifling an expense as to be within the means of the poorest." In 1840 one of the leading activists in the Manchester branch told the story of his early years as a radical organizer in that city, when the only meeting venues were pubs whose inebriated clientele indiscriminately cheered progressive orators and reactionary opponents alike. Fired by this experience, he and his fellows had "determined upon attempting to elevate the character of the working classes. . . .":

> At first everyone said it was a mad trick—it was the greatest absurdity to talk about the working classes having halls of their own—schools of their own—music halls of their own—libraries of their own; why it was said the plan was preposterous . . . it was the rich, and the rich alone (it was said) for whom these things were intended; but he and his friends were determined that the poor should have them too. They therefore called the working classes together, and explained . . . how easy it would be for them to get instruction for themselves and their children, and how much more enjoyment there would be in the family circle if they joined in music and song at home, instead of the son being at the public-house, the daughter roaming the streets, and the poor mother breaking her heart at home. Proud was he to say that they had succeeded to a considerable extent; the working classes were now determined to be elevated; they were determined no more to be slaves. . . .
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> [*New Moral World*, October 1840.]

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By 1840 the Manchester Owenites had built their own Hall of Science (an enormous Gothic edifice with "Doric columns" and seats for 3,000) with funds raised by selling one-pound shares to local working men who (in the words of one) "having tasted the sweets of education, sobriety, and strictly moral habits are desirous of facilitating the means of imparting the like character . . . to their brother workmen." Within a few months, the Hall was able to offer its members a rich agenda of activities, from evening classes and Sunday schools ("for interested persons of both sexes"), to dances, picnics, day-outings and an occasional Grand Social Festival with dinner and dancing. A band was formed that practiced during the week for its regular Sunday morning performances. Tea parties (to which "female members are particularly invited") were frequent and popular, and often provided the occasion for a short lecture on women's rights by a local speaker. "Community dress" was sometimes worn at these functions, as a way of symbolizing the connection between present comradeship and future communalism.

Similar halls were established in more than two dozen Owenite centers by 1842, although in some cases (as in the Worcester branch) they were really only small workshops that had their fittings altered, benches added, and a plaque hung proudly ove the door, "Hall of Science" —"not that we had much science," the local Social Missionary in Worcester, George Holyoake, recalled, "only a preference for it. . . ." In every case the building became the focus of a cultural life whose closest equivalent, in Old World terms, was undoubtedly the plebian chapel. In the Salford Social Institution, for example, "a good book of music was formed, singers were drilled, a hymn book published, a form of service arranged . . . [for] the Sunday meetings" when a sermon would be delivered on some Social topic. In 1836 the branch purchased a "delightfully toned seraphania" to accompany its congregational hymn-singing. Other branches rehearsed choirs and held regular Sunday services, while some even provided their own funerals and child-namings, in addition to the weddings.* Christian holy days, no matter how solemn, were celebrated with a blasphemous gusto that would have made even hymn-singing suspect to most Methodists. Christmas Day 1839, for example, was observed by the London Owenites with a party whose "entertainments" included "music, dancing, singing," and various "scientific" experiments with laughing-gas, electricity, "electro-magnetism, chemistry, geology, phrenology, optics." On the same day the Liverpool branch also held a Social Festival that was duly reported in the *New Moral World* [January 5, 1839]:

> A good band was in attendance. We had country dances, quadrilles, hornpipes, marches, recitations, glees, songs, etc.; and . . . an address suitable for the occasion, recommending strict adherence to the great principles of our profession. . . . It made my heart glad to see so many of the wives and children of our married members there, all enjoying themselves, more than they had done since the pleasing days of courtship; and I believe it was the wish of us all that the time may speedily come, when we shall be enabled to meet in community, where we shall enjoy these and much greater pleasures, without measure and without end.

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*This pilfering of the sacramental rites did not increase the Socialists' popularity with the clergy, particularly when these ceremonies were then invested with "blasphemous" content. Naming rituals, for example, were often the occasion for a little diatribe against the doctrine of original sin, while funerals were not only displays of mournful appreciation of a lost brother or sister, but also infidel demonstrations on a large scale. The Socialist who had died an unrepentant free-thinker ("No fearful terrors—no false hopes, depressed . . . or . . . excited him. . . .") would often be followed to the grave by hundreds or even thousands of comrades. Hymns were sung and sermons delivered (the chosen text on one occasion being "Whatever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might, for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge in the grave whither thou goest"). If there had been opposition from local clergy, huge mobs of curious or hostile townspeople would also arrive, sometimes to jeer, occasionally to stone or attack the procession, but often to stand awed by the solemn scale of the event. "We are glad to hear of . . . these solemn and catching ceremonials," James Morrison wrote after one such funeral in 1834 (*The Pioneer*, February 22, 1834), "they make a powerful impression on the public mind, and produce more permanent and decided results than the most eloquent speeches . . . ":

> make a new ceremonial for yourselves—a rival ceremonial—which shall win the people on your own side, by the very same arts by which kings and generals, bishops and monks, have in all ages secured popularity to themselves. Theirs was the tyrant's ceremony—let yours be the people's ceremony. . . .

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Such events usually attracted (in the words of one Manchester man) "many who have hitherto held aloof from us," particularly many women. When the Bradford branch introduced an orchestra into its menu of entertainments as a way of luring women, they met with great success: soon female attendance was "uncommonly numerous." Dance classes, balls, and concerts were all very well attended; so well attended, in fact, that they encouraged further sneers from the opposition, who accused the Owenites of turning their Halls of Science into dance halls with political speechifying as a mere "tax on admission." In at least one case the accusation came uncomfortably close to the mark. In 1844 the secretary of a London branch wrote to the *New Moral World* bewailing the collapse of all activities in his branch except dance sessions, which were held three or four times a week. "Our friends have paid by far greater attention to their lower than their upper understandings," he concluded dolefully.

But if the social medium occasionally drowned out the Social message, in general the opposite was true: not only did these playful events attract women and men for whom lectures would have been too dry an initiation, but they also provided an important training ground in Socialist principles. Before the dancing began at one Social Festival in Liverpool, for example, John Finch rose to remind those assembled of the natural equality of all mankind. "You will not, therefore, be found quizzing each other's dresses, language and manners," he urged them, but "will treat each other with the greatest kindness, like children of one family." Fellow-feeling and mutual respect were the emotional foundations on which Socialism would be built—including mutual respect between the sexes, which was encouraged in a host of little ways, from censure of obscene language (Robert Dale Owen was "girlishly sensitive to the coarse and ribald jests in which young men think it witty to indulge at the expense of a sex they cannot appreciate") through to constant reminders to male Socialists to smarten up before attending Social functions, and always to remove their hats. "To sit covered in the presence of *one* female is a breach of decorum." (Apparently these admonitions were necessary, since complaints of dirty clothes and rowdy behavior at Owenite events were fairly common. One report from Manchester complained of members talking during lectures and lounging about in the aisles "as in a promenade.") If a certain confusion between comradely courtesy and conventional etiquette was evident in all this,* at least the motivating impulse was always the same, for "each individual [to] do all in his and her power to . . . increase the general happiness."

FOR FEMALE SOCIALISTS, this style of social life had a threefold significance. First, it drew on strands within working-class culture that were traditionally associated much more closely with women than with men. This was most evident in activities modeled on the plebian church, which had long been a center of feminine sociability, but it could also be seen in all the other gentle and genteel "entertainments" on offer, which appealed to well-established female tastes. Second, this was a much more accessible form of political culture than the one it was trying to replace, based almost entirely on the male domains of workshop and pub. The pub in particular had acted as a focus of radical organization throughout the early 19th century, and the Owenites' decision to abandon it in favor of their own institutions was a deliberate step toward a feminized form of political development. "It would be injudicious to bring families to a public house, but this is only another reason why a society should have

*The line that divided mutual respect between the sexes from high-minded prudery was a very fine one indeed, and Socialist feminists occasionally crossed it. In 1841 Margaret Chappellsmith wrote a letter to the *New Moral World* (September 18, 1841) in which she criticized certain branches for allowing waltzing at their Social Festivals, thereby encouraging an extension of "that revolting familiarity which has arisen from large numbers of boys and girls being congregated in the same workshop, without anyone to check impropriety or sustain modesty." This familiarity arose, she went on to add, because of the "pernicious error that industry is a badge of disgrace, which subjects every milliner, dress-maker, and servant, or factory girl, to the rude touch and offensive speech of any vagabond. . . . We should strive to create virtuous dignity in females, and respectfulness toward them in males, and this, it appears to me, we do not if we allow the familiarity of the waltz."

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a house of its own . . ." an early article in *The Co-operator* explained, "why should females be so studiously excluded from cheerful and friendly meetings?"

Finally, the Owenites' campaign for moral and cultural improvement led to an immediate enhancement of women's social status, if only by providing them with respectable and respectful male companions. Here again the question of drink is an obvious case in point. Throughout the early 19th century, male alcoholism wreaked havoc on poor homes and the lives of women within them, soaking up wages that were desperately needed for family necessities and often leading to the wife-beating for which Englishmen were notorious. Socialist temperance propaganda always played on this theme of male selfishness and female misery, and since most Owenites were temperance supporters there was rarely any drink served at Social functions. "Excess, intoxication and noisy revelry have too often attended the banquetings of the 'old world,' " the secretary of the Socialist London District Board noted in 1841, "but these we have put from us," thereby also allowing them to terminate "the old practice of excluding the ladies" from such gatherings. A Huddersfield Socialist on his way home from a Social Festival there could not help but contrast

> the sobriety and civil manners of those who had participated in our "feast of reason" with the brutal language and bullying conduct of the unfortunates who were reeling from the public houses; and when I consider that those who were *now* so sober and courteous might, but for the circumstances of our festival, have been similarly situated to the individuals around me, the good moral results of these kind of institutions, and the general want of them appeared to me clear and self-evident as light amid darkness.

"The attendance of females is larger than formerly. . . ." his letter concluded. [*New Moral World*, January 19, 1839.]

In creating an atmosphere of cheerful respectability within their branch meetings, then, the Owenites not only provided women with "a foretaste of the pleasures to come" in community life, but also allowed them the more immediate satisfactions of sober husbands and courteous treatment. The enforcement of moral discipline was in itself a modest version of feminism, as the high level of female involvement in the temperance movement and later "social purity" campaigns demonstrated. But cultural puritanism and moral discipline, although they served to protect women from some of the harsher features of male dominance, also had the effect of policing women themselves. The Socialists' attempts to order their branch activities in ways that met women's particular needs became inextricably connected with a wider cultural redefinition of female needs themselves. The issue of drink serves again as an example of this process.

In insisting that meetings be held outside pubs so that women could attend, the Owenites were actually helping to enforce new standards of *female* temperance. Before the early 19th century, working-class women's presence in pubs, either alongside men or in all-women groups (like the Female Friendly Societies), had usually been taken for granted. It was only with the rise of the moral reform movements—conservative and radical alike—that alcohol and respectable womanhood came to be seen as wholly incompatible. Even the working women of the 1834 unions had often met in pubs, but by the 1840s few Socialist women would have done likewise. Nor, of course, would most of their husbands, and no doubt many women found the benefits of a teetotaling husband outweighed the loss of their own drinking rights; but it is important to see how the self-improvement mentality of the movement could actually serve to promote narrowed definitions of feminine respectability.

In all cases, opposition to women drinking was bound up with a higher valuation of their significance as wives and mothers, and this was as true of the Socialists as it was of other moral improvement campaigners. The whole drive toward sober, family-oriented leisure activities within the Owenite movement was fuelled by an underlying belief that the type of emotions and experiences associated with domestic life were the ones that should be nurtured in the collectivist environment of the branches. And although in principle these values and emotions were supposed to be generalized across the membership as a whole, in practice they fre-

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quently devolved on to the women alone. No one ever suggested, for example, that the way to prepare men for the New Moral World was to have them teach children or perform child care at branch meetings. Fatherhood was never the ground on which men entered political life. Instead, the "moral preparation" of children was seen as women's prerogative and one of their central contributions to the building of a Socialist society. In 1839 the women of the Manea Fen community were addressed by a leading male resident there:

> Sisters of the community! you who have all to gain and nothing to lose,—you who have been counted politically dead in law,—you whose rights have never been recognized except by the social system, remember, I say, you must get knowledge; on you mainly depends the character of our youths; on you depend mainly the peace and happiness of the community circle. Without you the superstructure would be unfinished; you, the chief cornerstone that the builders rejected, have become the bulwark of our peace and unity. [*Social Pioneer*, March 16, 1839.]

The "self-improvement" of women would lead to the moral regeneration of society as a whole. The practical implications of this idea were most obvious in the Socialists' policies with regard to women's education.

II

The most important self-help aspect of Owenism was its internal educational program. "Educate! Educate!! Educate!!!" the branches were exhorted in 1840,

> Let every institution forthwith have its Sunday and Day school, distribute tracts and works explanatory of the Social System with unsparing liberality, let the lecture rooms be made as attractive as possible, and be as seldom empty and unused. Commence, where possible, private classes, lyceums, reading rooms and other means of instruction and innocent recreation. Let us not be outstripped in the endeavour.

Two years later delegates to the Seventh Annual Congress were able to report that 29 branches had "Social Institutions" of which 8 seated over 1,000. In addition, 22 branches held regular classes, 9 had day schools, and 12 operated regular Sunday schools where both adults and children received elementary and "social" instruction. Twenty branches had libraries of their own.

Women were usually encouraged to participate on an equal basis in all these educational activities, from the sexually integrated class in chemistry held in a hired room over a pub at Dalkeith branch, to the separate "female classes" offered in many branches from 1830 on. Special emphasis was placed on women's attendance at all membership discussions, partly to coach them in Social Science (like the men, all women members of the Rational Society were supposed to pass a test in the Social principles before admission), but also to give them a forum in which to discuss their own condition. An agenda of discussions in the Ipswich branch for example, included: "The Emancipation of the Female Sex"; "May the Fogs of Religious Animosity be speedily dispelled by the Genial Sunshine of Universal Charity"; "The Formation of Character"; "The Connection between Women and Civilization"; and a discussion of the question of Miracles. In the Manchester Hall of Science, it was reported, "the evils of marriage are among the favourite topics; the women are told that they live in slavish dependence upon the men; the men are in their turn flattered that they are the producers of all wealth; they are the bees, the rich the drones. . . ." Classes like the one held in the Huddersfield branch, modeled on the Methodist class system, were adopted elsewhere, as a method of ensuring women's active participation.

The popularity of these classes and lectures among women was at least partly caused by the very low level of educational opportunities available to them elsewhere. Throughout the first half of the 19th century most working-class girls acquired what little schooling they could in dames' schools (schools run in the homes of local women who were often minimally educated themselves) or Sunday schools, which generally provided children with only enough education to allow them to carry out their religious duties. Charity day schools, most of them church-sponsored, provided a rudimentary literacy training, heavily supplemented by courses in needlework, cooking, and

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so on. But even this was beyond the reach of girls whose home duties or paid employment left them no time for daily attendance. "The education of the females of the lower classes, in many cases, does not extend even so far as a knowledge of their letters," one woman complained bitterly to *The Pioneer* in 1833, "in the agregate [sic] to sew and read (and that but very indifferently) is the sum of their acquirements. Yet these females are to be the bosom friends of the most useful portion of our population. . . ."

Adult women were no better served; partly, it was claimed, because of the hostility of their husbands who, in Frances Morrison's words, "tremble at the idea of a reading wife. . . ." The autodidacticism so central to the lives of radical working men usually played little part in the busy daily lives of their womenfolk. "Most working men now feel to read a newspaper is a want as urgent almost as the desire for food. . . ." as one journalist in a radical newspaper noted, "yet few of them take any trouble to create in their wives this taste for reading, fearing that it would lead to all sorts of problems with dirty homes and untended kitchens." The Mechanics Institutes established by middle-class educationalists for working men in the early decades of the century did not admit women either, probably for similar reasons. This policy soon elicited protests from Owenite feminists.

The Owenites' role in relation to the Mechanics Institutes is a good example of how the question of women's education arose in the context of a wider struggle over the control of working-class education. The Institutes were established by philanthropic industrialists who aimed to provide male workers with the skills and, more important, the disciplined work attitudes required in the expanding manufacturing sectors. The intrusion of radical elements into these Institutes was therefore viewed as a highly dangerous development. Socialist speakers were banned; Socialist texts were weeded out of Institute libraries and sometimes even destroyed. Political and religious disputation was prohibited, and radicals who persisted in trying to initiate such debates were often expelled. A number of the Owenite Halls of Science were founded by men who had either been expelled or seceded from a local Institute, including the Halls in Manchester, Coventry, and Sheffield. (The Sheffield Hall was established after a local Socialist leader had been sacked from his post as the Mechanics Institute's secretary for placing Socialist books in the Institute library. The new Hall announced its independence with a defiant inscription over the door: "Under the Patronage of Nobody.") A fierce competition then developed between these radical Halls and the Institutes, in which the question of women's education became one lively point of dispute, along with issues of democratic control, class aims, and political affiliation. "Would you improve intellectually and socially the *men* of the industrious classes, improve the *women* also," William Thompson urged in an early article supporting working-class control of the Institutes,

> Let your libraries, your models, and your lectures . . . be equally open to both sexes. Have not women an equal right to that happiness which arises from an equal cultivation of all their faculties that men have? . . . Long have the rich excluded the poorer classes from knowledge: will the poorer classes now exercise the same odious power to gratify the same anti-social propensity—the love of domination over the physically weaker half of their race? By such conduct the best fruits of their own knowledge would be lost. . . .

In 1830 a fierce struggle developed over democratization of the Manchester Mechanics Institute, in which female admission was one of the reforms demanded. A breakaway Institute was eventually established that immediately initiated classes for women and urged radicals in other towns to do likewise. By 1840 the Owenite reputation for supporting reforms in this area was so well known that when a group of women petitioned the Birmingham Mechanics Institute for classes and were refused ("such a thing would ruin the Atheneum in a month," the directors told them), they immediately turned to the Owenites. Delighted, the local branch provided them with classrooms and instructors and then used the incident as a handy stick with which to beat their middle-class competitors.

When one considers the reasons proffered by some Owenite leaders for this female instruc-

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tion, however, it is difficult to see how even the staunchest sexual conservative could have objected. The men who seceded from the Manchester Mechanics Institute in 1830, for example, urged women's classes on the grounds that "young women should be taught the duties of housewifery," and a decade later the founders of the Manchester Hall of Science were defending their own decision to provide instruction for women on the basis that "numerous scenes of domestic thriftlessness, discomfort and contention" would be thereby eliminated. "Elevate women everywhere, and the effects will speedily show themselves throughout society. . . . *That* is the keystone of the arch. . . ." When the Mechanics Institutes finally did begin to admit women in the mid-century, it was for exactly these reasons, since "the absence of a systematic provision for female instruction" had proved to be "a fertile source of improvidence and domestic unhappiness" in the homes of working men.

> Even the zealous friends of female education are afraid to press its claims on other than utilitarian and comparatively low grounds [one feminist complained in the mid-century]. Women are to be educated . . . in order to qualify them for the duties of wives . . . and servants. . . . How rarely is it argued that women should be educated in order that whatever capacities they possess may be permitted to grow to their full height! . . .

YET WITHIN OWENISM there were others willing to defend women's intellectual development on those higher grounds as well, including a number of feminists who demanded education precisely in order to free women from the narrow boundaries of domestic concerns ("the stupid, mind-destroying, mill-horse routine of domestic slavery" as one woman called it). Arguments veered back and forth. Articles defending women's innate mental equality ("are the sensations of woman weak . . . ? All persons affirm just the contrary. Then I argue that they ought all to admit . . . that the associative power infused into her ideas is also equal. . . .") appeared in the Socialist press alongside letters explaining that women ought only to be trained in nonanalytical subjects, since their concerns were with "matters of the affections" rather than "the cold calculations of masculine intellect." A good deal of this propaganda, whatever its particular line, was produced by the lower-middle-class wing of the movement, but it was generalized to apply to working-class women as well, who were alternately exhorted either to educate themselves for home duties or to prepare for "a wider sphere of action." "To be a good wife, nowadays, means nothing more than to be a *good drudge*," George Fleming told the 1840 Rational Society Congress, but under Socialism all this would change:

> The Socialists want women to be educated equal to themselves; they want to place women in such a position, as that the lecture-room, the ball-room, the study of the stars and earth, might be to her, as to others, a source of amusement and pleasure. (cheers) They wished women to be free—to assert their own dignity . . . as the wives and daughters of free men, enjoying equal benefits with them. They wished her no longer to be the inhabitant of the cellar and the kitchen. (cheers.) [*New Moral World*, June 20, 1840.]

It was this blend of ideals—the emancipationist and the "utilitarian"—that lay behind the classes that Owenite women themselves organized, of which the best-documented example was the Ladies Class established by the women at the London A1 branch in 1844. The class began with a few women in March and quickly grew to over 60 members. Its goals were laid out in a statement of "Objects and Laws":

> To promote the individual and collective happiness of every man, woman and child, without regard to country, colour, or class.
>
> 1st. By the circulation of useful, practical information.
>
> 2nd. By the cultivation of social and industrial pursuits, and the taste for literary and scientific pursuits,—including the song and the practice of the pianoforte.
>
> 3rd. By acquiring a practical knowledge of the science of human nature, the science of the formation of character and the science of society, as developed in the outline of the Rational system of society; and by giving all possible assistance to the establishment of Communities of mutual interest.

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4th. By taking an active part in the business of the Branch, and assisting each other in times of affliction.

[*New Moral World*, March 16, 1844.]

The cost of membership was twopence a week, and another a penny for those wishing to contribute to a "health insurance fund" for themselves and their families—an echo of the old Female Friendly Societies. Like most Female Friendly Societies also, the class was self-governing, with its own elected executive whose president (first a Mrs. Skelton and then a Mrs. Hornblower) also sat on the local branch executive. Classes in reading, writing, arithmetic, grammar, and history were reported to go so well that "an advance from this elementary instruction to the more arduous studies of moral and physical science" was urged, "for the time when woman shall, by equality of education, assume her rightful place in society. . . ." Discussions were wide-ranging, moving between "abstract rights, and the principles of political and social economy" to topics that conventional society would have deemed most improper for feminine ears. On one occasion, for example, a Mr. Ellis was brought in to deliver a lecture on "The Duty of Man as a Father" in which he

> dwelt at some length on the transmission of moral and physical diseases—the evils of near alliance—the want of a proper knowledge of anatomy, physiology, etc., and trusted much to the effects of the Ladies' Class to remove the existing false delicacy which prevented its acquirement. [*New Moral World*, April 20, 1844.]

This class was obviously considered a model of its kind. Its members, according to some male supporters, were "consistent demonstrators of our principles, living exponents of the superiority of morality and intellect over the stupid negative requirements of theology" —a reminder that one of the other functions of education for women was to wean them away from pious "superstition." The intellectual preparation for Socialism, in other words, involved not only mental enlightenment but a change in those characteristics thought feminine: instead of "false delicacy" there would be frank discussion; instead of religiosity, rationality; instead of "foolish giddiness," intellectual courage and moral strength. But always there remained the suggestion that these were merely "relative virtues," developed not to meet women's own expanding needs but those of their husbands and children. "The wife to an almost unbounded extent determines the happiness of her husband and children," the men of the A1 Branch reminded their sisters in a solemn public address, "If she is ignorantly selfish . . . she is a drawback upon his improvement, a poison to his existence. On the other hand, if she is enlightened . . . she pacifies and improves him, and sweetens the paths of domestic life. . . ." It was to this end, they assured the women, that they offered the class their heartfelt support.

Attempts to prefigure the egalitarian social relations of the New World within the boundaries of Old World existence were obviously going to run into practical limitations set by women's existing needs and responsibilities. In many ways Owenite branch life represented a genuine attempt to come to terms with those conditions and offer women an improved status within them. Certainly there were few other contemporary milieus that offered as much to women, intellectually and socially, as the Socialist movement. Nevertheless, the lack of female leadership in the branches was symptomatic of underlying ambiguities in Owenite thinking that were never resolved. Even the communities themselves reflected similarly divided and ambivalent attitudes toward the women's role—but here such problems were further complicated by a series of practical and political crises that not only made feminist reform difficult, but eventually undermined the Socialist movement as a whole. □

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Iring Fetscher

Some Problems of Democracy

Can It Remain Vital in Advanced Countries?

This article is the first in a series to appear intermittently in our pages, on the general theme of Problems of Democracy in Advanced Industrial Countries. The series has been made possible by a grant from the Joyce Mertz–Robert Gilmore Foundation, to which we express our gratitude. — EDS.

Classical Greek democracy was the social organization of the free "men" (not women) of a city-state (*polis*), who had either enough leisure to occupy themselves with matters of common interest or—in the late Athenian democracy—were compensated for their loss of time by public funds. The kind of equality at the bottom of this classical democracy was that of free (self-determined) men (family fathers) as opposed to the status of slaves, who were owned by private citizens or by the city-state.

Excessive wealth or poverty among free men was viewed as dangerous to the stability of the community. The very rich might easily become tyrants while the extremely poor multitude could become the social basis of popular dictatorship. Aristotle therefore argued that only the "middle class," people of moderate property, could provide a solid foundation for a democratic city-state. For the ancient Greeks, public offices ideally were filled by a kind of lottery in which every citizen had a real chance. The higher the public office the shorter the term during which a person could serve.

Classical Greek authors defined democracy as "rule of the majority of free citizens" or "the rule of the poorer majority over the richer minority." In the latter case they assumed that an equal distribution of wealth could not be realized.

Modern, bourgeois democracy was not based on the concept of a community of free men as distinguished from slaves but on one of a community of property owners of either land or other means of production. John Locke indirectly hints that the propertyless are neither "reasonable" (rational) nor "independent," and therefore incapable of shaping the commonwealth.

The same conviction—that only the property owner and socially independent man can be a citizen—was still expressed by Immanuel Kant (in *Metaphysics of Morals*). Thus bourgeois democracy was conceived originally as a society of economically independent owners of their means of production who exchanged (sold) their products (commodities). Propertyless males and all women were excluded from political rights. Jean Jacques Rousseau shared this view but insisted on an equal distribution of wealth as a precondition for a "good government." In his *Social Contract* we read:

> Under a bad government, this equality [of the citizens] is only apparent and illusory; it serves only to keep the poor in their poverty and the rich in their usurpation. In reality, laws are always useful to those with possessions and harmful to those who have nothing. From this it follows that the social state is advantageous to men only insofar as each owns something and none have too much.

Rousseau therefore advocated a republican state composed of property owners—for example, of small farmers, craftsmen, and shopkeepers.

In Adam Smith's *Inquiry* we read: "Civil

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government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is, in reality, instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all." Where Rousseau opposed the unjust suppression of the poor by the rich, Adam Smith soberly took it for granted that the poor were to be suppressed.

In the opinion of Immanuel Kant and others, the presence of propertyless people was morally tolerable because they had the right to acquire property and so to become citizens. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, in 1800, turned the argument around and argued that no government could expect obedience from people who have no property. If a government expected obedience, Fichte maintained, the state had to provide property for every (male, adult) citizen.

In the 20th century, democracy has acquired a new meaning through its enfranchisement of the whole, first solely the male and finally also the female, adult population, which inevitably creates a vast majority of propertyless people who neither own their means of production nor are "self-employed." They are salary- or wage-earners, at the service of private or public employers.

This change in social structure has had far-reaching consequences for political institutions, consequences very different from those anticipated by the opponents of universal suffrage in the 19th century. Before Alexis de Tocqueville "discovered" the conservative biases built into American democratic institutions, almost everybody assumed that universal suffrage would lead to expropriation of the few rich by the many poor. Proponents of universal suffrage—for example, the English Chartists of the 1830s and 1840s—did indeed expect it.

This expectation came to naught partly because of the widespread belief that the market system is just, and partly because of the great influence of patriotism and nationalism, which suggests that among the members of one nation there are more common interests than there are antagonistic and clashing ones. Finally, after the Great Depression—with the introduction of welfare economics and Keynesian state intervention in the business cycle—the opinion gained currency that governments can compensate for economic inequalities without abolishing the existing property distribution and the market system itself.

The "welfare state" was "invented" as a device to correct the deficiencies of the market economy and, indirectly, as a way to preserve a socioeconomic system that can no longer offer the prospect of economic independence for the great majority of the population. Whatever the situation was in earlier times (as in the days of the open frontier), nowadays an independent economic position is sheer illusion for the great majority of citizens in the United States as it is in other industrial societies.

Changes in the social structure have produced changes in the attitudes of governments. The "classical" bourgeois parliament, representing the well-to-do taxpayers, wanted to economize. Today, at least in most European states, members of parliament normally press for government-spending in order to maintain or restore "full employment." Conservative responses, as those in Britain, are uncommon and usually unpopular. This is not surprising, since the members of parliament no longer represent the well-to-do minority but, far more, the propertyless majority. This is, of course, a simplified picture, but it illustrates how in some respects the transformation of the social basis of modern democracy has generated new expectations.

The so-called economic theory of democracy, first sketched by Joseph Schumpeter (in *Socialism, Capitalism, Democracy*) and further developed by Anthony Downs, is a perfect reflection of the kind of rudimentary democracy that corresponds to the new state of affairs. Democracy, in the view of Downs, can no longer be called "government of the people for the people by the people" or—as in Rousseau's view—a political system in which the rulers and the ruled are finally identical. Instead, democracy here is an organization in which two (or more) competing teams solicit majority votes so they can operate the governmental machinery in their own interest. The behavior of incumbent and opposition parties can be measured and even predicted. Public benefit—so runs the argument—is protected in this competition because, once elected, the winner has to deliver at least some of the "commod-

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ities" he had promised to the people during the campaign.

Democracy, in Downs's view, is nothing but the application of the market system to politics. The fact that in many countries only two or three parties are competing does not diminish the value of this special market, nor is Downs put out by the fact that once the "buyer" (voter) has made up his mind he cannot change it for four or five years.

The analogy to a free market is obviously imperfect yet mirrors a condition in which the citizen has become a *passive consumer*. The difference between this and the classical model of bourgeois democracy is striking. There the property owners were not only supposed to select representatives from among themselves but to constitute the "public opinion" that controlled those elected to parliament. Free information and free exchange of "opinions" among the citizens were supposed to be a precondition of rational political activity. Today the voter is offered not information but advertising. Need it be added that the rich can buy the "advertising" and the information that serves them best.

II

In Europe, the reality of this kind of "economic democracy" is not yet generally accepted. The political parties still try to recruit members, and the active members of some political parties try to influence the policies of their party leaders (whether they are in government or in opposition). In practice their influence steadily diminishes once their party forms a government. The number of party members, in general, has declined and, though party congresses may still express strong dissent, they rarely have a decisive impact on the government. Political activity within party organizations tends to be disappointing, at least for those who are not so much interested in a party career (or government job) as in furthering political aims or ideals.

One European answer to this dilemma has been the demand for democratization of all kinds of social institutions. If we expect the citizens to participate in the shaping of politics, then we must help men and women to acquire the experience that promotes self-determination and protects their liberties. If they can no longer enjoy economic independence, they should be able to participate in the daily government of the factory, office, hospital, school, wherever they work.

But it is impossible to be a passive, subservient worker all week, and then, all of a sudden on a political "Sunday," to become a self-reliant, morally motivated, and well-informed citizen. Democratization of the work place in a society composed of wage earners is a necessary complement to the democratic structure of the state as a whole.

In Germany, the pressure for democratization exercised by the labor unions and the Social Democratic party, above all in factories and generally in businesses above a certain size, has encountered violent resistance from the Christian Democratic and Liberal parties. In their ideological view democracy is a structural device operable only in public and not in "private" life. Factories, offices, schools, hospitals, universities should be structured according to professional competence and not to the principle of democratic equality. This argument was, of course, used a century ago as well against democratic participation in public life.

Helmut Schelsky, a German sociologist, has formulated the term "technical state" to describe contemporary Western society. Schelsky is convinced that democratic institutions in the public field are no longer really essential and are more a nuisance than an instrument of stability and progress. Governments, he argues, are running considerable parts of the economy; they are "responsible" for general prosperity, fiscal policy, international trade balances, full employment, monetary stability, infrastructure investments. All these complex problems can only be solved by specialists; the general public is hardly capable of judging the value of government decisions. Democratic elections therefore have to be tolerated because they are the only accepted means of providing necessary "legitimacy" to governments. But their practical "utility," Schelsky maintains, is rather slight, hence manipulation of the voter can be justified. The modern state, so the argument continues, would be run much more efficiently by trained specialists unhampered by the obstacle of periodic elections in

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which incompetent masses decide the fate of governments and their teams of experts.

Both "answers" to the fundamental problems inherent in the complexity of modern societies and "mass democracy" have their merits and their weaknesses. Participatory democracy extended to all spheres of social life would, in fact, hobble competent "elites" in many fields. The free exchange of ideas is necessary in science and scholarship, but certain criteria of competence have to be accepted in order to avoid unnecessary debate, cumbersome detours, and loss of time. Paul Feyerabend's utopia of a completely open debate among all kinds of cranks, quacks, and men of science could not really work. However, political democracy without social democratization will never go beyond Anthony Downs's oligopolistic competition between two (or more) teams of professional politicians. In my view, a considerable degree of participatory democracy in society as a whole is now a necessary precondition for a vital and stable democracy.

The "theory" that democracies remain stable as long as a considerable part of the electorate abstains from voting (because it lacks motivation), a notion that seems widespread in the Anglo-Saxon world, forgets that those nonvoting minorities (which sometimes can amount to 50 percent of the electorate) can sometimes be swept up by demagogues and become the basis for totalitarian mass movements.

Society and state can no longer be separated as strictly as in the 19th century during the heyday of classical bourgeois democracy. For Aristotle "despotic rule" at home (in the "great house" to which not only wife and children but also slaves belonged under the rule of the patriarchal father) was compatible with democratic equality and freedom on the level of the city-state. Something similar was still assumed by the bourgeois democrats of the 18th and 19th centuries. Today this separation and combination is no longer tenable. The vast majority now lives under social conditions of economic dependence on relatively large corporations and employers. If citizenship would be restricted to those few who are really economically free, we would have to take away the franchise from about 80 percent of the population. And despotic rule "at home" (in factories, offices, workshops) inevitably leads to the "reduced form" of democracy that Anthony Downs has described.

Still, the conservative argument that political decisions require a high degree of specialization and sophistication, beyond the capacity of the "common man," is not completely mistaken. But this argument can easily be used for a different approach. In order to maintain and revitalize democracy all political issues must be explained, so that alternative decisions can be judged rationally at their true value by the great majority of the voters, if not by all. It is true that modern society, technology, and economy are much more complicated than they were in the past, but I don't see an impenetrable wall that prevents a sufficiently high degree of education for all, as a means of bringing all citizens to a level that would allow each to make these judgments. If we, as democrats, wish to avoid the prospect of technocratic rule by uncontrollable experts, we must insist on providing the kind of education that, together with participatory democracy in the society at large, would build and nurture an electorate capable of participating actively in politics.

Obviously, those who profit from the majority's ignorance are hardly inclined to promote such an educational effort, which in fact would amount to a cultural revolution. Those "in charge" generally prefer emotional appeals, simplifications, talk about personalities and scapegoats to political and economic enlightenment. Modern political and socioeconomic problems are neither as simple as some ideologues (on both the "right" and the "left") pretend, nor as complicated as some "experts" with vested interests will maintain. Most issues can be explained in a simple way, without oversimplification. But rational decisions can only be arrived at if the controversial ideas and ideals, interests and motives have been openly presented. Most politicians and all privileged minorities shudder at the thought.

This is not only a question of minority vs. majority interests but also of short-term and emotionally obscured interests vs. long-term, enlightened interests. Rational choices for the future have been obscured for many decades. Whatever the surface controversies, there has

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been a basic consensus that economic and technological growth is necessary for "progress." Liberals, conservatives, and even socialists have agreed that the growth of production and productivity is a yardstick to the success of a society.

The "welfare state," it is true, was to compensate for some of the unpleasant side effects of the market economy, and state regulations were accepted to lessen damage done to the environment. But "growth as such" was hailed by almost everybody. In the 1950s, with the prospect of inexhaustible supplies of energy that was to be helped along by nuclear breeder or fusion energy, a future with fantastic levels of wealth was anticipated. The ideal of continuous and endless growth had effaced all former human ideals and had made social compromises much easier than ever before. Compromises between the interests of the business world and those of the employed then were feasible without much open conflict, so long as growth could be taken for granted.

By now, however, even the most optimistic have to accept at least some limits to growth: ecological limits, social limits, material limits, psychological limits. And so, as we have to accept definite limits (although no one can say exactly where they are), it will be necessary to decide what kind of a future we want to provide for. Our responsibilities are, accordingly, far greater than those any earlier generation on earth has had to face.

III

Let us look at the complex industrial societies from another angle. Many problems result from the centralization of most modern states (more so in Europe than in the U.S.) and from the growing reluctance of various provinces and regions to abide by the rules of their central governments. In the recent decades, highly centralized modern states, such as Spain, Great Britain, and France, have seen more and more centrifugal tendencies among their ethnic minorities and peripheral regions. Such ethnic groups as the Basques, Catalonians, Welsh, Scots, Flemish, Corsicans, and Northern Irish have questioned the legitimacy of their central governments—which, in their opinion, have neglected and even hurt local interests and traditions. Sometimes these regional and ethnic oppositions have been connected with opposition to new industries or technical installations (such as nuclear power plants, chemical works, new harbors, airports), or with a stand against the "immigration" of people from other parts of the same country whom they consider "foreigners" because they don't speak the same dialect or language and threaten the ethnic-cultural homogeneity of those regions.

In the days of the French Revolution and generally throughout the 19th century, a common nationality was considered a great achievement. During the Revolution, local dialects were called "counterrevolutionary," and a good French citizen was supposed to speak French, not "patois." This "elegance" is no longer accepted by oppositional groups. The "leveling" of all local particularities is perceived as a threat to one's own individuality. The fisherman from Brittany is proud to be a Breton, not a Frenchman. The progress of industrialization and mass culture is experienced not as "liberating" but as a threat. In Norway a strange coalition of conservatives, young socialists, and local communities has opposed entrance into the Common Market because farmers and fishermen felt that the expected economic progress would impair traditional forms of life. Fishermen would become employees in great corporations and big fish-processing factories. The GNP would rise, but the "quality of life" would go down.

Sometimes regional "identities" or common interests and a common cultural heritage are even rediscovered beyond national borders. See, for example, the fight of the people of Baden in West Germany, of Alsace in France, and of Switzerland against the construction of a nuclear power plant in Wyhl on the upper Rhine. People from three different countries banded together and discovered that they could communicate in their local dialects, and that some hundred years ago their ancestors, together, had participated in the peasant wars! The—legally correct—decision for the construction of a nuclear power plant had been made in Stuttgart by the government and parliament of Baden-Württemberg; but neither the people directly concerned nor the political

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representatives of the French and the Swiss had been asked, and so they felt that they had been passed over.

The problems that we observe here are again contradictory. On the one hand, the most modern technologies—nuclear power plants, chemical plants, and airports—demand centrally planned and coordinated decisions, even international agreements. The river Rhine, for instance, serves four countries: Switzerland, France, West Germany, and the Netherlands. It spans their interest not only in terms of transportation but for cooling systems, waste disposal, and as a means of irrigation in the Netherlands. Very few agreements have hitherto been arrived at for the sake of all these countries' common, and differing, interests. On the other hand, local people living near a new chemical plant or nuclear power plant are much more directly affected by deterioration of their environment than the rest of the population of the same country or state. In a parliamentary democracy they have, however, no more influence than anyone else in the same state regarding the decision to build such a plant, and therefore their opposition might easily be overcome by representatives from other parts of the country who are not at all or much less concerned with the problem.

In this case, as in many instances in West Germany, solid majorities in parliament can be in favor of the construction of new power plants or airports against very considerable, but locally limited, large blocs of votes. The disparity of ethnic and regional cultures is therefore not the only reason for a growing opposition to centralized government; there is also a growing disparity of interests between the immediately concerned and the community at large. In states where some preventive power is held by local authorities (state, provinces, cities), the opposition to the construction of nuclear power plants so far has had a considerable delaying effect. Both the U.S.A. and West Germany have not been able to carry out their nuclear projects as scheduled. Countries with strong centralized governments—such as France—have been "luckier" in this respect. I do not think, however, that countries with a less centralized and more "federal" constitution need to be pitied.

Are there any practical solutions to these problems? Again, there are two contradictory, very different answers. One is the anarchist answer that proposes the complete dismantling of centralized states and the founding of small, regional groupings of free individuals who will arrange their common affairs on a democratic basis, by discussion rather than by majority vote, until complete agreement is reached. This system did presumably work in some earlier, "premodern" societies. The other answer maintains that local, dissenting groups will have to comply with their nation's legally arrived-at decisions and subordinate their local interests to the larger, common interest. Local dissent, in this view, is merely the expression of local egoism, which has to be curbed in behalf of the well-being of the whole community. This argument has been the legitimization for the violent repression of demonstrations against the construction of a planned nuclear waste disposal plant at Brokdorf and against plans for the construction of an additional take-off strip at the Frankfurt airport.

This second answer, or proposal, is based on a kind of nationalism, an assumption that the citizens ought not to look out so much for their local interests—their own village or town—but should first of all want to consider the interest of their country, their nation. Over the past two centuries in almost all Western societies, nationalism indeed has played an important role. It often has compensated for the lack of social homogeneity and has forged a sense of "togetherness" that surmounted class barriers and local particularities. But in some countries it now seems to have lost its efficacy—perhaps in West Germany (and in East Germany) more so than elsewhere, because of the extreme abuse to which nationalism was put under the Nazis.

The argument for industrial growth and greater buildup of energy sources is based on the need to maintain the "nation's place" in a worldwide competition among industrialized powers. West Germany, for instance, will lose its actual position if "we don't develop nuclear energy, a field in which we have reached a considerable level." And people will add that —"in other fields—as, for instance, the air industry—we now are a second-rate country. If

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we give up nuclear physics and nuclear technology, we shall lose standing in this field too."

Such arguments still have some force, but no longer with those groups who accept "limits to growth" and who deny that growth brings about a better quality of life. The critics of ever-growing industrial development are not necessarily unpatriotic, but they oppose a nationalism that is responsible for many of the evils we face. There were, in fact, more patriotic overtones in the speeches made in Bonn in October 1981, at the great meeting in opposition to the arms race, than in the discussions among politicians who favor unlimited growth and the quick deployment of nuclear technology. There are indeed those who favor a national community that will preserve some of its traditional aspects and is oriented toward a better quality of life for everybody, and there are others who favor a nation that can attain and maintain a leading place in the international economic, scientific, and political competition.

Neither the anarchist nor the conventional institutional solution seems to suffice. Probably only a combination of increased local self-administration with central decision-making that recognizes the weight of local vetoes will enable us to overcome these problems and conflicts. Participation in local or regional self-administration will accustom people to looking beyond their narrow concerns and diminish the antagonisms between the shared, larger national and individual and local interests.

NOT ALL IMPORTANT DECISIONS OF common interest in our Western societies are taken through democratic institutions. Many decisions are arrived at by the market mechanism or through a bargaining process between various organized groups. The most prominent, of course, are the labor unions and employers' organizations. The outcome of their bargaining so far has been acceptable because, given economic growth, it has been possible to increase both wages and profits. But if growth in the not-too-distant future will cease or at least be considerably diminished, this bargaining process is bound to become more difficult and the clash of interests more violent. It is not unlikely that the democratic legitimacy of both sides will be questioned. And from a democratic point of view the unions, as the representatives of the vast majority of wage earners, have a far better claim than those who speak for the corporations.

Here again democracy in our complex industrial society is facing great problems. We all know, having observed the course of some Communist countries who call themselves "socialist," that the abolition of private ownership of the means of production by no means is bound to provide a homogeneous society serving everyone's needs. In the absence of competing democratic institutions, bureaucratic state-socialism also represses local, regional, and other interests. There are no common, identical interests, in such a society, between city-dwellers and the rural population, between those in the central and those in more remote areas, between those who administer and those who are administered, between skilled and unskilled labor, between intellectuals in and outside the bureaucratic apparatus. Clearly there is no simple solution to our problems, even if one could do away with some of the obstacles facing a democracy, by socializing (or "nationalizing") the great corporations.

The market or bargaining device, as a complement to democratic decision-making processes, is likely to become insufficient in the future. It is already so as a means for the regulation of relations between nations at different stages of industrial development. Contrary to the expectations of Adam Smith, the disparity between "developed" and "underdeveloped" countries is growing. The detrimental consequences of colonial trade, in Smith's view, were owing to "accident" and not to "anything in the nature of those events themselves":

> Hereafter [he thought] the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow weaker . . . and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this equality of force than that mutual communication of knowledge, and of all sorts of improvements, which an extensive commerce from all

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countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries along with it.

This effect has not materialized. Of course, one could say in Smith's defense that "extensive commerce from all countries to all countries" for many, many years has been hampered by monopolies and customs barriers. Nevertheless, it does not seem likely that free trade will bring about more equality between competing nations so widely apart at the point of departure. If the market mechanism as regulator were supplanted by democratic majority decisions on a world scale, things certainly would look very different. The international economic order is based on differences in economic, military (technological), and political strength, not on democratic legitimacy. It is therefore no wonder that belief in Western-style democracy is not very far developed among the elites of the "developing countries."

The neoconservative idea of enhancing the role of a self-regulating market by lessening government intervention and reducing public expenditure for the welfare state assumes that an unfettered market is compatible with "justice as fairness." This is not very convincing and will look much less so in an era of diminished economic growth. Understandably, these same neoconservatives generally argue in favor of the restoration of economic growth at all costs—notably at the cost of diminished environmental protection or the protection of workers' health. But many industrialized countries are no longer ready to accept this. The common belief in the absolute desirability of economic growth has lost ground. It is no longer possible to substitute national egoism for a consideration of the common, larger interests reflecting wider and shared socioeconomic conditions and problems. Therefore the market mechanism, which is not likely to produce a more just distribution of living standards and the free development of individual capacities, will become less and less acceptable as a regulator of relations between and within societies.

IV

Some new conservatives have been criticizing the "welfare state" because of the "negative, unintended consequences of many government policies." They have a point. But they forget that first came the many unintended consequences of the market economy itself in the form of mass unemployment and misery. Another complaint of neoconservatives is directed against the welfare state's "destruction of traditional problem-ameliorating institutions"—meaning, above all, families, local and ethnic communities, and religious organizations. These neoconservatives forget, however, that those institutions—or, at least their traditional forms—have been destroyed not by the welfare state but by the economic system that concentrates people in big cities yet demands high individual mobility and motivation (thus destroying families, traditional communities and loyalties, and religious beliefs). From the point of view that aims at the economic system's continuous growth, the optimum society would be one of "single swingers" who are the best consumers of all kinds of commodities and services, of gadgets and luxury articles, and who are most adaptable to the labor market's changing demands.

Another, related complaint concerns the breakdown of traditional moral values and norms and the spread of a superficial materialistic hedonism. Here again neoconservatives blame the "radical" or the "liberal" for this phenomenon and overlook the fact that "affluent societies," which need a steadily increased demand for more and more consumer goods, necessarily create this kind of "hedonism."

Fred Hirsch, in his *Social Limits to Growth*, has given a sophisticated explanation of the failure of Keynesian economics and the welfare state, and has shown, too, how the economic system destroys the moral foundations on which it stood:

> The utilitarian-consumerist view of man banished from the social plane the explicit moral content that was embodied in Christian philosophy and thought. . . . This banishment was fully consistent with individual objectives: morality was a personal, individual matter, representing the individual's highest goal. But in so doing, liberal philosophy had an unintended side effect. It undermined its own mechanical instruments for attainment of individual goals. For the effective working of the market itself rests on certain aspects of social morality that are affected by the means and motives prevalent in the economic system. As capitalism has become more

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mature and more managed, the stresses resulting from social dichotomy have grown.

Keynes, as well as other European proponents of the welfare state, continues Hirsch,

> . . . assumed that the managers of the system would be motivated by higher goals than the maximization of their private interests, and that standards of public behavior would progress in a way that gradually put less rather than more emphasis on maximizing monetary gain. These noble and for the most part implicit assumptions enabled Keynes to bypass the implementation problem of superimposing collective objectives on an individualistic calculus. In the American liberal tradition, which for historical reasons has been disinclined to lean on similar assumptions of enlightened paternalism, the potential conflict is more apparent.

The shortcomings and weaknesses of the welfare state in the United States may thus be caused at least in part by this complete absence of traditional paternalistic assumptions and the fact that the American society is less able to rely on precapitalist values and norms than British society.

The core of this explanation for the failure of welfare economics is that capitalism necessarily destroys the precapitalist moral value system on which it depended during its initial phase and which again is needed for the management of the welfare state. Hirsch continues:

> The more a market economy is subjected to state intervention and correction, the more dependent its functioning becomes on restriction of the individualist calculus in certain spheres, as well as on certain elemental moral standards among both the controllers and the controlled.

Complaints about the moral deficiencies of the unemployed who try to get the maximum benefit from the state are understandable, but those who voice them forget that to try as skillfully as possible to get the "maximum" is exactly what the economic system teaches day in and day out. Those on welfare who try to cheat do nothing more than the great corporations who employ lawyers to find all possible loopholes in the tax system. The ways and means of the unemployed may be somewhat more "primitive" and less "legally acceptable," but the difference is, from a moral point of view, only one of scale, not principle. In family, school, and church the young are still taught traditional moral values and norms, but those very norms and values are belied by the actual behavior of almost everybody the young meet in the grown-up world.

> Neoconservatives think they can restore traditional bourgeois moral standards as they would have pleased Adam Smith: "Men, he thought, could safely be trusted to pursue their own self-interest without undue harm to the community not only because of the restrictions imposed by the law, but also because they were subject to built-in restraint derived from morals, religion, custom, and education." [A. W. Coats, *The Classical Economists and Economic Policy.*]

Those very restraints, however, have been lifted in the course of time by the impact of the socioeconomic system. Not only Keynesianism and the welfare state but the market system itself all depend on social norms that had preceded their existence and made their functioning possible. Fred Hirsch seems to agree with the neoconservatives when he says that "the market system was, at bottom, more dependent on religious binding than the feudal system, having abandoned direct social ties maintained by the obligation of custom and status." But Hirsch parts company with the neoconservatives when he says that "the individualistic, rationalistic base of the market undermined the unseen religious support." His most striking example of the necessity of traditional moral norms for the functioning of the market system is that of a judge motivated exclusively by the ethics of the market:

> If judges were regularly to sell their services and decisions to the highest bidder, not only the system of justice but also of property would be completely unstable. . . . If everything can be privately appropriated, including the judge, then nothing can be—for who will save the system from the first entrepreneur able to raise enough credit to buy the judge and everything else through him?
>
> [And Hirsch concludes:] . . . some minimum area of social obligation therefore has to be held. The problem is how to reconcile this social responsibility with the opposing mainstream of the market ethos.

Some neoconservatives have suggested reli-

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gion as a useful corrective for the market ethos (or for radicalism). This suggestion resembles the ideas of the Moral Rearmament movement of the '40s and '50s. It advocated the "introduction of God" as the "forgotten factor" in order to make societies less antagonistic and more peaceful. But for a really religious person, God is not a "factor" at the disposal of politicians. To advocate "more religion" for political purposes is an impious act. One is reminded of the "traditional" argument of defenders of the social status quo that the people should believe in God because otherwise they would attack private property. (This was Voltaire's cynical argument.) The upper classes can be as atheistic as they like, but the plain people had best be pious.

If, however, we really wish to change such attitudes, the moral values and norms of men and women, then we have to provide them with the everyday experience that makes this possible without harm to themselves. Socialists—at least Marxist socialists—used to underestimate the role of morals. Conservatives, on the other hand, assumed that moral norms and values could be "infused" by proper teaching under almost any social condition. Both have seen only a part of the complex reality of life. If it is true that a society of egoists can no longer survive and that the capitalist economic system reinforces such a society, we have a new argument for social (and economic) transformation. And if at the same time the socioeconomic system threatens to destroy the material environment, we have two important arguments that reinforce each other.

FINALLY, if active participation in the shaping of one's society is an important form of human activity, then we will have to look for solutions to our problems that will demand:

(1) Smaller, self-administrating communities in the realm of production that will allow the individual citizens to experience the sharing of common aims and interests, solidarity and community.

(2) An intensification of public education, including open presentation and discussion of controversial political issues, to enable every citizen to understand the consequences of alternative policies.

(3) The creation of forms of work that will provide greater job satisfaction and avoid individual antagonisms.

(4) The creation of intellectual preconditions for an understanding of our social, economic, and scientific world, in order to give every citizen the necessary basis for participating in public life.

(5) The attempt to create a climate in which citizens will abandon the pursuit of the old, never fully satisfied pleasure in consumption—built on the premise of endless growth of ever-more commodity production and an ever-more "affluent" society—for the pleasure and satisfaction to be found in one's own activity, both in production and communication.

(6) The attempt to create a climate in which people will abandon the old pleasure of achieving "a better position" for their own country—in a world of competitive, threatening nations—for the greater pleasure in the well-being of all humanity.

(7) Let us try to abandon the old pleasure in the growth of technological power—the increased ability to "subjugate" nature and other human beings—for the greater pleasure derived from the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and in artistic creation. □

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Lukasz Socha

Poland: Must History Repeat Itself?

The following essay was written by a Polish sociologist who for obvious reasons must remain pseudonymous. I have translated it, incorporating some material from a far longer essay by the same author that appeared in Krytyka, *an uncensored political quarterly published in Warsaw since 1979 (No. 6, 1980), and made available in the West by the Polish journal* ANEKS *(London). I have added a few explanatory footnotes to the author's about references that may not be familiar to the American reader.*

The essay, in my opinion, is fascinating on two counts. First, it contains revelations about the early period of the Communist takeover in Poland proving that it was one of extraordinary brutality and not—as is commonly assumed—one of relative freedom, "pluralism," and tolerance. As the author demonstrates, Polish Stalinism was not a product of the cold war but was concomitant with the "liberation" of the country by the Red Army. Second, the way in which Solidarity was subdued is singularly reminiscent of the tactics used by Moscow and Polish Communists during the mid-1940s in imposing a detestable system on a country where Communists had never enjoyed popular support. Obviously, what is happening in Poland today cannot be strictly compared to the events of 1944-48. But one cannot understand the present period without reference to this sinister chapter in Polish history. — ABRAHAM BRUMBERG

At the end of October 1981, I delivered a lecture at one of the higher educational institutions in southeastern Poland. When I finished, a young man rose to ask a question that had no relation to the subject of my talk, but which was clearly uppermost in the minds of my audience—indeed, in the mind of every thinking Pole at that time. "Do you think that Solidarity will be allowed to continue, or will it be suppressed? After all, what's happening today is not exactly unprecedented. After the War we had an independent Polish Peasant party and a Socialist party. As a result of the Yalta Agreement, the Provisional Government of National Unity came into being, including Stanislaw Mikolajczyk and other representatives of democratic parties.[1] Free elections were to be held. Yet we all know what happened. The Peasant party was decimated; the Socialists were split and swallowed up in the new Polish United Workers party.[2] The election results were falsified. Mikolajczyk and his associates were forced to flee the country. What guarantee do we have that Solidarity will not meet with the same fate?"

I must confess that I lacked the courage of candor. I was loath to rob my questioner of the hopes he still obviously clung to. For already at that time I saw the writing on the wall: the appointment of General Jaruzelski as the party's first secretary (this in addition to his functions as minister of defense and, since February 1981, prime minister) was in itself a chilling omen. This was the man who had led the Polish

[1] Stanislaw Mikolajczyk was the leader of the prewar Polish Peasant party. In July 1945 he became prime minister of the Polish Government in Exile. In November 1944 he resigned and then joined the new Communist-dominated government established in Poland in 1945 and recognized by the Western powers. He was forced to flee the country in 1947.

[2] After having been forced to expel its "right-wing" elements, the Polish Socialist party (PPS) was merged, in December 1948, with the Communists into a new "Polish United Workers party." — A.B.

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troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 and was responsible for the massacre of workers in December 1970. Equally ominous was the ubiquitous presence of military units, dispatched throughout the country ostensibly in order to combat corruption and prop up the sagging economy. The unyielding and provocative attitude of the authorities ever since Solidarity had come into being, the shrill references in the press to the danger of a "civil war," the open talk about an impending state of national emergency (to be introduced, so everybody thought, with the full "majesty of the law," that is, by a vote of parliament)—all this, evoking memories of the past, suggested that yet another in my country's periodic quests for freedom was about to be crushed.

Now, more than a year after the imposition of martial law, and several weeks after its farcical "suspension," the missing links are slowly emerging. We may never know precisely when the fateful decision was taken, but common sense and the historical record both suggest that preparations for the ultimate showdown had been worked out months in advance (just think of how much time it took to manufacture the hundreds of thousands of uniforms that were to make the ZOMO look like regular army units).[3] And the prime mover was not (as one often apparently hears in the West) the armed forces, called in to "save the country"—or the party—but the same old police apparatus that has ruled Poland ever since 1944–45, an apparatus whose ties to Moscow had never been broken, all the heady achievements of the Polish "renewal" notwithstanding.[4]

History, as we have all learned from our high-school teachers, seldom repeats itself in exactly the same way. Yet in Poland (as in other Communist countries) historical precedents are unusually compelling, for the rulers of these countries have repeatedly resorted to the same methods to eliminate their real or potential challengers. While the degree of violence may vary, the readiness to use it has never wavered. More important, the principle of disguising brutality with a facade of democratic institutions has remained a permanent feature of Communist rule. In the first years after the War, the facade was that of a "people's democracy," an ostensible "multiparty" system, with elections and a "national referendum" (about which more in a moment). Yet behind it, violence raged unrestrained. Thousands of people were killed without due process of law or as a result of sentences passed summarily by military tribunals. The democratic opposition was ruthlessly liquidated. How did it happen? What is the evidence? Let me turn, then, to the story of those fateful years.

The mainstay of the opposition to the Nazi occupiers during World War II was the Home Army (Armia Krajowa—AK), numbering approximately a quarter of a million members. The "People's Guard," organized by the Communists in 1942 and supported by the Soviet Union, had no more than about 20,000 members. Under the command of the London-based Polish Government in Exile, the AK planned to stage a general uprising as soon as the German armies began to withdraw—and before the Red Army fully "liberated" the country. Yet without evidence of disarray within the German ranks, the AK decided to launch another operation called "Tempest," which was to consist of diversionary attacks—rather than a full-scale insurrection—in the rear of the Wehrmacht.

In July 1944, military forays in various areas

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[3] ZOMO—Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej (Motorized Detachments of the Citizens' Militia)—the special branch of the police used to disperse demonstrations and protests. — A.B.

[4] The real role of the police was revealed by Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Gen. Boguslaw Stachura at a meeting of the parliament's Committee for Internal Affairs, Administration, and Justice on Dec. 9, 1982. In his report on the activities of the police during the year of martial law, the general said that his troops had arrested more than 10,000 people, broken up nearly 700 opposition groups, silenced 11 clandestine radio stations, destroyed nearly 400 underground printing shops, confiscated more than a million copies of illegal pamphlets, and carried out nearly 150,000 "preventive and warning conversations" with people suspected of underground activities. (The prisons could not accommodate everybody, but potential troublemakers had to be told what they could expect.) Said the general, "The goals set and the results achieved could not have been possible without the support given to our ministry by the Polish People's Army and the party apparatus. . . ." (See the *New York Times*, December 19, 1982, and *Foreign Broadcasting Information Service*, Washington, D.C., December 19, 1982.)

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(e.g., Lwów and Wilno) led to armed collaboration between units of the AK and the Red Army. With the rout of the German troops, however, the AK was confronted with the choice of either disbanding or entering the First Polish Army, organized in Moscow in 1943 under General Zygmunt Berling, and loyal not to the Polish government but to the Soviet Union. The other option was to withdraw to the western part of (still occupied) Poland, and there to engage in sporadic resistance. This the AK decided upon. The resistance continued until the end of the ill-fated Warsaw uprising, which began in August and ended in October 1944 (an uprising for which Stalin refused to provide any assistance, despite Soviet radio appeals calling upon the people to rise, and despite the fact that Soviet troops were approaching the eastern bank of the Vistula River).

After this tragic debacle (which resulted in over 80,000 casualties, and the deportation of over 500,000 others), the AK was officially disbanded. Its leadership remained, of course, politically anti-Communist, but it hoped to become part of the open, legally constituted opposition. It issued appeals to its followers not to engage in any military actions against Soviet troops or their Polish allies.

In March 1945, the commander-in-chief of the AK, General Leopold Okulicki, along with 15 other leaders of the Polish underground, accepted an official invitation from the Soviet authorities to enter into negotiations with the Red Army and with the representatives of the new Polish Communist government. This was clearly an act of good faith on the part of Okulicki and his colleagues: they had recognized the Yalta Agreement and hoped to play a constructive role in the political life of the country. Instead, they were arrested, brought to Moscow, and put on trial, under the notorious article 58 of the RFSSR criminal code, for engaging in anti-Soviet activities.[5] The charges were as absurd (such as "terroristic attacks" against the Red Army, undertaken jointly with the Wehrmacht) as the original invitation was duplicitous.[6]

The arrest and trial of the 16 underground leaders, while the most shocking, was but one of many similar incidents, all designed to break the political opposition. Thousands of AK soldiers and officers were lured with promises of clemency, only to be arrested and deported deep into the Soviet Union—to Kaluga, Orel, and beyond. Even after the proclamation of an amnesty for the Home Army, issued in August 1945, trials and deportations continued.

It is noteworthy that none of the other East European leaders were treated as contemptuously as the Poles: not one of them, for instance, was put on trial in Moscow. The reason seems clear: Poland was (and is) the largest of Moscow's satellites, and one in which the Communists had never commanded any real following. The consolidation of Communist rule, therefore, had to be more ruthless. At the same time, and for the same reasons, the need to maintain the pretense of a "democracy" was correspondingly greater.

In July 1945, a new government—the Provisional Government of National Unity—was established, including representatives from democratic parties (those representing the prewar right were not allowed to resume their activities). The largest of these was the Polish Peasant party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe—PSL), which by mid-1946 had far more members than the Workers' (that is, Communist) party (PPR)[7]—600,000, as compared to the latter's 300,000.

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[5] Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic (RFSSR) was promulgated in 1926 and served as the basis for the criminal codes of all other Soviet "Republics." It stipulated savage sentences for a variety of loosely defined "counterrevolutionary activities," including anti-Soviet propaganda, sabotage, diversion, terror, and treason. The article (with some prescience, one must admit . . .) asserted that "in view of the international solidarity of the interests of all working people, all actions are deemed counterrevolutionary if they are directed against any workers' state, even if it does not constitute part of the U.S.S.R." Article 58 provided the "legal" justification for Stalin's reign of terror, and also for the prosecution of Polish "counterrevolutionaries."

[6] For an account of the trial by one of its survivors, see Z. Stypulkowski, *Invitation to Moscow (1939-45)*, with a preface by H. Trevor-Roper (London, 1951). — A.B.

[7] The prewar Polish Communist party was dissolved by Stalin in 1938 on grounds that it had become infiltrated with "Trotskyite" and other "hostile" elements. It was reestablished under a new name—the Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza—PPR) by Wladyslaw Gomulka and others in 1942. — A.B.

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Reflecting the country's postwar social structure (a far larger percentage of peasants than before the War, resulting from the slaughter of over 3 million Jews, most of them urban and *shtetl* dwellers, and the destruction of Warsaw and other urban centers), the PSL was at first allowed to be represented in the government (by a vice-premier and three ministers), to run its own newspaper, *Gazeta Ludowa* (Peasant Daily), and to occupy a number of posts on the lower rungs of the state administration.

Yet it was precisely the popularity of the PSL that proved to be its undoing. Its demand for a proportional number of seats in the Sejm (parliament) was rejected. Consequently, the PSL refused to join the "democratic bloc"—composed of the PPR, the PPS (the Polish Socialist party), and a few splinters subservient to the Communists—and decided to run independently in the upcoming elections. The PSL was certain of victory: after all, a few months earlier, in November 1945, free elections in Hungary had resulted in victory for the Small Landowners' party (the Hungarian counterpart of the PSL), and the appointment of its leader, Ferenc Nagy, as prime minister.

But these hopes proved illusory. On June 30, 1946, the government (now completely controlled by the Communists) staged a referendum asking the Poles to approve the major planks of its program: a unicameral parliament, nationalization of industry and land distribution, and the incorporation of the western territories.

Even though the PSL was not opposed to the program in principle, it asked the voters to vote No on the first proposal, thus registering their support of the PSL. The vote went overwhelmingly in the PSL's favor, but the results were suppressed and falsified.[8]

The same happened in the elections to the Sejm, which after many delays were finally held in January 1947. During the election campaign, thousands of PSL members (including 142 candidates!) were arrested, and about 2 million people were disqualified from casting their votes.[9] According to the official statistics, the "democratic bloc" captured 80.1 percent of the vote, and the PSL only 10.3 percent, which meant that the latter was to have only 28 out of the 444 seats in the Sejm. The elections were a fraud.

Similarly fraudulent were the legal sanctions the Communists invoked in their drive against political opponents. While the War was still in progress, a number of decrees were promulgated by the PKWN,[10] conferring extraordinary powers on military tribunals. Political cases, which traditionally (before the War) had been tried by civil courts, were now to be tried exclusively by military tribunals—all firmly under the thumb of the Communists.

On September 23, 1944, a new "Criminal Code of the Polish Armed Forces" came into effect. One part was devoted to "crimes against the state." The death penalty was to be applied for offenses such as ownership of weapons, membership in various "hostile" organizations, propaganda against "allied armies" (that is to say, the Red Army), and so on.

By the summer of 1945, the tribunals were literally working round the clock. Official propaganda claimed that Poland was in the grip of a "civil war," instigated by "terroristic gangs" working with the London government. That there were still individual groups carrying on armed resistance against the authorities is indisputable. But most of those "terroristic attacks" were staged by the security services, employing for this purpose special detachments disguised as antigovernment partisans.[11] In addition, AK members who, following the amnesty, reported to the special rehabilitation commissions, found themselves facing not only

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[8] An extremely revealing book by the Polish historian Maria Turlejska, entitled *Zapis Pierwszej Dekady* ("The Record of the First Decade"), noted that in the few districts where PSL tellers were admitted to the count, they learned that 85 percent of the voters followed the PSL's appeal, but that, on the whole, votes were counted in secret by government representatives (*Zapis Pierwszej Dekady*, Warsaw, 1972, pp. 71-73).

[9] See Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), Vol. II, p. 570. — A.B.

[10] PKWN—Polski Komitet Wywzeolenia Narodowego (Polish Committee of National Liberation), established in Moscow in July 1944, was recognized by the Soviet Union as the "temporary organ of executive power in Poland, and superseded a year later by the Provisional Government of National Unity (TRJN). — A.B.

[11] This was admitted subsequently by several Polish historians.

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(as the decree stipulated) former AK officers, but representatives of the security services, who were in charge, and who often "rehabilitated" the soldiers by dispatching them to local prisons and detention camps.

The war in Europe ended on May 9, 1945, but Poland remained under martial law. It was only on December 17, 1945, that the journal *Dziennik Ustaw* ("Daily Monitor"—the official government organ), in its issue No. 57, published a decree by the Presidium of the National Council of the Homeland (KRN)—the parliamentary body organized by the Communists in 1944—terminating the state of war that had been proclaimed by the president of the Polish Republic on September 1, 1939, the day of the Nazi invasion. More than a month earlier, however, in its issue No. 53, the *Dziennik Ustaw* had published three decrees that formally ratified the earlier decrees concerning the military courts. The aim was to place the country in a de facto state of emergency, and thus to nullify the significance of the subsequent abolition of the state of war.

A close look at the decrees is instructive. The first dealt with crimes deemed especially dangerous during the country's reconstruction. It was in fact the first version of a decree published a year later, on June 13, 1946, called the "Small Penal Code," and it remained on the books until 1969. On the basis of this decree, as well as of the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces, military tribunals sentenced over 2,000 people to death between 1946 and 1948.[12] The overall number of sentences handed down by the tribunals (including prison sentences) was staggering: 5,000 in 1945, over 6,000 in 1946 (that is, after the formal abolition of martial law!), over 6,000 in 1947, and more than 5,300 in 1948. Once the political opposition was crushed—that is, by 1948—the terror began to decline.

IT IS CURIOUS that the post-1948 period is remembered as the apotheosis of Stalinist terror. The three preceding years have somehow gone down in history as an era of pluralism: a legally constituted political opposition was allowed to function, the press engaged in spirited polemics, and the Catholic Church enjoyed unprecedented freedom—indeed, for a Communist country especially, astonishing privileges.[13]

Yet precisely in this era of "pluralism" the terror was at its height. The jails were filled with political prisoners, most of whom were never even brought to trial (a total of 100,000 according to the internal reports of the Ministry of Public Security in 1949, as many as 150,000 according to the 1962 reports of the Ministry of Internal Affairs).

The bloodiest toll was exacted in the countryside, under the guise of "pacification" of "rebellious" villages, both Ukrainian and Polish. During those operations, in which the principle of "collective responsibility" was frequently applied, a total of 10,000 people lost their lives. These murderous actions were justified by the ostensible dangers posed to the security of the state by numerous "armed bands." As I mentioned earlier, there were indeed some "armed bands" carrying on guerrilla warfare against the government. Especially in the Ukraine various nationalist groups, some of them formerly allied with the Nazis, engaged the Polish and Soviet troops in sporadic battles, and often committed atrocities upon the non-Ukrainian civilian population as well.

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[12] These and all subsequent figures are taken from confidential government reports, shown to me by a party historian. I vouch for their accuracy.

[13] The treatment of the Catholic Church in the mid-1940s was so extraordinary that it deserves to be characterized as a blatant attempt to buy it off: the land reform of 1944-45 did not touch the huge estates owned by the Church; religion in schools was compulsory, so was attendance at Sunday mass in the armed forces. Religious services were broadcast over the radio. To be sure, while the Church was thus being wooed (and not altogether unsuccessfully—the bishops, for instance, issued several appeals to the faithful to support the authorities) the prewar leader of the Fascist party Falanga was permitted to organize a diversionary pro-Communist Catholic organization (PAX), and a number of laws distasteful to the Church, such as one legalizing civil marriage and divorce, were promulgated. The real offensive against the Church, however—consisting of wholesale arrests of the clergy, including Cardinal Primate Wyszynski, and the closing down of churches and tight censorship of Catholic publications—began only in the early 1950s. The similarity between those tactics and Jaruzelski's attempt to strike a bargain with the present primate, Cardinal Glemp, is striking.

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Yet in referring to "armed bands," the government press conveniently lumped together individual bandits, criminal groups, and political opponents, accusing them all of acting at the behest of the anti-Communist underground. The observation of a contributor to the recently published Cambridge *History of Poland* is worth quoting in full:

> It is surprising that not a single senior officer . . . was killed or wounded in the course of [these] operations, with the exception of General Karol Swierczewski, the deputy minister of national defense, who died at the hands of Ukrainian partisans at Baligród in the foothills of the Carpathians . . . on March 28, 1947. The existence of terrorists was convenient for the Communists, because it gave them a good reason to strengthen the security forces and to postpone holding elections until they had tightened their hold on the country.[14]

Returning to the decrees of 1945: the second one had stipulated that summary convictions could be pronounced only by civil courts; by July 1946, however, the military tribunals totally took over this function. The reason for it was the reluctance of the civil judges, many of whom had practiced law before the War, despite great pressure, to hand down death sentences. The military courts entertained no such scruples; the judges were loyal party members or military men trained to follow orders, and they did as they were told.

The Communist press made it clear that the civil judges caused the authorities no end of embarrassment. They were far too lenient, the press complained, showing undue compassion for youthful offenders. Once the military courts swung into action, however, the complaints came to an end. And indeed, it was precisely the young people who were the most numerous victims of the military tribunals: most were under the age of 21, with little or no education, mainly of peasant or working-class background; many had played a prominent role in the underground against the Germans, frequently as partisans, and frequently fighting side by side with Soviet troops. Now they found that mere membership in the AK constituted a "crime."

Finally, the third decree that brought about the undeclared state of emergency in Poland established a Special Commission authorized to pronounce sentences of up to two years of forced labor upon people accused of a variety of "economic" crimes, such as speculation, corruption, and bribery. The decree, as admitted in the official press, opened the door to a host of abuses: an anonymous denunciation was enough to settle a personal or political score, to get rid of an irksome individual, to silence a potential critic.

All the decrees were approved unanimously (by acclamation) at the Ninth Session of the National Council of the Homeland (KRN), on January 3, 1946—the final day of its deliberations. The KRN's session was taken up largely with discussions about the bill on the nationalization of industry; scarcely a deputy paid any heed to these measures that violated the most elementary principles of legality, and in effect deprived the citizens—including members of parliament—of any defense against the power of the state. Indeed, within several months after the elections to the Sejm, a number of deputies, including ministers and deputy ministers, were stripped of their parliamentary immunity, arrested, and accused of "antistate" activities. The arrests were ordered and carried out by the security services; only a few months later, the Sejm went through the motion of conferring its stamp of approval.

The de facto state of emergency lasted, as I mentioned before, for nearly ten years—until the beginning of 1955. As this period drew to a close, the dreadful rigors of the earlier years were relaxed. Some political prisoners were set free, and the number of political trials declined. Nevertheless, the security organs continued to function, and severe sentences against the regime's political opponents were still meted out, all based on extorted confessions and bogus evidence. The preparations for the trial of Deputy Minister of Defense Marian Spychalski, for instance, who was arrested in 1950 in a purge of "national deviationists," still went ahead. Soviet Marshal Konstanty Rokossovsky, who—along with a bevy of Soviet gen-

[14] *The History of Poland Since 1863*, by R. F. Leslie et al., R. F. Leslie, ed. (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 291.

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erals—had taken over the Ministry of Defense in 1949, remained in power. Soviet advisers (many cloaked in anonymity to this day) continued to supervise the grisly work of the Bezpieka (Security Office).

Only in 1956, after the death of Boleslaw Bierut, Poland's Stalinist dictator, following the publication of Khrushchev's "secret speech" in February '56, was Marian Spychalski released from prison and were Rokossovsky and the Soviet advisers sent packing. (The ties between the Polish security police and Moscow remained intact, though now they had to be concealed from public view.) The AK was formally rehabilitated in 1957: henceforth mere membership no longer constituted a punishable offense. Nevertheless, the notorious "Small Criminal Code" was not repealed until 1969. In the 1960s it was used to prosecute numerous intellectuals who were accused of maintaining relations with foreign "subversive centers." After the student riots in March 1968, the authorities used it in their vile anti-Semitic and anti-intellectual witch-hunt.[15]

In relating some of the highlights of Poland's earlier undeclared (but lethal) "state of emergency," I am not suggesting that the present situation is merely a replay of an old record. It seems clear that Jaruzelski neither wants nor is able to resort to the brutal methods employed by his predecessors in the 1940s and early '50s. Yet the lessons of the past are palpable: now as before, the job of destroying the opposition and of establishing (or reestablishing) the authority of the ruling elite is left to the Poles themselves. These Poles can be relied upon to preserve—by employing subterfuge and lies and by hiding behind a facade of "democracy"—the system and its ultimate subservience to Moscow.

The spurious "representative" bodies created by Jaruzelski, such as the Citizens' Committee for National Salvation (OKON) and the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth (PRON), are all remnants of 1945 that have been maintained throughout the history of Communist Poland (e.g., the "Front of National Unity," the "coalition" of various groups that since the late 1940s has provided the Communist party with an instrument for exercising its monopoly of power).

The specter of "civil war," to repeat, is another classic stratagem. It was used to justify the terror of the 1940s; it was raised during the strikes in the summer of 1980; and it was resurrected a year later, when the party press insisted that the workers were being incited by their "extremist" advisers to a violent confrontation with the regime. Yet during the 16 months of Solidarity's existence not one person was killed, not one party building was set on fire (as happened, largely owing to police provocations, during the previous workers' uprisings, in 1956, 1970, and 1976). Not one shop window was smashed by those hundreds of thousands of people—tired, hungry, on the verge of despair—who would wait endlessly in line for a loaf of bread or a pair of shoes for their children, for cigarettes or the occasional piece of meat. And the same insidious rationale is now offered by the Jaruzelski regime to justify the suppression of Solidarity, the enactment of numerous outrageous laws, the continuation of the country's state of emergency.[16]

In the summer of 1981, the West seemed chiefly to be worried about an impending Soviet invasion. The "pacification" of Czechoslovakia in 1968 required about 400,000 troops; an outright military invasion of Poland probably would have necessitated at least a million troops. Even so the resistance would have been fierce, the number of casualties and the political price enormous. It was far less risky, therefore, to resort to the tested instrument of the past: to set up the machinery of a putsch months in advance, to select the proper cadres, work out the necessary logistics, empty the prisons so as to make room for new prisoners, and draft the decrees—all the while maintaining the pretense of reasonableness and desire for "national reconciliation."

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[15] See, for instance, Michael Checinski, *Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism* (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1982), Part IV. — A.B.

[16] The bill on "social parasites," for instance, passed by the Sejm in November 1982, provides stiff penalties for those "deliberately avoiding work." Censorship of mail and telephone surveillance have now been incorporated into the Polish Criminal Code. — A.B.

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There will be no return, says General Jaruzelski, to the period before 1980. He is right; there is a return, however, more or less, to the state of affairs in 1945—that is, to the point of departure, when a small clique of power-hungry politicians set out to bring a nation of more than 20 million people (36 million now) to heel. And as there could be no real "liberalization" then, so now talk about liberalization is sheer delusion. To be sure, the earlier state of emergency finally came to an end, largely as a result of the pressure of a population bursting at the seams, emboldened by the death of Stalin, sickened by lies, and prepared to struggle for its rights. When and how this will come to pass again is difficult to predict. But one thing is certain: only when challenged by a powerful mass movement of protest will the regime of intimidation be broken.

Translated from the Polish by ABRAHAM BRUMBERG □

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Mark J. Osiel

The Agonies of *Abertura*

Brazil Moves, a Little, Toward Democracy

The book most prominently displayed on São Paulo newsstands in recent months might strike some passersby as a curious anachronism —if they have ever heard of its long-dead author. Sandwiched in between the usual soccer magazines and pornography one stumbles upon a new translation of David Ricardo. There could probably be no better symbol of Brazil's current preoccupation with the classic economic questions first raised by that early apostle of free trade. And what better adversary than Ricardo, a father of economic orthodoxy, on whom Brazil's left-leaning university students might cut their intellectual teeth? Disagreements about such economic orthodoxy and its contemporary embodiment, the International Monetary Fund, figured strongly in the country's election last November.

In this election Brazil seemed to be making up in vitriol for what it lacks in petrol (its costly import precipitated the current crisis). The inundation of the cities with piles of pamphlets apparently reached a point of saturation, for it provoked a minor countermovement. Irritated by the defacement of his building, the director of São Paulo's art museum painted the word *merda* across its walls, at once covering and commenting upon the political posters on display. When the police sought to punish the courtly director, public support for him was enormous. Journalistic pundits read a "deeper meaning" into the incident—that it revealed a public exhaustion with the election. Perhaps. But in the quasi-euphoric atmosphere of the campaign, one could also detect precious appreciation of democratic liberties in those to whom such freedoms were so recently denied. It had been 17 years since the citizens of most states in Brazil had been permitted to choose their governors.

The Elections

THESE ELECTORAL CONTESTS—for governor, federal and state legislators, mayors, and city councilmen—stand out from previous ones in two important ways. They marked the first chance for opposition candidates to win a measure of power in Brazil's highly centralized political system. And they registered the start of a multiparty system. Though still rather fluid, this multiparty system includes a democratic left.

There is no question that the elections mark a significant advance in the *abertura*—the controlled liberalization initiated by the regime in the mid-'70s. The last five years have witnessed the end of censorship over the printed (but not the broadcast) media, and amnesty and an end to torture for political prisoners. Habeas corpus has been restored; the death squads are gone; but rural labor organizers still disappear with some regularity. The authoritarian regime has never fostered the campaign demonstrations of mass support so characteristic of fascist governments, if only because it has never felt entirely confident that the population would remain loyal to its masters. Nor has the regime made anti-Semitic appeals. Jews, Japanese, and women, if not yet blacks, occupied conspicuous places in the lists of all five parties. And in Brazil the enclaves of private life have never been subject to intensive surveillance. If most of "our" authoritarian allies tend to look distressingly like "their" totalitarian ones, as Michael Walzer has la-

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mented, it must be said that Brazil has recently become something of a welcome exception. Hence the undisguised glee with which President Reagan has celebrated Brazil's rulers.

But to speak of "democratization" is to imply a gradual elimination of the impediments to the democratic process. In fact, for every authoritarian restriction abandoned, a new one is often added in its place. Hence the two most common words in the Brazilian political vocabulary are *arbítrio*, or arbitrary rule by governmental decree, and *casuismo*, the casuistry of new electoral laws. A byzantine jumble of such laws, decreed by the government in 1977, '79, and '81, ensured that the recent contest was something less than a fair fight. Coalitions between political parties were forbidden, preventing unification of the opposition groups. Voters were not permitted to split their ballots between different parties. The names and numbers of candidates had to be written in, rather than merely checked off—a rule that could only have been aimed at semiliterates. (Those incapable of signing their name, roughly half the adult population, are already disenfranchised by law.) The National Security Law, a very broad defamation act disallowing any explicit criticism of the president, was used against over 30 candidates. Access to the broadcast media was severely restricted. Finally, supporters of government candidates engaged in a vast range of dirty tricks far beyond the limited imagination of the Watergate conspirators. Most "impressive" was the clandestine printing press that turned out a spurious copy of the Church newspaper (with remarkable verisimilitude) in which one of the country's best-known bishops was made to renounce his radical views.

There are other undemocratic features. One-third of the Senate is appointed by the government and subject to no test of popular support. Cities that have been strong centers of support for the opposition are designated as "areas of national security" and not permitted to elect their mayors. The regional distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies is weighted in favor of rural areas where large landowners exercise considerable, if informal, control over the voting.

That same skewing reappears in the electoral college scheduled to pick the next president. Although two-thirds of the voters registered support for the opposition, the government party (the misnamed Partido Democratico Social) will continue to possess the largest bloc of seats in the Chamber and a majority in the Senate and the electoral college. Basic decisions of economic and social policy continue to be made by the president and his coterie. Since the 1964 coup the president has always been a general, selected by polling within the officer corps. If the elections then marked a definite step forward, neither were they the orgiastic celebration of popular self-rule that Reagan was sure to see in them.

Divisions Within the Left

UNTIL 1979 THERE WAS only one opposition party. Its more vocal members were always getting banished from public life, especially if they sought to put up authentic resistance. With the beginnings of the *abertura*, the party began to emerge as an authentic voice of dissidence. It was precisely at that moment, after the government's humiliation in the congressional elections of 1978, that the presidential staff began to contemplate a multiparty system, so as to fragment the rising discontent. In the back of everyone's mind, as hope or dread, was the possible creation of a system like that of Mexico, in which the government party handily wins all electoral contests and the opposition, such as it is, remains split among several small factions.

The Brazilian government did not win anything near the decisive majorities attained by the Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional. But the government did succeed in driving a wedge between segments of the opposition. One sign of this is that the "democratic left" is now spread over three separate parties, although that balkanization cannot be attributed entirely to machinations of the government. That division cost the opposition victories in at least two major gubernatorial races, although national coalitions in the Senate and Chamber still remain possible.

The first of the three parties is the Partido Democratico Trabalhista (PDT), whose center of power is Rio de Janeiro. Its leader is Leonel

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Brizzola, ultra-left orator of the precoup years turned moderate social democrat during exile in West Germany. His more radical past, however, has not been forgotten, and there have already been worrisome rumblings in military circles concerning his assumption of power. The party's poor performance outside of Rio has elicited some interest in a merger with the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT).

The PT and the Intellectuals

THE MOST INTRIGUING DEVELOPMENT in recent Brazilian politics undoubtedly has been the emergence of the PT. Most leaders of the other opposition parties began by challenging the military regime in the restricted channels of legislation, litigation, and journalism. But the founders of the PT emerged from grass-roots struggles in the metallurgical unions, the neighborhood associations, and the base communities of the Catholic church. Few radical movements in modern history could claim such humble origins. True to its beginnings in the sudden strikes of 1978–80, the PT has preserved an unusual degree of political spontaneity. Its apologists indeed even would claim to have repealed Michels's iron law of oligarchy, since major decisions are made only through extensive "consultation" with militants at its base. The theoretical analysis of Brazil's current crisis offered by the PT is quite distinct from that of the other opposition parties, although much of its actual electoral program overlapped with theirs.

The PT is much more wary than the other parties of any compromise with the middle and upper classes, as well as with the occupants of power. That wariness has three principal sources. The first is the disappointing experience with "populist" regimes in Latin America, including a string of Brazilian governments from Getúlio Vargas to João Goulart. These administrations, basing themselves on nationalistic appeals, involved forms of collaboration between labor and capital that provided significant short-term gains for the industrial working class. But, in exchange, the workers' autonomy—their right to organize and act independently, without state tutelage—was sacrificed.

The second source of wariness within the PT is its skepticism about middle-class commitment to democracy. There is no doubt, as opinion polls show, that estrangement from the regime now extends to very broad segments of the middle and upper reaches of the middle class. This discontent is the result of the crowding by both the ever-expanding state sector and the multinationals of domestic producers, and of the fact that the era of the economic "miracle" has come to an end. Yet, although the bourgeoisie was a standard-bearer of democracy in Europe, it has proved to be a reluctant warrior on democracy's behalf in Latin America. At first sign of the enemy, it has tended to take to ignominious flight. It has tended more often to see its adversary not in the autocratic rule of the rural oligarchy, whom it might in principle have wished to displace, but in the redistributive reforms of populist governments, whose rulers were always threatening to lose control of their unruly masses. Widespread middle-class support for the 1964 coup is not easily forgotten (or forgiven). And this memory leads many on the left to the startling conclusion that, because the bourgeoisie is not much enamored of "bourgeois democracy," the only type of democracy sustainable in Latin America must be a socialist one.

A third source of opposition within the PT to alliances with other social classes is the Catholic left—the base communities, radical priests, and liberation theologians. They hold a highly moralistic view of politics that missionary zeal gives a certain rigidity. They see compromise with those who don't share all of their views as alliance with error, complicity in sinfulness. Concern with preserving their ethical purity has taken precedence over their commitment, shared with other opposition elements, to the reestablishment of democracy. Their conception of the world exemplifies the "ethic of conviction," described by Max Weber, in which the obligation to follow one's conscience, above all else, precludes any assessment of the actual correlation of political forces and hence of their chances for achieving tangible results. Among segments of the Catholic left there is a straight line from prophetic religion to sectarian politics, from the wholesale denunciation of an unjust world to the unwillingness to capitulate to its temptations.

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The skepticism about coalitions between social classes has led to another conclusion. The PT leadership has openly expressed doubts over the possibility of initiating social reform through control of the state. The argument runs as follows: Considering the success of populist governments in co-opting reform movements and the willingness of the middle class to abandon democratic principles as soon as its interests seem threatened, it is hard to see what good could be expected to come simply from electing PT officials. Hence the greater strategic significance with which the PT invests popular social movements of recent years (the independent unions, the neighborhood associations, the Christian base communities, the mothers' clubs, and so on). These provide a means of building "dual power" within "civil society," to use the going idiom. Only after the cultivation of support among the working population does the assumption of positions within the state become a meaningful aim. It is not possible, in this view, to use the "capitalist state" to democratize society; that is the task of social movements.

Why, then, run candidates at all? The purpose of the electoral campaign, according to PT strategists, is not to put its militants immediately into places where they will be compelled "to manage the crises of capitalism." Rather, democratic elections are simply "a stage in the organization of the working class," according to a PT senatorial candidate. The "merely formal freedoms" of the democratic electoral process are an instrument for advancing the mobilization of the masses, for "building hegemony in civil society"—that is, of questionable value in themselves. The consequence of this analysis was a painful ambivalence about seeking state power, with PT candidates torn between wanting to unmask the elections as a fraud and wanting to win them. The poor showing of the party (10 percent in São Paulo, with insignificant support elsewhere) may now reveal to its ardent supporters the perils of such a course; so, at least, one may hope.

Perhaps the most unfortunate feature of the PT's campaign was the part played in it by intellectuals. The fascination that the party has exercised over the radical intelligentsia both here and abroad is based on its grass-roots origins in the urban social movements. Ironically, that very fascination with the stirring from below led some of Brazil's leading intellectuals to assume important roles within the party. In itself, this presented no great problem, and relations between party intellectuals and grass-roots militants have reportedly remained quite amicable.

But the effect of the intellectuals' presence, according to some observers, was a discernible escalation in the *revolucionismo* of PT rhetoric. It was apparent that the most radical spokesmen within the party were those without any experience in the tugging and hauling—and the inevitable compromise—of real-world politics. Union leaders within the party were usually more moderate in this regard. Their principal demands were acceptable even to a sector of industrial management: the right to organize independently of the state, to bargain collectively, and to strike. It should be said (and it is to the PT's credit) that this criticism of its left wing, which talked openly of wholesale nationalization of foreign capital and renunciation of the external debt, was initiated from within the party in free debate, immediately following the tabulation of the election results.

It is a curious question as to how the intellectuals came to exercise this influence. The probable explanation is the low profile that the "outsiders" maintained, never assuming an overtly pedagogical posture. That reticence had its source in the theory of the "organic" intellectual formulated by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, a theory much in favor among the radical intelligentsia of Brazil. According to this view, the responsibility of the radical intellectuals in their relation with the masses is not to bring them knowledge of the science of history but simply to listen to them, to attune themselves to the masses' common sense. In this way it becomes possible to show the worker "that his social consciousness already contains the presuppositions from which one can extract a superior conception of the world," as writes a recent Brazilian admirer of Gramsci. In fact, however, this felicitous idea has proved easily susceptible to distortion and manipulation. It is, alas, all too easy to write

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into "popular social consciousness" anything one wishes to glean from it.

Yet the process of humbling oneself at the foot of the worker, rather than lecturing him about the dialectic of history, has proved a more successful strategy for winning his respect and, ultimately, his support. As they would be the first to admit, the intellectuals in the PT offered very little in the way of new ideas. It is not the function of the "organic intellectual" to dream up new ideas. The consequence of this self-image was a reluctance to exercise the social imagination, to speak in their own voice—at the risk of proving themselves inattentive to the voice of the popular classes. This observation is confirmed by a comparison with the creative output of the intellectuals associated with the Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (PMDB), who turned out several books of interesting proposals during the campaign.

The PMDB, Social Movements, and the State

THE PMDB IS THE THIRD PARTY within which one finds elements of the democratic left. By no means, however, do these elements prevail within that party, which is sometimes described as center-left. In fact, the PMDB is composed of highly disparate elements, whose recent victory in nine gubernatorial races may or may not prove sufficient to stem its centrifugal tendencies. The openness of the party to anyone claiming to be "in opposition" to the regime has made for some strange political bedfellows. Its candidates span the spectrum from former cabinet members under the military to members of the outlawed Communist party. And the inability or unwillingness of the party to distance itself sufficiently from those who profit under the current regime has sapped its oppositional impetus in many states, and cost it an unexpected upset in Rio.

Because of the range of views within the PMDB it would be foolish to attempt to describe "its" theory of the Brazilian predicament with the same coherence as that of the PT. But it is possible to extract such an analysis from the writings of its democratic left. Clearly, the most important expositor of this current within the PMDB is Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Latin America's foremost sociologist and newly ensconced senator from São Paulo. There are two principal points of divergence between this analysis and that of the PT. These deal respectively with (1) the proper relation between the popular social movements and the opposition party, and (2) the existing connection between the Brazilian state and the dominant classes.

The left within the PMDB is no less sympathetic than the PT to the urban mass movements of recent years, although it must be said that it played a less active role in their formation. But PMDB analysts have little sympathy for the view that such movements, in themselves, provide the be-all and end-all of leftist politics. Cardoso, for instance, appears to view them simply as an important electoral constituency for a reform administration, one that would dedicate itself seriously to social change. He therefore is concerned that the incipient power of the social movements, with their millions of loyal followers, be used immediately to assist opposition candidates to power. If such grass-roots energy is not quickly channeled into support for a party within reach of power, then that energy may well be catered to by the regime itself. This is confirmed by the sizable public investments in slum communities that inevitably precede elections. It is worth observing, Cardoso argues, that many of the demands expressed by the new social movements, such as the provision of sewage and water hookups in the slums, are in principle entirely compatible with the survival of the authoritarian regime.

Only with a measure of power within the state will the opposition be able to deliver such services directly to its constituency, thus ensuring its continued loyalty. Only then will it be possible to elude the co-optation at which the generals are so adept, and to move from there to more ambitious reforms. But winning power through elections requires compromise with those whom the PT continues to brand as the "class enemy."

This argument already implies a rather different understanding of the nature of the Brazilian state than the one suggested by the PT. The leftist elements within the PMDB view the state as necessarily something more, or some-

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thing other, than "the executive committee of the bourgeoisie." The battering that national capitalists have taken at the hands of state enterprises and multinationals is sufficient evidence of this. Because the state does not have an intrinsic class character, its capture by the general population becomes a plausible objective. The essential attribute of that state, according to this analysis, is its patrimonialism. The term, adopted from Max Weber, refers to a state that sets the conditions on which interests and institutions in the society are recognized and permitted to interact. It is a state that dominates capital and labor alike. The interest groups of Western pluralism, with their incessant bargaining and constant demands upon the state, do not exist here. In their place one finds organizations (such as unions, professional associations, parties) whose interrelations are harmoniously orchestrated from above.

Another distinctive feature of the patrimonial state is the confusion of person with office, public resources with private wealth. Hence the omnipresence of corruption. From this understanding of the current regime it follows that the top priority ought to be the establishment of a state of law. This is precisely the emphasis of the PMDB, and not only of its left wing. The first objective of its newly elected legislators will be to pressure the government for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. That Assembly will then rewrite the Constitution, permitting direct elections (with universal suffrage) for the presidency. That, at any rate, is the plan. It may well prove excessively optimistic with respect to the readiness of military power to self-destruct. But it does appear, at least for the moment, that the "hard line" within the officer corps, which remains skeptical of the *abertura* and would almost surely oppose such a proposal, exercises little influence with President Figueiredo.

The dominant wing within the officer corps appears to favor retreat from any direct role in governance, while preserving intact its capacity for an occasional veto over the decisions of civilians. To engineer that retreat, the generals envision the creation of a highly restricted democracy that allows new channels of communication between state and society but will prevent the mass mobilization and inflationary social spending of the populist period.

The obstacles to that desire are clear enough: whenever restrictions on speech and assembly are lifted, the new liberties are employed not merely by the excluded middle class, seeking involvement in a broader political pact, but also by the leaders of the poor, attacking the entire development model with its increasing concentration of income. The economic measures recently imposed by the

Some Facts & Possibilities

Regional differences, as the election results show, are crucial in Brazilian politics. The strength of the government party—the misnamed PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO SOCIAL (PDS)—lies in the rural and economically backward northeast. There it won all the state governorships and most of the legislative seats. (And, according to press reports, bribery of voters by the party was common.)

The support for the PARTIDO DO MOVIMENTO DEMOCRATICO BRASILEIRO (PMDB), by contrast, is centered in the cities and the economically developed states. The party won mayoral contests in 75 of the 100 largest cities, with other opposition parties taking 8 of the remaining ones.

The PARTIDO DOS TRABALHADORES (PT) and the PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO TRABALHISTA (PDT), even more than the government party, are regional parties. The PT's stronghold is among the industrial working class of São Paulo, that of the PDT among the workers of Rio de Janeiro. These regional limitations have prompted discussion of a possible merger between the two parties. More likely, however, is a merger of the PDT and the PTB (PARTIDO TRABALHISTA BRASILEIRO), the heir of the populist period.

A change from proportional to district representation, which the government now is pushing, would make small parties impractical and would almost certainly precipitate mergers. Still possible, and now much discussed, is the formation of a socialist party, joining the PDT, the PT, and leftist elements within the PMDB. Such a party would combine regional breadth and relative ideological consistency with significant legislative weight. It offers the best hope for Brazil's democratic left. □

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IMF on Brazil will almost certainly prove recessionary in the short run, involving restrictions on wage increases, credit, and government spending. The unpopularity of such measures makes a return to democracy even more difficult. The generals and planners realize that such harsh economic measures would probably be abandoned by any democratically elected president.

The recent Spanish case of controlled transition from authoritarianism to democracy is now on everyone's mind here. But the differences, alas, are more conspicuous than the similarities. There was never a single figure, a Francisco Franco, on whom the Brazilian regime rested and whose passing would make reform inevitable. Nor has President Figueiredo shown the same unswerving dedication to democratic principles as King Juan Carlos. But Spanish democracy has advanced despite the continuing threat of terrorism, a problem that Brazil does not face. In this fact, at least, Brazilians may seek some solace and encouragement. □

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Roy Medvedev

Brezhnev: A Bureaucrat's Profile

Roy Medvedev is a distinguished Russian historian and political dissident. Shortly after the death of Leonid Brezhnev and the accession of Yuri Andropov to the Soviet leadership, the secret police gave Medvedev a "stern warning" against writing about his political views.

We are pleased to print here a translation of a recently written article about Brezhnev and his time, which for reasons of space has been somewhat abridged. Stroke by stroke, this essay shows us in rich detail the profile of a bureaucrat in the Communist society. — EDS.

1. The Brezhnev Era

In the U.S.S.R. the death of the leader of the party and state is a political event of extraordinary significance, usually marking the end of an era. Protracted tenure in office permits Soviet leaders to conclude a fair number of enterprises. At the same time, however, many problems accumulate that an aging leadership is no longer able to resolve. And while the speeches at funerals stress continuity, most of the population's first thought will be of the changes in the society and government ushered in by a change of rulers.

Although the condition of a Soviet leader's health is a carefully kept state secret, Brezhnev's progressive infirmity was obvious to anyone who heard his speeches or saw him on television. It was becoming increasingly difficult for Brezhnev to discharge even simple matters of protocol, and at times he was not fully aware of what was going on around him. However, it was in the interest of a great many influential people that Brezhnev remain, at least formally, chief of state. They literally led him around by the hand, which only made matters worse—the Soviet leader's age and infirmity not only earned his fellow citizens' pity but also their irritation and derision.

Although Brezhnev died in the early morning on November 10, 1982, the official report of his death only was made around noon on November 11. That is fully in keeping with Soviet tradition. In this country it is not only important to report the death of a person known throughout the world but to determine how to *formulate* that report and the procedures to follow it. It was, for example, necessary to establish tight security not only in the center of Moscow but on all roads leading into the city. Another question had to be decided—should Brezhnev be called a "great" or just an "outstanding" fighter for "peace and socialism"?

But the most important thing was to determine Brezhnev's successor. It would appear that by the evening of November 10 the Politburo had been called into session, with Shcherbitsky assuming the role of acting chairman. Minister of Defense Ustinov proposed that Andropov be elected general secretary of the party's Central Committee. This was not yet a final decision, since it would have to be approved by an emergency plenum of the Central Committee. To all intents and purposes, however, the question had been decided.

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FOR THE SAKE of convenience, the Brezhnev era can be divided into three periods.

• The first coincides with the late '60s. This was a time when the new leadership that was formed after the October plenum of 1964 set about energetically to correct everything considered mistaken in Khrushchev's policies. It was a time of reform and counterreform. The specialized [e.g., coal, fishing] ministries were restored and the regional Sovnarkhozes (economic councils) eliminated. The division of the party's Obkoms (provincial committees) into industrial and agricultural committees was terminated and party district committees were reinstated. A decision was made to change many former methods of managing industry and agriculture (the so-called economic reform). All this had a definite effect. After four years of stagnation, the economy showed relatively rapid development in industry and agriculture. Between 1966 and 1970, industry's gross output increased by almost 50 percent, while agriculture's yearly average production grew by approximately 20 percent.

In the international arena, however, the U.S.S.R.'s position took a turn for the worse in those years. Consider some of the events in the late 1960s: the "cultural revolution" in China and military clashes on the Sino-Soviet border; expansion of the war in Vietnam; defeat of the U.S.S.R.'s Arab allies in the Six-Day War; occupation of Czechoslovakia. The schism in the world Communist movement was growing deeper; the Soviet Union had to expand its military programs extensively; a political crisis in Poland led to Gomulka's fall.

At home, Brezhnev had to reckon with a rapidly developing "dissident" movement that was gathering strength despite repressive measures. An independent public opinion had emerged, and it was not meekly submitting to the party propaganda machine. Literature and art continued their forward movement that had begun at the time of the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses. The intellectual class was largely against rehabilitating Stalin.

• The second period in the "Brezhnev era" extends from the beginning of 1971 to the end of 1979, in many respects the most peaceful decade in Russia's 20th-century history. The principal political slogan advanced by the Brezhnev government in those years was "stability": stability in foreign and domestic policy, in policies applied to party and state personnel, and in economic development. That slogan was to a considerable degree realized, although "stability" often became stagnation when the leaders refused to make intelligent innovations or to replace obviously unfit personnel. The tempo of industrial development began to slow. In 1980 Soviet industry produced only 24 percent more than it did in 1975. The slowdown in agriculture was even more pronounced. In terms of yearly averages, the yield of the Soviet countryside had increased by all of 23 percent in ten years, with the greater part of the increase coming at the beginning of the decade. The enormous capital investment in agricultural production, comparable only to military expenditures, did not achieve the intended effect.

For the Soviet Union's foreign policy, the '70s were a time of its greatest successes, and these were usually attributed to Brezhnev. In this period of "détente," the Soviet Union and the United States concluded many treaties, including those on the limiting of strategic weapons. Many judicious treaties were concluded between the U.S.S.R. and the countries of Western Europe, and Soviet foreign trade with the developed Western nations increased sevenfold in ten years and exceeded 31 billion rubles in 1980. The high point of détente was the communiqué on security and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act communiqué.

At the time when the United States was compelled to pull out of Vietnam, the Soviet Union's influence was on the rise in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, though it had diminished in the Near East. The U.S.S.R. was not on friendly terms with China, but the relationship had not deteriorated. And in the '70s, for the first time, the U.S.S.R. achieved rough nuclear parity with the U.S. Had Brezhnev stepped down in 1979, he would have been able to speak of his administration's achievements with genuine pride.

• But one must also speak of a third period in the "Brezhnev era," which began at the end of 1979 and continued into late 1982. In many

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respects these were years of genuine crisis. None of the plans for economic development were fulfilled. Industrial production was only increasing at a rate of 2-3 percent per year. There were enormous problems with energy, coal, transportation. Agricultural production had begun to decline. By 1979 gross agricultural production was less than it had been in 1978, and it decreased in 1980 as well. 1981 was an especially poor year: figures on grain were not even published. The 1982 harvest was bad. The amount of food purchased from abroad increased and food supply at home took a sharp turn for the worse, the sale of meat and dairy products undergoing special curtailment. In the majority of industrial centers some form of rationing had to be introduced. The free market, which sold food at higher prices, assumed larger proportions.

The U.S.S.R.'s relations with many Western nations worsened markedly in the last few years and those with the United States were reminiscent of the cold war. NATO's decision to "close the arms gap," the U.S. Senate's refusal to ratify the Salt II agreement, the deployment of new nuclear missile systems by both sides marked the beginning of a new spiral in the increasingly expensive, dangerous, and senseless arms race. The Soviet Union now also had to deal with the difficult problems of Afghanistan in the east and Poland in the west. The Sino–Vietnamese conflict, the Cambodian problem, the boycott of the Moscow Olympics by the Western nations, the economic crisis in Rumania, the new conservative government in West Germany—all these created complications for the U.S.S.R. There was, however, one important improvement in foreign policy—a change of tone in Sino–Soviet relations. But that was only a possible beginning of a prolonged process.

Having attained no success with the economy, Brezhnev's administration was, however, marked by "outstanding successes" in the last four years in the struggle against the "dissident" movement. At present nearly all the dissidents' small organizations and printing operations have ceased to exist, and it is now difficult to speak of the dissidents as a political movement or a key factor in domestic or foreign policy.

2. Political Leader and Chief of State

Brezhnev's personal contribution to Soviet foreign and domestic policy is clear. But it would be erroneous to attribute all the successes or failures to Brezhnev alone, for he never possessed the degree of personal power that Khrushchev had, not to mention Stalin. Brezhnev was never able to make major decisions on his own. Throughout the "Brezhnev era," the country maintained a "collective leadership," which, in practice, meant that the Politburo ruled. Many problems were dealt with by an ever broader range of Soviet high officials.

IN THE 1960s Brezhnev was, at best, first among equals. He was not involved in Khrushchev's ouster although he had been kept abreast of Suslov's and Shelepin's plans. At that time few people believed he would retain power for very long. People like Shelepin aspired to power and the best Brezhnev could hope for seemed to be a return to his post as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In the covert struggle in the party, Suslov soon gained the upper hand over Shelepin, but Brezhnev's position had also grown stronger when a good number of his friends from Dnepropetrovsk and Moldavia became part of the higher echelons of power. Kosygin had enormous influence when it came to agricultural problems. Podgorny, who had replaced Mikoyan as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, did not wish to content himself with a position entirely formal and devoid of real power. Shelest and Mazurov also felt confident and rumor ascribes to them the most active role in the decision to invade Czechoslovakia.

Nevertheless, Brezhnev's influence was growing, slowly but continuously. The relatively simple, mild, and benevolent Brezhnev, to whom "nothing human" was alien and who was not too exacting with his subordinates, seemed more impressive than the other Politburo members to the Obkom party secretaries, the majority of the ministers and military leaders fed up with the tyrannical arbitrariness of Stalin and even Khrushchev. They found Brezhnev's slogan of "stability" entirely to

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their liking. The Soviet "establishment" displayed its clear preference for Brezhnev.

The "party machine" supported Brezhnev, for he satisfied its interests to the highest degree. This does not at all mean that Brezhnev was only a figurehead. Under Stalin and Khrushchev, Brezhnev had shown no signs of being an independent political force. But finding himself at the head of the party and with considerable power, he began to manifest signs that he was indeed an independent political personality.

People who worked with Brezhnev have a variety of things to say about him. Some believe that he was indecisive and soft, insufficiently independent and not critical enough in evaluating his aides' advice—others, that Brezhnev was a forceful personality with a keen intellect that he used to defeat his rivals. The truth no doubt is somewhere in between, though the former view should be favored.

THE SECOND PERIOD in Brezhnev's career began with the 1970s when his was the predominant influence in the "collective leadership." Gradually a special organization to serve him came into being: the Secretariat of the General Secretary of the Central Committee, something like the White House staffs of American presidents. Brezhnev created the Secretariat himself, staffing it chiefly with old colleagues from Dnepropetrovsk, Moldavia, and Kazakhstan. Brezhnev's close friend Chernenko assumed its leadership. Kirilenko, Brezhnev's loyal ally, was promoted to counterbalance Suslov and Shelepin in the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

The first sign that Brezhnev was in control appeared in the area of foreign policy. When visiting other countries, Brezhnev displayed increasing confidence and independence. In 1971, after meeting with the Soviet leader, Germany's Chancellor Willy Brandt wrote:

> There were two respects in which I sensed that a change had occurred in my opposite number. First, his status as the dominant member of the Soviet leadership could hardly have been more manifest. . . . Second, he showed greater self-assurance when discussing international affairs. . . .

By the beginning of the '70s Brezhnev was speaking not only as undisputed leader of the party but as head of the leadership. For a long time he had given the impression of being a man in splendid physical condition. But in the mid-'70s his health declined abruptly. He spent the first months of 1976 in the hospital; there were days when his doctors feared for his life.

Once the crisis had passed and Brezhnev returned to work, his power grew even greater. Shelepin, one of his principal opponents, was removed from the Politburo. Brezhnev was elected chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, uniting in his person the posts of head of the party and chief of state. When Podgorny, the former "president" of the U.S.S.R., objected to this, he was removed from the Politburo and pensioned off. Previously Shelest, the highly self-confident but none-too-bright leader of the Ukrainian party machine, had been removed from the Politburo and pensioned off for objecting to Nixon's being invited to the U.S.S.R. while the bombing of North Vietnam was in full swing. Voronov and Polyansky also had lost their seats in the Politburo. The latter, in particular, was held responsible for the difficult straits of Soviet agriculture. Brezhnev succeeded in appointing Ustinov as minister of defense, thereby limiting the role of the military professionals. Brezhnev himself was not only awarded the rank of marshal but was appointed chairman of the High Military Council, a special organization created to work out basic Soviet strategic military concepts.

Even in this period, Brezhnev's power was not without limits. He was not able to act on the most important problems in foreign and domestic policy entirely on his own, or to change personnel in the Central Committee and Politburo at his sole discretion. Yet in the Central Committee and the Soviet Council of Ministers there were quite a few people who owed their promotions to Brezhnev.

Several of Brezhnev's relatives also occupied important positions. His son Yuri became a member of the Central Committee and deputy minister for foreign trade. Brezhnev's daughter's husband, Churbanov, made a rapid career and became deputy minister for internal affairs after 1977. Tsvigun, an old friend of Brezhnev from their Moldavian days who was married to

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Brezhnev's wife's sister, was appointed first deputy chairman of the KGB in 1967. In many areas Brezhnev had more influence in the security organizations than Andropov. Nevertheless, the members of the Politburo and the Central Committee as well as the U.S.S.R.'s ministers were, for the most part, people who had advanced to the highest echelons under Stalin or Khrushchev.

Having come to power with his slogan "stability among personnel," Brezhnev was not able to introduce a great many major changes in the personnel of the Central Committee. This made for a very substantial limitation on his power and also hindered him in promoting younger cadres. In the '70s meetings of the Politburo were never a mere formality where Brezhnev could dictate his will, without taking other opinions into account.

THE THIRD PERIOD in Brezhnev's political career was that of the last three or four years of his life. His illnesses had grown very serious. Frequently, and for long periods, he was compelled to shift his duties to an ever larger staff of aides; Chernenko, chief among them, had been brought into the Politburo and chaired meetings of the Secretariat and Politburo rather often, replacing Brezhnev. Brezhnev's workday shrank to just a few hours. He began vacationing in the spring as well as in the summer. He was able to express his opinion only on some of the problems requiring resolution.

Brezhnev's health underwent an especially serious deterioration in the spring of 1982. On April 12, 1982, *Newsweek* wrote:

> . . . the approaching end has been written in his face: the drawn expression, the distant gaze, the eyes empty of the strength that has animated and driven the Soviet Union for the past eighteen years.

This article caused *Newsweek* correspondent Andrew Nagorny to be expelled from the U.S.S.R. Meanwhile, millions of people who had seen Brezhnev on television also had remarked on his approaching end. *Newsweek*'s only error was in asserting that it had been Brezhnev's strength that had animated and driven the Soviet Union. But in fact Brezhnev was never a "forceful personality." He did not rise to power by shoving his weaker rivals aside or by destroying them. As a rule, Brezhnev had been promoted by other, stronger people who appreciated his loyalty, flexibility, and discipline.

After the war Brezhnev owed his rise to Khrushchev, a figure whom Brezhnev carefully passes over in his memoirs. On Khrushchev's recommendation, Brezhnev was elected first secretary of the party's Zaporozhe Obkom. It may even be true that Stalin telephoned him a few times for information about the restoration of the metallurgical plants in the area, as Brezhnev (with the help of several anonymous writers) wrote in his memoirs. But Khrushchev not only called Brezhnev frequently but was often in Zaporozhe and Dnepropetrovsk helping Brezhnev solve difficult problems or holding him sternly responsible for their neglect.

In the postwar period the Moldavian S.S.R. fell into the Ukraine's "sphere of influence." There was an insufficient supply of party personnel in that recently formed Soviet republic since a large portion of Moldavia had recently become part of Rumania. It was Khrushchev who nominated Brezhnev to be first secretary of the Moldavian Central Committee. At the 19th Party Congress in the fall of 1952, Brezhnev was for the first time elected a member of the Central Committee and even became a member of its expanded Presidium. It was probably only at that Congress that Stalin became personally acquainted with Brezhnev. The dictator, old and very weak, was interested in the tall, well-dressed, 46-year-old Brezhnev. "What a good-looking Moldavian," said Stalin.

Brezhnev's further career is also connected with Khrushchev. Brezhnev's rise was not owed to exceptional political or intellectual abilities. He was not a man with a well-rounded education and, at the start, he realized how modest his intellectual resources were. Julius Caesar said that it is better to be first no matter where; Brezhnev thought otherwise. Until October 1964 he most likely never conceived of himself as ever being number one. He was content to be number two or three. Of course, he was by then a professional politician, but even politicians can be distinguished by their degree of political ambition. When the young Shelepin was asked

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by a group of friends: "What would you like to be?" he answered without a moment's hesitation: "Number one!" And how many people in the 19th century dreamed of careers like Napoleon's!

Brezhnev was more modest in his plans and ambitions. He was fully satisfied with the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to which he had been elected in 1960 on Khrushchev's suggestion. At that time Brezhnev dreamed of nothing more than signing decrees, receiving ambassadors' credentials, and heading the Supreme Soviet convened at most once or twice a year. And he was manifestly offended when Khrushchev decided to make him the second secretary of the Central Committee, freeing him from his duties as "Soviet president." Brezhnev's real power was increased by this change of post, but that did not seem an advantage to him. He took offense at Khrushchev, who had also treated him crudely and humiliatingly in the past, and this was the principal reason Brezhnev joined the ranks of his former "patron's" enemies.

BREZHNEV DID NOT ASPIRE to "great power," nor did he wish to strike terror in his subordinates. But there was a shortcoming in the modesty of Brezhnev's political ambitions—he never had a political and economic program thought out in detail. He only "went with the tide" in a political ocean that was growing increasingly stormy.

Brezhnev never aspired to hold all the reins of power, even in the most important matters. The chief of state's job was only to question and encourage (or punish). In fact, however, Brezhnev did not even keep too careful a watch on his subordinates. He almost never resolved matters that could be resolved on a lower level. For example, he almost never interfered in literature and art. At one point this outraged Suslov when Brezhnev refused to see him concerning Sholokhov's literary complaints about *Pravda*. Nor did Brezhnev concern himself with details connected with airplane and tank construction, as Stalin had. When he traveled about the country, Brezhnev never suddenly changed his itinerary as Khrushchev had done rather often. In accordance with the policy of "stability," personnel were given even greater power and by no means all of them used that power intelligently. Not only did this lead to an increase in localism and departmentalism, it also led to abuses of power and corruption. Under Brezhnev, the state and party machinery became less centralized. Sometimes the results were entirely to the good, but often they were inimical to the interests of the people. At the same time, Brezhnev's party machine did not foster sensible independence in management by introducing economic experiments—and this, in the last analysis, brought the economic reforms initiated by Kosygin to naught. Brezhnev did not declare war on corruption and violations of state discipline and, in the end, that evil even affected some members of his own family.

Brezhnev's insufficient activity was coupled with enormous power, and this caused many problems to be handed over to such new organizations as the Central Committee Secretariat, which had, so to speak, been turned into an organization parallel to the Central Committee. All of this only muddled the system of leadership and resulted in a rampant growth in bureaucracy.

Brezhnev did not possess Khrushchev's phenomenal ability to work and, in his last years, his capacity for work was, on the whole, less than average. Unable to fathom even some of the state's administrative branches, Brezhnev grew too used to relying on his aides, and this opened the door to corruption. Many of the major figures in the government not only had to consider how to report to Brezhnev about their problems but also which of his aides to approach. Clearly, this created fertile soil for intrigue of every sort. But it also would be incorrect to say that Brezhnev had simply transferred his power to those around him. He demanded to be reckoned with when he expressed some desire, though his responses were frequently inadequate to a given situation. He sometimes distanced himself from his former "favorites" if he thought they had gone too far.

All in all, Brezhnev had begun to live increasingly in a world of illusions that he himself had created and to which he was bound. That, however, is the inevitable result of too long a reign and extraordinary power. In the past even the greatest of men have fallen into

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that trap, not only seriously ill rulers with middling abilities.

3. Brezhnev as a Man

None who knew Brezhnev well would have called him an intellectual, even though in recent years he had been called an "outstanding theoretician of Marxism–Leninism" in the Soviet press. Of course, his speeches contained some ideas that, from the point of view of theory, could be considered a step forward in Marxist–Leninist ideology. But all those speeches and articles are hardly the fruits of Brezhnev's own creative labor.

Television did more to harm than help Brezhnev's popularity, for it was plain to all that Brezhnev was unable to deliver even the simplest speech without reading it off the page, and he never departed from his prepared text as Khrushchev frequently had done. Brezhnev was unable to hold an open press conference or debate, or to answer questions spontaneously—something Khrushchev, Mikoyan, or Gromyko could handle with ease. Brezhnev was never fast on his feet and did not possess much of a sense of humor. Even when awarding decorations to his closest associates, he would read a few words from a prepared text. In the last months of his life he was obviously reading his speeches mechanically.

Only once, in October 1971, while being received by President Pompidou in France, a country where the art of rhetoric is held in much esteem, did Brezhnev deliver a speech without reading it. The ceremony was broadcast and to Russians it was obvious that Brezhnev had taken pains to memorize his short speech; however, out of agitation, he omitted words and phrases that rendered some of his sentences incomprehensible. This escaped the notice of the French, since the Soviet interpreter had memorized the translation better than Brezhnev the original.

We have mentioned that Brezhnev did not overload himself with work. Of course, at times he had to do a great deal of work—when Stalin and Khrushchev were running the Soviet Union. However, once Brezhnev's personal power increased, his workday grew shorter. He loved to vacation and spend time in pleasant company. When he was younger, he seldom missed a chance to go hunting; he loved fishing and ocean swimming. He was fond of a good time at the table, liked good wine, and enjoyed success with women. In such circumstances he was cheerful and straightforward, which greatly facilitated his popularity with his own generation of leaders. Until late in old age, Brezhnev loved fast cars. Foreign leaders often presented him with sports cars produced in their countries and one must assume that somewhere Brezhnev had a garage large enough for them all.

One of my friends, a party member, once attended a ceremonial party function and ended up beside a group of Politburo members—Suslov, Brezhnev, Chernenko, and a few others—who were engaged in a discussion. Seeing them up close for the first time my friend paid special attention to their facial expressions and mannerisms. "You know," he told me later, "if I had to approach one of those people with an important piece of business, I would choose Brezhnev. He acted more simply and naturally than the others." This does not mean that Brezhnev was especially attentive to the requests and feelings of simple people. He had practically no contact with them.

Brezhnev never received "emissaries from the people" as Lenin had in order to learn the moods and aspirations of ordinary workers and peasants. He relied more on his aides' memos. However, Brezhnev frequently attended reunions of war veterans to meet with those who had served in the 18th Army. Even there the talk was none too open. "How well the Soviet people have begun to live!" said Brezhnev to one veteran who came from a city where there was no meat, sausage, or cheese in the stores. But the old veteran was not about to try to change "Marshal" Brezhnev's opinion; after all, if you compared 1982 with 1942, Brezhnev was even right to some degree.

BREZHNEV DISLIKED CONFLICT in both politics and personal relations. But it is impossible for a head of state to avoid such conflicts. Nevertheless, he nearly always tried to smooth things over and avoid taking extreme decisions.

If Stalin removed someone he found disagreeable from his post, it was rare for that

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person to remain alive or at liberty. Every summons from Stalin held a hidden danger, even for a member of the Politburo. When Khrushchev removed someone, he would deprive that person of all rank and responsibility and send him to an ordinary job in the provinces. These people did not lose their lives but lost their former privileged way of life. Brezhnev, in similar situations, would merely pension off a few people already quite advanced in years. The majority of those who "fell into disfavor" remained in the *nomenklatura*—the power elite—merely descending two or three ranks.

Brezhnev not only retained people who had committed errors but even those who had been caught embezzling, refusing to approve judicial inquiries. A great deal of time and effort were required, for example, to remove V. P. Mzhavanadze, whose greed and corruption were legendary in Georgia, from the Central Committee and the Politburo.

S. V. Medunov, the first secretary of the Krasnodar Obkom, remained unperturbed even though his corrupt activities were examined more than once. A. A. Ishkov, minister of the fishing industry, suffered no punishment either, even though his department had been marked by unprecedented fraud for years, dozens of leading figures in the ministry arrested for their part in it and one of the deputy ministers sentenced to death.

It is well-known that Brezhnev had friendly feelings for the famous Soviet satirical actor Arkady Raikin. They had known each other since June 1941, when the young Raikin had been on tour with his theater in Dnepropetrovsk, and during the war Raikin performed frequently for the 18th Army. In the '50s, whenever Raikin was in Moscow, he nearly always got together with Brezhnev, and those meetings continued, though less frequently, even in the '60s and '70s.

At one point in the mid-'70s Raikin's tours in Moscow were suddenly canceled by Polyansky and Grishin on the basis of some entirely nonsensical complaints by the theater censors. Raikin appealed the decision to the Central Committee, not considering it feasible to make use of his acquaintance with Brezhnev. He was seen by V. F. Shauro, director of the cultural department of the Central Committee. Shauro was extremely rude to Raikin and made such insulting remarks to him that he suffered a heart attack right on the spot, in the Central Committee building. Naturally, Raikin was placed in the best hospital and then spent two months in a Central Committee sanatorium. But no one, Brezhnev included, held the high-handed party bureaucrat Shauro responsible.

In 1965, S. P. Trapeznikov was appointed director of the Central Committee's department of science, schools, and institutions of higher learning. He had been close to Brezhnev since the days when they had worked together in Moldavia. Trapeznikov is not only a crude but an uneducated man whose ignorance was the subject of much talk in the Academy of Sciences. Not only the scientists but Kosygin and Podgorny raised the question of replacing Trapeznikov. Even Suslov was in favor of removing Trapeznikov, especially after twice "flunking" the elections for corresponding members to the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1967. But on every occasion Brezhnev acted as his protector. As a result, Trapeznikov remains director of the Central Committee's science department and in the '70s even was elected a corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, although the Politburo had passed a resolution forbidding leading party members to run for election to the Academy of Sciences.

STRANGE AS IT may seem, Brezhnev was a very sentimental man. He would weep not only at the funerals of friends but on other occasions that would not seem especially moving to a politician. In the early '70s, a Moscow studio made a film entitled *The Belorussky Station.* It was a very good movie but the censorship did not allow it to be shown since, in the censor's opinion, the film did not present the Moscow police in the most favorable light. It was decided to screen the film for the Politburo.

One scene in this film shows some soldiers meeting for the first time after the war. A woman with whom they had been friendly at the front where she had been a nurse sings a song about their paratroop battalion. The song, composed by the famous Soviet bard Bulat Okudzhava, so touched Brezhnev that he burst into tears. Of course, the film was immediately

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permitted distribution, and from then on the song *The Paratroop Batallion* was nearly always included in any concert he attended.

Brezhnev wept another time as well—at the first performance, played by the Pacific Fleet's orchestra on the occasion of a Brezhnev visit to Vladivostok, of Pakhmutova's song *A Small Piece of Land, Soviet Land.** This rather primitive song is about the battles fought by the 18th Army. A few days after the concert, the soloist was awarded the title "Honored Artist of the Russian Soviet Republic."

A similar episode occurred when Brezhnev viewed the film *The Red Guelder Rose*, whose director, writer, and star was V. Shukshin. There is a scene in this film in which a former criminal, released from prison and trying to mend his ways, returns home to see his mother accompanied by his girl friend. Hiding behind the door, the son listens to what his mother says to the girl about him—that he disappeared a long time ago but she is waiting for his return and still loves him. He decides not to let his mother see him but slips away and walks slowly toward a half-ruined church. He falls weeping to the grass by the church wall. The nit-picking censors demanded that this scene be cut from the film. They asked Shukshin—why does your hero walk toward a *church*, and a half-ruined one at that? Yet it was precisely at this point in the film that Brezhnev had cried. Naturally, the film was permitted distribution.

Brezhnev was very fond of movies and could see two or three a day when on vacation. He had a great love for old American westerns and knew Reagan as a Hollywood actor long before he became president. During Brezhnev's visit to the United States, at a private reception at Nixon's residence, Brezhnev was approached by another American superstar; he unbuttoned his jacket, undid his broad belt holding two enormous revolvers and gave them to Brezhnev as a present. Brezhnev was unable to conceal his joy! In his last months, already gravely ill, he was still frequently shown the best Soviet films, for the most part older movies that he had been too busy to see. For example, he liked *And Quiet Flows the Don*, which had come out in three parts in 1957–58. Piotr Glebov, who played the lead role, had not, however, done anything of distinction since then and had not been given a single major part. After seeing the movie, Brezhnev declared that this actor had to be given some award. It was explained to him that the film was now very old and that Glebov's career as an actor had not met with much success in the meantime. But Brezhnev insisted and a few days later the world of art was surprised to learn that Piotr Glebov had been awarded not only the Order of Lenin but the title "National Artist of the U.S.S.R."

NEITHER OVERLY AMBITIOUS nor power-hungry, Brezhnev was, however, extremely vain. He displayed a surprising weakness for all the tinsel of superficial honors. Toward the end of his life this trait occasioned considerable derision at all levels of Soviet society. During the war, Brezhnev had not received many decorations or medals. When, as a major general, he marched across Red Square in the victory parade of June 1945, there were only three decorations and three medals on his chest.

Brezhnev received a few decorations during the Khrushchev years—but after he assumed the leadership decorations began to rain down on him. The rank of Hero of the Soviet Union was conferred on him four times. He was awarded the "Victory" decoration, which, according to statute, can only be granted to high-ranking generals for major victories in battle at the front. It was not enough that he became the Peace Prize Laureate or that he received the Karl Marx gold medal from the Academy of Sciences. He even received the Lenin prize for achievements in literature, for a few small books of memoirs in no way distinguished from those of other Soviet politicians. (A few professional writers had been enlisted to help him compose those memoirs.) At the funerals of Soviet leaders it is customary to carry their medals pinned to small velvet cushions. At

* "A small piece of land" was the nickname given to a battle zone to the southwest of the city of Novorossisk retaken and held by Soviet forces in February–September 1943. The surrounding area was all held by the Germans and thus the "small piece of land" became a symbol of stubborn, heroic resistance. The 18th Army, to which Brezhnev was attached, took part in this battle and one of Brezhnev's books of memoirs is entitled *A Small Piece of Land*. (Translator's note.)

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Suslov's funeral some 15 senior military officers walked behind his coffin carrying his orders and medals. But Brezhnev had more than 200 decorations and medals!

Soviet propaganda became grotesque at times when indulging Brezhnev's vanity. Photographs of him appeared in the press more often than had those of Stalin and Khrushchev. Portraits of Brezhnev with quotations from his speeches were everywhere. One of his aides who cautiously hinted that it would be better to appear on television less often was immediately dismissed. Brezhnev was very fond indeed of watching his own broadcasts.

A good deal has been said about the Brezhnev personality cult. But all those clumsy efforts of Soviet propaganda can only be considered merely the outward signs of a personality cult. In reality, the majority of Soviet citizens were surprisingly indifferent to Brezhnev. The denunciation of Stalin, Beria, Molotov, Kaganovich, and others, and later of Khrushchev himself all led to a considerable weakening of the party leaders' general authority. Despite all the propaganda efforts, the populace remained skeptical of Brezhnev throughout his 18 years in power.

Even in the late '60s, when Brezhnev's long-winded speeches were broadcast on radio and television, practically no one listened to them. In the '70s, even in public places—hotel lobbies, or hospitals—people would turn off the television set and walk away when one of those speeches came on. I observed this myself in Kislovodsk on the eve of elections to the Supreme Soviet, when all the loudspeakers in a park at a health resort were broadcasting an almost four-hour-long speech by Brezhnev—thousands of vacationers strolled about the park not paying the slightest attention. In the late '70s, ordinary people began to show him a little pity along with indifference—"so old and sick and he still has to work." But later on people began to grow irritated—there were fewer and fewer goods in the stores, prices were rising, yet there were more and more medals on Brezhnev's chest. It was probably in his last two years that his popularity and his administration reached the lowest point: he had not been able to step down in time.

In the 18 years since 1964 the Soviet people had, of course, begun to live a better life in nearly all respects. But people are more apt to compare their situation with what it was four or five years earlier, not 20 years ago. And that is one of the reasons Brezhnev was buried with his nation's highest honors but without the people's grief.

Translated from the Russian by Richard Lourie □

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Russell Jacoby

Graying of the Intellectuals

Conservatives and Dissenters in the '50s and '80s

In 1957 Norman Podhoretz participated in a symposium on "The Young Generation of U.S. Intellectuals." He was 27 years old, already an editor of *Commentary*. He observed that his generation, which came of age in the Cold War, "never had any personal involvement with radicalism." His peers breathed an atmosphere of "intellectual revisionism," characterized by "an intensive campaign against the pieties of American liberalism, which, for reasons we all know, had become the last refuge of the illusions of the '30s." Intellectual revisionism taught that liberalism lacked recognition of human and social limitations; nor did liberalism offer a "sufficiently complicated view of reality." Podhoretz concluded that for the young intellectual "the real adventure of existence was to be found not in radical politics or in Bohemia" but in accepting conformity and adult responsibilities. "The trick, then, was to stop carping at life like a petulant adolescent."

Now, a quarter-century later, Podhoretz and many other intellectuals from the early and mid-'50s still loom large on the cultural terrain. Numerous commentators have sought to explain, and most often to approve, the conservative consensus that has settled over the country. Analyses abound of a skewed economy, the rise of a new right, the appearance of the neoconservatives, and so on. Yet a disturbing truth is ignored or slighted: the face of today's cultural scene closely tallies with the landscape of the early '50s. Except for the age of the participants, little has changed in 30 years. To this a corollary can be appended: there is a marked absence of younger intellectuals. Where are they? Is America's cultural life graying?

References to a "return" to the 1950s risk instant clichés and nostalgia. Nevertheless, even when undeniable differences between the '50s and '80s are registered—gains in civil and sexual rights or the absence of a McCarthyism—the convergences are striking. Public radicalism has disappeared, replaced by alarm over crime and delinquency. Anticommunism grabs the cultural limelight. Demoralized leftists slink off; puzzled liberals hang on the news. A sobering routine of jobs and careers chills dreams of refashioning America. Conservatism and conformism waft through the culture. C. Wright Mills, in an essay entitled "The Conservative Mood," judged in 1954 that the "tiredness of the liberal" and the "disappointment of the radical" reinvigorate conservatism. "There is no doubt that the conservative moods are now fashionable."

Yet to speak of a return to the '50s is misleading. The '80s signal a continuation, not a restoration. A wide-angled view of post-World War II America suggests that the movements of the '60s only temporarily rattled a liberal-conservative consensus that comfortably housed the intelligentsia.

THE RECONSTITUTION OF A '50s CONSENSUS is less startling than the virtually identical cultural program; not only the plot but after 30 years the actors themselves have not changed. This is most obvious in regard to the conservatives. The continuity is less evident for radicals, primarily because deaths, too, have diminished their small ranks. And in the case of the radicals, continuity may be valid for their work, which remains pertinent and frequently unsurpassed. Yet in the cases of both conservatives and dissenters the extended reign rests on a vacancy; a younger generation—the intellectuals of the '60s—is missing.

Peter Steinfels, in his acute study of the neoconservatives, misdates their appearance. If new recruits, reeling from the '60s, recently joined up, many key figures enlisted in the '50s. Not simply William Buckley and *The National Review*, but Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, and Seymour

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Martin Lipset made their mark almost 30 years ago. Describing the cultural scene of the early '50s in *Making It*, Podhoretz might be reporting the current mood. "Revisionist liberalism" permeated the air. "The effort was to purge the liberal mentality of its endemically besetting illusions regarding the perfectibility of man and the perfectibility of society." For Podhoretz and his friends, revisionist liberalism put to rest any lingering illusions about the Soviet Union and communism. Antiutopian in its core, it stressed "human imperfection as the major obstacle to the realization of huge political dreams." Even Daniel Bell, with a past steeped in radical politics, concluded in 1957 that the revolutionary illusions are finished. "What is left is the unheroic, day-to-day routines of living."

The '50s conservatives responded to events that would be roughly duplicated 30 years later. A revolutionary decade floated dimly in the past (the '30s and '60s), but its lessons—danger of utopia, communism, and political dreams—were very much alive; fresh events discredited Soviet communism (from the Berlin Blockade to Poland); American democracy was shining; a new anti-Communist literature sprang up; radicals retreated and brooded.

The cast of '50s dissenters also has seen few changes. From Irving Howe to Gore Vidal and Norman Mailer, they remain our cultural radicals. While there have been few additions, there have been many subtractions. The radicals of the '50s did not fare as well as the conservatives. Many died young, perhaps the cost of their isolation. If he had lived a full life, C. Wright Mills now would be 66. He died at 46, Paul Baran at 54, Robert Lindner at 41—all from heart disease. Precisely because they bucked a tide that has now returned, their contributions retain vitality and relevance.

Mills's *White Collar* (1951) reads almost as if it had just been completed. One might imagine that, after 30 years, a book drenched in empirical material would be impossibly dated. Not so. Much more than a dry study of middle-strata employees, it ranges over the mass media, new professional groups, academic entrepreneurs, and so on. *The Power Elite* (1956) contains more spunk and insight than much recent research. It also includes a chapter on the conservative atmosphere that speaks directly to the present. Many intellectuals "feel that they have somehow been tricked by liberalism, progressivism, radicalism. What many of them want, it would seem, is a society of classic conservatism."

That so many critical works of the '50s remain on target underlines the continuity of the '50s and '80s; it also throws into relief the uniqueness of the '60s. Its literature, such as Theodore Rozak's *The Making of the Counter Culture* or Philip Slater's *The Pursuit of Loneliness* seem hopelessly dated. To jump back a quarter-century, however, to Paul Goodman's *Growing Up Absurd* or William H. Whyte's *The Organization Man* is to find works that seem current. For Whyte, a virulent conformism and careerism raced through the land. "In comparison with the agitation of the thirties," he wrote, college students do not "care too much one way or the other" about political and philosophical issues.

At least in tone, the '50s dissenters often differed from their successors. More isolated and beleaguered than their future compatriots, they were thrown back on their own resources. A note of hysteria frequently entered their voices. As Christopher Lasch has written, in a world partitioned by a discredited communism and an unpalatable liberalism, American radicals risked becoming "increasingly shrill, increasingly desperate." "A stench of fear has come out of every pore of American life," lamented Norman Mailer in 1957. "The only courage, with rare exceptions that we have been witness to, has been the isolated courage of isolated people." The isolation particularly afflicted academics and professionals. Unlike a loose community of poets and novelists, the professionals lacked a network of support and often complained of their isolation.

In both his strengths and weaknesses, Robert Lindner, today forgotten, exemplifies the '50s dissenter and perhaps illuminates the "missing" '60s intellectuals. In such books as *Prescription for Rebellion* (1952) and *Must You Conform?* (1956) he showed himself a trenchant, if sometimes strident, social critic. For Lindner a vast array of teachers, counselors, psychologists, priests, and officials systematically undermined an "instinct" to rebel that dwelled within the individual. A soporific existence oozed throughout America. Decades before R. D. Laing and "antipsychiatry" Lindner, himself a nonmedical psychoanalyst, blasted psychology for its blind ethos of adjustment. For the discontent of the original neurosis, psychology substitutes "the neurosis of conformity, surrender, passivity, social apathy, and compliance."

Lindner is important both for what he was and what he was not; the sharp limits of his work illuminate the course of American radicalism. A theoretical loner, his intellectual resources never equalled his moral and critical passion. It is almost as if he had to invent his radicalism from the

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ground up. Perhaps he did. For this reason, he sometimes succumbed to the clichés of the time. For instance, a thoroughly conventional kind of anticommunism and vision of the rise of the "mass man" marred his work.

In his theoretical boundaries and isolation, Lindner personified the deracinated American radicalism that later bewitched '60s activists. Without an oppositional labor movement or an institutional base, American radicalism is always precarious and regularly disappears. Continuity between generations is frequently severed, compelling radicals to reinvent their radicalism. For this reason—to jump to the '60s—their radicalism, while novel and even vibrant, lacked the resilience of accumulated experience; it easily succumbed to creaking Stalinism and hip terrorism or literally vaporized into spiritualism. The absent '60s intellectuals may be a casualty of the discontinuous American radicalism.

I would suggest a more cynical response to the fate of the '60s intellectuals: there were none. Indeed, it is true that many intellectual luminaries of the '60s were hardly young. Earlier phases of radicalism informed the life and work of Isaac Deutscher, I. F. Stone, Herbert Marcuse, Paul Goodman, and Wilhelm Reich. That "under 30" new leftists banked heavily on aging leftists is not surprising; it is surprising that they have not (yet) significantly supplemented the older works.

When the list of '60s intellectual luminaries is expanded—Paul Baran, Erich Fromm—another feature jumps out; not only were the '60s intellectuals aging, they were largely European-born and -educated. This indirectly confesses to the weakness of American radicalism. By the end of the 1950s only those personally rooted in a European experience could mount a compelling social critique. Often emigré scholars served as conduits, introducing American radicals to European texts —for instance, Hans Gerth for C. Wright Mills or Joseph Schumpeter for Paul Sweezy. That American radicalism often owes its existence or vitality to external infusions of theory and people confirms its vulnerability.

Nevertheless, the congenital fragility of American radicalism does not pinpoint the specific factors that have paralyzed '60s intellectuals as a historical force; this is the novel situation of the '80s, the dependency of its political culture on older intellectuals. Their continuity draws not only on the reestablishment of a political mood, which renders their contributions once again germane, but on the absence of new and younger voices.

Insight into this situation can perhaps be glimpsed from the following: when Paul Baran died in 1964, Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman edited a memorial volume, "a collective portrait." It included some 38 "statements" about Baran by friends and associates. Consistent with the orientation of American radicalism, perhaps 80 percent were by older foreigners or foreign-born and -educated Americans. The list of contributions ran from Bruno Bettelheim to Isaac Deutscher, Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Eric Hobsbawm, Otto Kirchheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Ralph Miliband, Joan Robinson, and many others. It also included statements by four younger intellectuals: Peter Clecak, John O'Neill, Maurice Zeitlin, and Freddy Perlman.

The first three, at the time all assistant professors, went on to make important contributions to radical scholarship. They now all teach at major universities and are familiar figures in their disciplines. The last, Freddy Perlman, founded an anarchist press in Detroit, Black and Red, which has published some fine pamphlets and books. Today his name is probably recognized by a few cognoscenti of left literature.

While this is hardly a scientific sample, it does suggest the trajectory of younger radical intellectuals. While journalism, publishing, editing, freelancing, and the legal and medical professions attracted many, the lion's share entered the universities. Today in several disciplines—sociology, history, political science, economics, anthropology—an identification with radicalism or Marxism by younger faculty is not unusual.

THE FOOTHOLD IN THE UNIVERSITIES of radical intellectuals marks a fundamental change from the '50s. American radicals had been rarely or marginally academics. Or, from Veblen to Mills, the most significant were ostracized or sent packing by the universities. In the early 1950s only a handful of professors were publicly associated with Marxism or socialism. No longer. Not only do radicals teach at major universities, a series of dissenting journals (such as *Review of Radical Political Economics*, *Radical History Review*, *Insurgent Sociologist*, *Telos*, *New Political Science*, *Dialectical Anthropology*) serve as their forum.

The academization of the intelligentsia may mark a fundamental turn in American cultural life. It goes far in explaining the continuity of '50s intellectuals and the "disappearance" of those who succeeded them in the '60s. The two phenomena are inextricably linked. The intellectuals of the '50s and their works continue to speak to us not only because of the similarity of political culture. From C. Wright Mills to Paul Goodman, Gore Vidal, Paul Sweezy, and Dwight Macdonald they were

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independent intellectuals or marginal academics. They were and are committed primarily to a public universe and discourse and only secondarily, and often not at all, to a professional discipline. For this reason they lucidly addressed public issues to a cultural lay audience.

The successor generation of '60s intellectuals flowed into the universities. Consequently, in their writings, they have essentially reversed the loyalties of the independent intellectuals; they are devoted first to professional colleagues, and second to a wider public. This is not a judgment on the honesty and quality of left scholarship over the last 20 years, or on its quantity; neither can be denied. It is a judgment on the nature of the cultural discourse, now primarily directed to and read by colleagues.

A recent collection, *The Left Academy* (edited by Bertell Ollman and Edward Vernoff) surveys Marxist and radical thought in the universities. Surely, 30 years ago its content, taking up almost 300 pages, would probably have been covered in 10; the change is startling. However, with the exception of some works in the field of history (significantly, the least technical of the disciplines) —works by Christopher Lasch, Eugene Genovese, William A. Williams, Herbert Gutman—and occasionally one by a sociologist or political scientist, very few will be recognized outside a university community. Even the most important contributions, for instance, Immanuel Wallerstein's *The Modern World System*, do not tempt a wider public.

The monopolization of intellectual life by the universities is not simply a cultural but also an economic fact. The independent producer, inventor, or intellectual belongs to the past. The material existence of the nonacademic intellectuals—always precarious—has become impossible; even painters, novelists, and dancers affiliate with institutions or find another trade. This structural tendency is compounded by the job squeeze. The migration into the universities ended some years ago and is slowly being reversed. Untroubled by a vigilant student movement and blessed by a conservative consensus, universities and colleges easily, and regularly, terminate the employment of radicals.

This reality profoundly affects younger intellectuals. The situation is not entirely new, but the ante has been upped. The academic parks, already suffering purges by conservative managers, enclose the only patches of unregulated thought. And if they too are regulated, camping outside the park is risky, if not prohibitive. Obviously, this exacts a toll from those who like to think. The effort of maintaining the good will of colleagues supplants that of addressing larger issues or, perhaps more crucially, a larger public. Anything can be written as long as it is unreadable. And so the missing '60s intellectuals are lost in the universities.

Some of these observations can be turned upside down; it could be argued that the academization of the intelligentsia will break the curse of American radicalism, its lack of continuity. With a secure base in the universities—teachers, journals, students—the traditions that regularly dissipate will remain alive. Perhaps. An alternative, however, is equally plausible; the translation into disciplines and subdisciplines encapsulates radical thought in dead and arcane languages. This is the danger: when a public is ready to hear another message, the radical intelligentsia will have lost command of the vernacular.

The long view of post-World War II cultural life refutes belief in the perpetual rejuvenation of America. The political culture has not fundamentally changed in 30 years; nor have there been many new faces. While the aging industrial plant of America sparks much discussion, few mention the aging intellectual plant. The universities have occupied and preoccupied the most recent generation of intellectuals, depriving the wider culture of youthful talent. A future without independent intellectuals, now an endangered species, promises endless reruns. □

Emanuel Geltman

Who Killed Carlo Tresca?

It has been 40 years since Carlo Tresca was gunned down on the streets of New York, at 5th Avenue and 15th Street (January 11, 1943). Who killed him? Mussolini's Fascists? The Stalinists? Mafioso hirelings working for either (Genovese hit men?), or those Tresca called "ex-Fascists"?

Immediately after the murder, then New York District Attorney Frank Hogan and the police launched an active investigation. There were leads a-plenty, clear lines of investigation—and, then, nothing. Silence. Case closed. It might be too late to unravel the leads and suppositions. But we *can* remember.

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With official channels clearly dismembering the investigation, the Carlo Tresca Memorial Commission undertook to put the known facts together. Commission members included Norman Thomas, chairman, Angelica Balabanoff, William Henry Chamberlain, Frank Crosswaith, John Dewey, Varian Fry, Sidney Hertzberg, John Haynes Holmes, Sidney Hook, A. Philip Randolph, Oswald Garrison Villard, Edmund Wilson, Bertram Wolfe. Their report was published as a pamphlet in October 1945, with introductions by Arturo Giovannitti and John Dos Passos. Whoever wrote the report did a remarkable job. In slightly over 20 pages, there is a summary of Tresca's life, his beliefs, government stalling, and all the investigatory information then available, including such "byways" as Tresca's persistence in looking into the matter of the disappearance of Julia Stuart Poyntz a few years earlier. (A "byway" that could have been most relevant. Poyntz reportedly once had been a Soviet agent and Tresca pointed a finger at a Communist agent who could have had a hand in her mysterious disappearance.)

This report has now been reissued, with an introduction and some editing (as to facts) by Warren Hope of Mountain Laurel Publications. Why now? It is an "anniversary" year. More important, the case can never be closed for people of conscience, especially those for whom radical and labor history remain compelling.

WHO WAS TRESCA? A much abused word comes to mind: legendary. In *Heroes I have Known* Max Eastman preents an admiring portrait. There is the occasion when Tresca and others have come to Lawrence, Mass., in 1913 (I haven't the book at hand and rely on memory), to lead a march in support of textile strikers. Deputy sheriffs, rifles poised, face the marchers. Tresca stops the march and, alone, marches right up to the guns. They didn't shoot. Bravado, courage? Hardly. Tresca enjoyed living too much to risk his life in a grand gesture. It was, quite simply, the thing to do.

I remember, when I was a kid, hearing him speak at Sacco and Vanzetti demonstrations in his heavily accented Italian-American voice, which seemed to grow heavier the longer he was in this country. A few years later I would see him at radical meetings or, on rare occasions, watch him hold forth at a favorite Italian restaurant, John's, enjoying the food, drinking red wine. Everyone was his friend, even his jailers—except Fascists, Communists, and "ex-Fascists."

(Fiorella LaGuardia, then mayor of New York, was also his friend, but when Tresca's widow, Margaret De Silver, tried to see LaGuardia, in order to press him about the investigation, the Little Flower closed his petals and his ears.)

Flamboyant surely, Tresca was an anarchist, but his own kind: "I seek only freedom, not anarchy." Norman Thomas, who tried as hard as he could to press the inquiry (and that was *his* way), said of Tresca:

> In a very real sense, Carlo Tresca was the last of "old-school" radicals or revolutionaries. As such we shall miss him sorely. He loved men better than the abstraction, mankind. He loved life too much to be forced into any Procrustean bed of dogma. He had a great faith without bitter intolerance. He was a figure of courage, incapable of the sustained cruelty which has marred the communist as well as the fascist movement. He was equally incapable of the communist type of duplicity. [Quoted in Hope's introduction].

This reissued pamphlet is available from Mountain Laurel Publications, P.O. Box 1621, Harrisburg, Pa. 17105, at $3.95, postpaid. It's worth getting. □

A. J. Liehm

Reform in Eastern Europe

What has been called Eastern Europe since the end of World War II is a political, not a geographical, phenomenon. Geographically it comprises countries that have always been considered part of Central Europe (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland), as well as countries distinctly East European (Bulgaria, Rumania). What brings them together is neither history and civilization (they belong to traditions as different as West European and Eastern forms of Christianity); nor ethnicity (some are Slavic, some not); nor a comparable degree of political and economic development (before World War II some were democracies, most dictatorships, some industrialized, others underdeveloped and agrarian); nor similar experience in World War II (some fought Hitler, others were his allies).

Eastern Europe, as now defined, is the territory

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conquered by the U.S.S.R. in World War II and transformed into a huge Soviet province upon which the Soviet political and economic system was imposed. It is often argued that the West abandoned these countries to the U.S.S.R. in a political deal at the Yalta conference. It seems, however, more accurate to state that "Eastern Europe" is just one of the consequences of the Soviet military victory in World War II that probably could be entirely reversed only by a Soviet defeat in a World War III.

This does not mean that there is nothing left for "Eastern Europe" but to develop into a series of little Russias (which is not even true for the various republics of the Soviet Union). The Soviet political and economic model definitely does not fit the countries of "Eastern Europe." They have tried again and again to reform it, change it or, at least, adapt it to their own needs and traditions. These attempts have failed, but almost 40 years after the end of World War II, "Eastern Europe" remains an extremely heterogeneous and explosive conglomerate, held together only by the Soviet military presence. For a better understanding of the situation, let us look at the three main attempts at reform in 1956, 1968, and 1982.

1956

THE FIRST ATTEMPT AT REFORM came after a relatively short period of Stalinist rule. (Stalinism was imposed on the countries of "Eastern Europe" in 1948–1949; after Stalin's death in March 1953, efforts at reform started almost immediately.)

Those who then attempted a change were confronted with two kinds of temptation:

1. Some believed that "Stalinism" was just a deviation. In their view, it would be sufficient to rehabilitate people, avoid the excesses of coercion, slow down the rhythm of industrialization, change agrarian policy, elect a new politburo, and so on, and everything would be all right. (This eventually happened in Poland.)

2. Others thought that after a mere four years it would be possible to return to the status quo ante (to the conditions of 1948, and even further back), and rebuild the country more or less along the lines of a multiparty parliamentary democracy. (This eventually was attempted in Hungary.)

In this context, let us not forget that Poland, before 1948, did not have a significant Communist party. It would and could incorporate a kind of Khrushchevian reform into its national program. As for Hungary, it lacked the solid tradition and experience of parliamentary democracy.

The two paradoxes that issued from these first experiments in reform and change are:

(a) The psychological aftereffect of the Polish crisis of 1956 was a sense of victory: the Soviets retreated. They accepted a Polish "solution," and will do so again under pressure. In contrast, the Hungarians were psychologically traumatized by defeat in 1956: a heroic revolt was crushed, as it had been crushed before and will be crushed again in the future. These different psychological attitudes governed further developments.

(b) A self-conscious Poland was led by Gomulka further and further away from the promises and hopes of 1956, toward a new confrontation in 1970, which can be seen as the first rehearsal for the crisis of 1980–81. Kadar, on the contrary, led his depressed and traumatized country closer and closer to the fulfillment of many of the proposals and promises of 1956, away from confrontation and toward a growing degree of compromise.

1968

THE CZECHOSLOVAK ATTEMPT at reform came 12 years later (the "long march" toward 1968 having actually started as early as 1961). By this time it was no longer tenable to consider Stalinism as little more than a deviation. Nor was there much strength left in the illusion that it might be possible to return to the pre–1948 situation.

The attempt at reform was carried out in a highly industrialized country (whose traditional economic structure was badly damaged by Stalinist economic policy). Czechoslovakia had a long democratic past, a successful experience of parliamentary democracy, and a deeply rooted tradition of trade unionism, with working-class political parties and movements of a socialist character. At the same time, Czechoslovakia was one of the two countries in "Eastern Europe" (the other being Bulgaria) with a long tradition of a good, unpoisoned relationship with Russia.

There were two main characteristics to the Czechoslovak reform movement:

1. In the absence of a national nobility and with a weak national middle class while nationalism was a growing force, Czech intellectuals became a genuine political class by the end of the 18th century, and more so at the beginning of the 19th. The first movement for change in the 1960s was political, motivated largely by the absence of any measurable de-Stalinization in the 1950s. Since the working population was not yet directly hurt by the consequences of the economic slump, this movement was essentially propelled by a political oppo-

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sition that profited from the weaknesses of the regime. However, the workers and even the peasants ultimately joined the movement, which concentrated more and more on problems of economic reform and self-management. By the summer of 1968 it was firmly implanted in the factories, which became, after the Soviet invasion, the bastions of political and moral resistance to "normalization."

2. Unlike Poland or Hungary, the mass membership of the Czech Communist party brought under its enormous one-party umbrella a great many people who retained ties to the country's democratic traditions—political, intellectual, trade unionist, and socialist in general. The reform movement was, to a large extent, born within the system. One of the aims it almost achieved was the democratization of the CP. (The Eurocommunist movement really started here.) Far-reaching economic reforms, as well as democratization of the political structure, were among the goals sought in this reform, which, it must be noted, presupposed continuing ties with the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact.

It can thus be said that the Czechoslovak attempt at reform proposed to change the system considerably without bringing on its collapse. It sought to adapt its proposals to the country's own traditions, at the same time reassuring the U.S.S.R. about its strategic interests. Characteristically, absolute calm reigned during the reform period; the organization and performance of the country's economy improved.

After the reform movement was suppressed by the Soviet invasion, what had been first its strong point (the fact that it originated in the system and did not wish to destroy it) became its weakness. Unlike in Poland, there was no parallel structure on which to fall back (for instance, the Catholic church). And, unlike in Hungary, the invasion brought to power the worst and most incompetent representatives of the Stalinist past, advocates of total subservience to Moscow. The country was thrown into a state of turpitude and remains there. Very few care to risk breaking the stalemate.

1980–1982

FOURTEEN YEARS LATER (but the breakthrough had been prepared throughout the 1970s), the Polish crisis produced a classic case of how the "new social contract" had collapsed, replaced by Stalinist terror. According to that contract (a model I started working with about ten years ago), the East European state guarantees the citizen employment for life, at a mediocre salary, with all kinds of social services, for little work and almost no individual initiative. In exchange, the citizen yields all his civil rights, and most of his human rights, to the state. As long as both sides stick to the contract, social and political calm remain in balance. But when the contract collapses for economic reasons, and the state begins to talk about such things as productivity, adjustment of prices, harder working norms, initiative, the other side answers: the contract does not seem to be working any more; what you are asking for now was not part of the contract; give us back our rights and we shall organize and renegotiate a new contract with the powers-that-be.

This is how the Solidarity movement came about. (The Poles published my text on the "new social contract" through the underground publishing house NOWA in the mid-1970s, and often referred to the concept in their writings and discussions.)

The two main characteristics of the Polish reform movement seem to be the following:

1. It came not from within the system, but from outside it. The workers originally spoke not of self-management but about organizing themselves against the employer, that is, the state. Those in power had no role in the movement and, to all practical purposes, the Party disintegrated.

2. The ideology of the movement was provided from the outside by the enormously powerful and influential Catholic counterculture, well structured and entrenched, and identified with Polish nationalism.

Almost from the outset the armed forces were kept out of the conflict. Repeating a traditional Polish myth, they were cast in the role of possible mediator. General Jaruzelski's popularity was promoted. At the same time all kinds of special units and detachments of the army, police, and militia were strengthened. Thus when the time came for armed intervention, it could be carried out without Soviet participation. For the first time—but probably not the last—the army and the police publicly assumed the role of the single authentic safeguard of the regime. It is a role they have played for a long time, but with less publicity, all over "Eastern Europe."

The specific characteristics of the situation in Poland after the crushing of the attempt at reform are:

(a) the existence of a parallel ideological and political structure that cannot be "normalized": the Catholic church;

(b) the catastrophic, deteriorating economic situation, which makes compromise impossible "over the butcher's counter" (this played an impor-

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tant role in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia);

(c) the openly admitted political role played by the "apparatus in uniform" (Lenin).

THESE THREE MAIN ATTEMPTS AT REFORM in "Eastern Europe" were different in character, undertaken at different times, in different circumstances, and against different traditions. There is, however, a common denominator to them all. They were crushed at the moment they reached the point of sharing power. The introduction of some kind of pluralism was probably the only way out of the crisis. That it didn't come shows the limits of Soviet willingness to accept any changes in the area. There will be no sharing of absolute power, retained nominally by the Communist party but, in reality, more and more by the army and the police, the "apparatus in uniform."

On the other hand, "Eastern Europe," once considered an asset by the U.S.S.R., has become a heavier political and economic burden. It has also become clear that the graft of Russian culture (under the aegis of Soviet communism) on cultures of a radically different character has failed. The rejection of the graft has become one of the permanent characteristics of "Eastern Europe's" existence. It is probably inevitable that the U.S.S.R. will tolerate, and maybe even instigate, some adjustment to local conditions and national traditions, as well as economic reforms that would reduce the burden on Soviet shoulders. Already we can see that Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania (for example) live under arrangements that make them extremely unlike each other in many respects. These differences probably will grow. It seems impractical for the Soviet Union to attempt to streamline them, as long as overall military and political control is assured. Which means that the "East European" societies must be considered as societies in movement, limited as that movement may be at different moments. They should not be considered as a monolithic bloc. The question arises whether the time has come for negotiating a new status for the area, provided a system guaranteeing Soviet security and strategic interests could be worked out.

One might also be tempted to ask whether certain countries and societies (such as the Polish or Hungarian) still fit the definition of totalitarianism proposed by Hannah Arendt. Are they not, under the pressure of circumstances, developing toward a kind of system that has resigned itself to abandoning totalitarian control of all aspects of an individual's life, in favor of a sort of authoritarian militarism—an "East European" brand? □

Tony Levitas

Solidarity—At Work in Paris

In the Paris office of the Coordinating Committee of Solidarnośc, Jacek xeroxes pages of the underground press recently smuggled into France. "We are a clearing house for most of the information coming out of Poland," he says. Holding up a flyer from the city of Wroclaw, he adds, "This must have come out of the country in a pack of cigarettes. No telling how many people read it before it got here."

The shipment also brought cassettes. "These are fairly new. They started in 1980 at the shipyards when people began recording everything. It was as if they couldn't believe they had a voice; they wanted to hold on to every word. Now the tapes are like chain letters—one person makes copies and passes them out for others to do the same. People add their thoughts and the tapes become stories. . . ."

JACEK, AND 30 OTHER MEMBERS of Solidarnośc who were caught behind the lines when martial law was declared in Poland on December 13, 1981, are the heart of the Paris Coordinating Committee of Solidarnośc. The Committee was set up on December 16, thanks principally to the aid of the Socialist-aligned trade union, the CFDT. The union provided the Poles with an office in their headquarters on Rue Montholon and with 500,000 francs; money continues to flow in from individuals and other unions.

Each week the Committee publishes its *Bulletin d'Information (Biuletyn Informacyjny,* in the Polish edition), a collection of articles from the underground press. The tactical debates of the clandestine leadership, descriptions of life under martial law—currently "suspended"—and essays smuggled out from the internment camps make the *Bulletin*, now in its 54th number, an invaluable journal of a society in revolt.

A group within the Committee monitors the conditions of Poland's political prisoners and passes this information to Amnesty International and the International Red Cross. There is also a program that allows the French to "adopt" distressed, or dismembered, Polish families.

Somebody arrives searching for the first issue of a Polish literary journal just published in Paris. The

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quarterly, *Zeszyty Literackie,* is the collective effort of leading East European intellectuals, including Polish Nobel laureate Czeslaw Milosz, the Czech writer Milan Kundera, and the Russian poet Joseph Brodsky. There are no more copies in the office, but the visitor settles for the latest issue of the primarily political, Paris-based magazine *Kontact.*

The Committee, while acting as Solidarnośc's publicists in the West and serving as the hub of emigré cultural projects, also provides crucial aid to the underground itself: through its networks funds and printing equipment are sent to Poland.

THESE ARE NOT the only Poles in Paris, nor are they the first. They are the crest of the most recent wave in a history of immigration that stretches back to the late 18th-century partitions of Poland by Russia, Prussia, and the Habsburg monarchy, and to the Napoleonic wars. Here begins a historical romance between the stateless Polish nation and the various incarnations of the French Republic.

In the 1790s, thousands of Poles joined the Napoleonic legions hoping that the exportation of the French Revolution would reestablish an independent Polish state.

In November 1831, following the overthrow of the "July monarchy" in France, an insurrection erupted—and failed—in Poland, forcing thousands to seek refuge in Paris. The bookshop and the library these emigrés established exist to this day, and their Polish Democratic Society was, throughout the mid-19th century, one of the main links in the European network of revolutionary democrats.

The relationship between France and its Polish patriots has had its ups and downs. Napoleon, for instance, never made clear what his plans for Poland were in his attempt to redraw the map of Europe. And in the late 19th century, as massive amounts of French capital were being invested in Czarist Russia, the Parisian authorities' tolerance of Polish revolutionaries waned. The problem was, said English Lord Brougham, that "They all want peace, whilst to take up the cause of Poland means war." These words, almost 100 years later, still haunt Poland and its various diasporic communities.

After World War II, some 50,000 Poles—many former soldiers—were warmly received by France. But their repeated calls for a rectification of the "Betrayal at Yalta" proved to be an embarrassment for most French governments, which, like virtually everyone else, were unwilling to challenge the new boundaries of Europe. Only the Mitterrand government has called into question the legitimacy of Yalta.

The French reception of the dissidents who arrived in 1968, after the Polish Communist party's offensive against "Zionists and counterrevolutionaries," was also ambiguous. Many of these exiles had until recently been members of the party and were thus given the cold shoulder by the French right. But the left was not waiting with open arms either.

"Initially," said Alexander Smollar, "the left took us in socially, but wouldn't—to use Brezhnev's phrase—listen to our critique of 'really existing socialism.' They thought we were just bitter." Emigré historian Wojtek Karpinski adds that "it wasn't until the left had digested Solzhenitzyn and finished its romance with Mao, that they began to hear us."

Since the mid-'70s, however, the relationship has taken on its old 19th-century coloring and French and emigré intellectuals collaborated in aiding both Solidarnośc and such groups as the Social Self-Defense Committee (KOR).

Beneath the intellectual tip of this Polish iceberg is a mass of working-class emigrants who came to France at the end of World War I, settling in the mining districts of Pas-de-Calais and Le Nord. Estimates of the number of French of Polish origin now run as high as 1.2 million, and although these communities are fully integrated into French life—there are strong Polish sections of both the CGT and CFDT—they have provided a social bedrock upon which more recent emigrés could build.

Since the pope's election, Milosz's winning of the Nobel Prize, and the birth of Solidarnośc, their Polish identity has become more vocal, and their Polish language press more lively. Children and grandchildren of these immigrants are showing up with increasing frequency at the Polish Library in Paris and at the multitude of Solidarnośc support committees. Since the declaration of martial law, large amounts of money have flowed from these working-class communities to Poland.

THE SCENE IN PARIS, however, is dominated by the more politicized post-World War II generations. Of the 74,000 Poles in the city, a fair number can be seen on any Sunday at the Polish church on Rue St. Honoré.

A middle-aged woman looking more Parisian than the French says, "Everybody comes here instinctively. In Poland, the churches were the only place you could get anything that resembled truth. So we come, believers or not." A graying poet, sporting a button of the "World Union of Intellectuals," says angrily to a small crowd, "All the Poles want is freedom. We have always fought for freedom and we always will. . . . You must understand

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that this has been going on for a long, long time."

The group minding the Solidarsc table watch, a little bemused. They find the older generation hard to take at times and are less inclined to talk about the past than they are to play the latest tape of a banned comedian.

Despite the older emigrés' support of Solidarnosc, the relationship between them and the younger activists has often been strained. Smollar notes that the mass immigrations after the two world wars were "very strong, perhaps too strong. These people were able to set up their own Polands abroad, often losing sight of the real state of their nation." Jacek adds that for many "the symbols of Poland are more important than the reality; a peasant dance from Mazowse, a Polish pope, a Nobel laureate, that is enough for them. For us it is not."

NONETHELESS, THE YOUNG ACTIVISTS have come to well tended soil, tilled since World War II by older emigrés. On the Ile St. Louis, Casimir Romanowicz, a novelist, and his wife Zofia run the Polish bookstore Libella and the adjoining Gallery Lambert. The soft-spoken couple has played a quiet role in getting Polish literature banned in Poland back into the country—most importantly the works of Czeslaw Milosz and Witold Gombrowicz—while the gallery has aided Polish artists by providing them with a market abroad.

"I'm not overly politicized," says Romanowicz. "I'm an editor and I run a bookstore. But living in the relative freedom of France we have been useful to Poland. . . . When I first got here I would say that I was Polish, then that I was French. Now my heart is balanced between the two countries."

He is proud that Adam Michnik, a dissident now charged with treason, once told him that he'd "never seen so many books defended." And when asked if Polish officials ever bought books unavailable in Poland, Romanowicz smiles and says "Well, I don't ask names, but some of them I recognize."

Across the Seine, in the heart of the Left Bank, stands Ksiengarnia Polska, or the Polish Bookstore, founded in 1833. Its rambling second story is reminiscent of Shakespeare & Co. and, like its American counterpart, it too has at times served as hotel and salon, but with a distinctly political accent.

The bookstore is the main European distributor of the Institut Literacki's publications. The Institut, also based in Paris, is the major publisher of censored Polish titles, and the bookstore carries its full list of some 250 books, as well as 330 French works on Poland. As in the 19th century, intellectuals gather here after business hours to discuss art, politics and, in recent years, how to get the Institut's page proofs of banned books to underground presses in Poland.

"We have been able to survive so long because the Poles are a people who read. Look at this," says the bookstore's Elizabeth Rybczynska, holding up a catalog from 1835 and pointing out that the greatest number of titles appear under the heading "Moral Education." "Yes," she continues, amused and a bit slyly, "the young Poles who come to us today are very well educated."

This "education" is owed in no small part to the Institut Literacki and its Polish-language journal *Kultura*, which until Solidarnosc arrived in Paris was the most important of all the diasporic institutions in France. Both the publishing house and the journal are the children of Jerzy Giedroyc, who sensed that the struggle in Poland would be long and that the nation's interests would best be served not by continually denying the legal legitimacy of the new Communist government, but by trying to give Poland what was rapidly being taken away: a critical voice.

The distance between Giedroyc and other emigrés became apparent in the early '50s when the Institut published Milosz's *The Captive Mind*, an analysis of what moved Polish intellectuals to collaborate with the Communist party in the immediate postwar years. Milosz had defected to France in 1951 from his position as the Polish cultural attaché in Paris, and for most emigrés the beauty of his prose did not compensate for the lateness of his break with the party, while the content of the book seemed to them like an apology for having been blind to the obvious.

The Institut's office in Paris became a necessary stop for Poles lucky enough to travel and Giedroyc's contacts held fast. By the '70s, the settings of the Institut's books were finding their way to underground presses such as NOVA, and there is many a private library in Poland that can boast a complete set of *Kultura*. After the bloody worker demonstrations in 1970, Giedroyc was one of the first to suggest that the intellectuals "go into the factories," a notion that "struck many of us as farfetched," recalled Karpinski.

Seweryn Blumsztajn, a founding member of KOR, was one of those who went into the factories. Imprisoned periodically since the student demonstrations in 1968, Blumsztajn was in France the day martial law was declared. He now edits the *Bulletin*. Like most Poles he speaks of the "state of war," but as time goes on it seems that a more apt

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phrase might be the state of siege. And yet he was quick to point out that "We are not emigrés. It is the last thing we want and our greatest fear. We are the ambassadors of Solidarność and hope never to lose contact with the needs of our country. . . . "

"I don't think we can be compared to the 19th-century emigrés on a political level," he continues, "but culturally we feel quite close and see ourselves nurturing the development of a democratic society whose evolution was interrupted by force. Politically, we have more in common with those who arrived after World War II. . . . "

"But there is a big difference," he adds. "The heart of our institution is home, while the postwar generation carried theirs around with them. Eventually they lost touch, and this we will not do. Like those who came in '68, and without whom Solidarity would have been inconceivable, we will continue to respond to the concrete needs of the opposition."

And what if the opposition in its present form should be dismantled? "This," says Blumsztajn, "cannot be, thankfully, our problem; experience has taught us that in general the 'Emigracja' can be, in the long run, stronger only on the cultural level—not the political. That remains the responsibility of those at home."

November 1982 □

Cheryl Benard

Afghanistan's Resistance: An Unsentimental Look

When President Reagan dedicated the flight of the space shuttle to the Afghan resistance, he was displaying once again his intuitive talent for political cabaret. The Reagan administration's choice to support a "liberation movement" already provides a clue that something out of the ordinary must be going on, and a second look at Afghanistan confirms that here, even in an age resplendent with political paradox, you have the ultimate show.

The actors: Pakistan, a military dictatorship suddenly elevated to the rank of last bastion against Soviet aggression, and consequently the recipient not only of money and military supplies from the U.S. and from Saudi Arabia but also of a rapid upgrading of its international standing. The U.S., delighted that for once it's the other superpower that is in trouble with the Third World, is content that Soviet soldiers busy in Afghanistan will not be free to invade a country and kill a population one cares rather more about, such as Poland. Then there are the Afghan rebel groups, whose leaders see that their chance has come: their chance to get back the land that was confiscated when previous Afghan governments moved against the large landowners, their chance to come to power. And then, of course, you have the Soviet Union, from all indications content to outwait the rebels; after all, Central Asia was not pacified in a day, either. We have a war, all in all, that no one powerful has an interest in ending, since the only real price for it is paid by the Afghan peasants and they, in the eyes of the main actors, are eminently dispensable.

To get the feel of contemporary history you ought to go to Peshawar. Peshawar is a small border town in Pakistan's northwestern frontier province. It has always been the turnover point for drugs and stolen and smuggled goods from various Asian locations, and it still is. In the bazaars, ominous male figures clothed in blankets trade in various goods, and their demeanor of sinister illegality is the same whether they are offering opium, plastic sandals, or sacks of rice pilfered from the U.N. and blatantly stamped "International Aid to Afghan Refugees."

There are practically no women in sight anywhere. Occasionally a shriek and a flurry of arms, of blankets and handbag will reveal that an "emancipated" young woman student has given in to the impulse to do her own shopping instead of sending her brother, and has met her inevitable fate: she has been mauled, she has protested, and a huge crowd of men has assembled and is lecturing her assailant on the Islamic impropriety of his action while the young woman makes her escape. There may also be a few very young girls wrapped in an assortment of cloths that they struggle to keep in place while rinsing pots and dishes in the gutter.

THIS IS PESHAWAR TODAY, and it probably is much the same as Peshawar in the past, with one difference. Today it is the headquarters of the Afghan resistance. Six groups have opened their offices here, and about a million refugees have arrived (Pakistani officials triple the number in order to triple the amount of aid received for them). In their wake has followed a motley assortment of Westerners.

There are, of course, the journalists. They can be

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found in the Foreigners' Bar of the Hotel Khyber Intercontinental, where upon exhibition of a passport from a non-Muslim country one may drink oneself into a stupor provided one can pay $150 for a bottle of whiskey. The journalists, on expense accounts, can, and it is their custom to sit together in the lounge in the mornings and compare how many times the salary of a Pakistani doctor they consumed in liquid form the previous night.

Then there are the political tourists; the young Germans fleeing unhappy love affairs and determined to commit suicide by leading a human-wave attack against Russian tanks—these are eventually collected by the German consul and sent home. And there are numerous other young Europeans who are disgusted with life in the affluent West, living as a new kind of groupies on the fringes of one or another of the rebel groups, having themselves photographed in turbans and robes and sentimentalizing about the ferocious warrior Pashtuns in tones reminiscent of an S/M phantasy made respectable by the note of politics.

Finally, there are the Afghan students who have abandoned their scholarships in Paris or Vienna in order to assist in the establishment of the social democratic, or Maoist, or Islamic fundamentalist —whichever they prefer—government that they believe must invariably follow once the dust of the war has settled.

Ruling over this peculiar Pakistani town is the most powerful of the rebel leaders, Hekmatiar. A youthful Afghan version of Khomeini, he parades through the streets escorted by his personal bodyguards, about 25 men armed with machine guns. He resides in a fortress that includes a private prison, a training camp, barracks for his troops, and offices for a large staff. If you have an interview with Hekmatiar, the people whose house you are staying at will implore you to take a rickshaw cab to the Intercontinental, have a cup of tea in the restaurant, change to a taxi, drive to Green's Hotel, change to another taxi, and never under any circumstances tell Hekmatiar or anyone associated with him where you are staying in Peshawar.

FEAR AND PARANOIA ABOUND, and it is hard for an outsider to distinguish between the two. "When you talk to the U.N. people, remember they know me by the name of Majid, not Pashtun." "Don't let anyone know I studied in Germany." "Don't tell the Red Cross that Doctor H. is still alive." Your head will soon be dizzy from all these admonitions, the deceptions you are supposed to keep track of. And clearly it is not all imagination, bad nerves, stress. Within two months, ten people are found dead in their rooms, heads severed; a note is attached to each body and the note reads "Maoist" or "Communist." This is the work of Hekmatiar, and any Afghan to the left of Khomeini lives in a state of fear. The rest of the leadership, while less well armed and equipped, is not much more inspiring, and to call the Afghan rebel organizations "freedom fighters" requires granting the word "freedom" more elasticity than even liberal persons scrupulous to avoid imposing their own values on another cultural setting can provide.

Group and camp leaders—landowners, tribal chiefs, village elders, and fundamentalists who want to remodel Afghanistan along the lines of Khomeini's Iran—are determined not to lose their grip on the population, which means vigorously opposing anything resembling social change. It also means fighting each other over the distant prospect of ruling the country once the Russians leave. In their haste to settle this matter, the groups have already embarked on their civil war, and in several Afghan provinces Soviet victories were achieved by simply waiting until the opposing rebel factions had wiped each other out, and then moving in to claim the area.

FRUSTRATIONS over this state of affairs are growing, even among the "freedom fighters" themselves. Ask Afghan rebels in Peshawar which of the parties they belong to, and they will frequently make this clear in their reply; "Hizbi Islami," they will say (Hekmatiar's fundamentalist party) and spit on the ground to show their contempt for Hekmatiar. But, without a party affiliation you don't get refugee papers, you don't get food rations or tents or medical supplies, and you don't get a gun.

Frustrations are highest among the idealists, the Afghan and foreign individuals who rallied when news of the invasion came, only to watch with growing resignation as the maneuvers of Pakistani, Saudi, and U.S. interests helped bring the most repressive forces in Afghan society to the forefront. The Agence France Press representative on the spot, a man who has lived in the region for ten years and has accompanied rebel soldiers into the country seven times, has since taken refuge in cynicism. "If European and American liberals understood the social values of the Afghan resistance," he said, "they would send their money to Moscow." It is the refugees and the Afghan villagers who are caught in the crossfire as their most socially backward leadership is bolstered by foreign money and support. Two Pakistani doctors, summoned by an elderly Afghan widow to treat her unconscious daughter, were shot and killed along with the two

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women by an angry mob of fundamentalist vigilantes who saw the men enter the tent of two women and drew their own conclusions. The Pakistani authorities, called upon to do justice, accepted the camp leader's "apology" for the "incident."

A water pipeline project initiated by the U.N. had to be abandoned because heavily armed delegations from outlying settlements kept arriving at the site to announce that unless the pipeline was instantly diverted to their camp, they would shoot down everyone working on it; this was the work of local leaders intent on impressing their constituency by making theirs the first settlement with running water.

Afghan widows become victims of the brotherly concord between Pakistan's fundamentalist regime and the fundamentalist rebel parties, who agree on the following bit of impeccable logic: since women may not be seen by anyone except their closest relatives, obviously, they may not have their photograph taken. Since they may not have their photograph taken, they cannot be issued refugee documents, and since they do not have such documents, they cannot receive food rations. This has obliged many widows, thrown upon the tender mercies of distant male relations, to provide for their daughters by marrying them off at the age of seven or eight. The provisions that reach the women are in any case meager, and resourceful U.N. officials finally hit upon the idea of distributing Australian protein biscuits to these refugees: whereas the men are not willing to share the meat or eggs with women and girls, the biscuits are taken to be dry bread and therefore undesirable and suitable for female consumption.

The aid organizations have had less success in the areas of medical care and education. In the latter field, the battle was given up when the Pakistani refugee authority, pressured to provide a textbook that would be a neutral alternative to the indoctrination literature published by Hekmatiar, finally issued a reader that featured such sentences as "This is an airplane. This is a good airplane. This is an Islamic airplane." (Needless to say, efforts to persuade the camp leaders to allow girls to attend these classes were rejected out of hand.)

In health care, the iron rules laid down by the village elders and the fundamentalist parties have brought about the paradoxical result that while health care is abundant and most camps have their own clinic, medical care is defined as a privilege not everyone is entitled to. For the idealistic young Afghan doctors from the cities who have stayed in Pakistan to help their compatriots rather than become part of the migration to the West, it all seems very grim. One of these is Latifa, a young Afghan woman who studied medicine in Poland and is now part of a team looking after a camp population of 30,000. While we were in the camp she was asked to come to a tent. Arriving there, we found a young woman who had been in a coma for three days, had meningitis and would probably die because treatment began too late. Why didn't the family, who lives 500 yards from the medical tent, call Latifa sooner? Latifa, in her one and a half years of refugee work, has gone beyond anger, surprise, or depression; she shrugs her shoulders. "These people come from the mountains, where a trip to the doctor took several days and cost a lot of money, certainly more money than one would spend for a woman. Now the clinic is free and only a few yards away—but they haven't adjusted to that yet."

Efforts on the part of urban Afghans to educate their countryfolk meet the resistance of the old leaders. Latifa's colleague, a surgeon from Kabul, explains, "When I try to talk to them about their attitudes, the village elders confront me. They tell me they're fighting the Russians because the Russians tried to force them to change. Am I not a Muslim? Why am I talking like these Russians then? Am I perhaps a Communist?" At night this doctor studies English from a textbook, in the hope of getting a visa for Canada. He is losing hope of a positive outcome.

HOPE IS NOT EASY to hang on to, in this particular crisis. Obviously, a superpower invasion of a small state is wrong. The fundamentalists, who as a result of international support are becoming the most powerful factor in Afghan politics, are determined to maintain their stranglehold on the population by fending off such dangerous harbingers of new ideas as schools, more freedom for women, and social reform. The Saudis and Iranians are solidly behind Hekmatiar, and the Pakistani authorities assure that he is also the recipient of most of the U.S. arms and aid destined for the rebels. Zia wants the fighting to go on at a low level, so the Russians won't get the idea of attacking Afghan bases in Pakistan while the money and weapons continue to arrive. And the rest of the world has more pressing concerns.

One can't predict who will win the war in Afghanistan, but one can safely predict this much: whoever wins, the Afghans will lose. □

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Feminism, Community, Freedom

The following exchange between Marshall Berman and Jean Bethke Elshtain concerns her article "Feminism, Family, and Community," in our Fall 1982 issue. EDS.

Marshall Berman Comments

Almost exactly a century ago, Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor presented what is probably the most trenchant argument ever made against democratic socialism. By democratic socialism I mean the demand that men should come together to create a new kind of community, one that will generate mutuality and solidarity, as communities always have, but also one that will be created through a free covenant, and will operate through a network of free institutions. Dostoevsky's Inquisitor is convinced that this can never be. "Freedom and bread enough for all are inconceivable together, for men will never, never be able to share among themselves." The only way modern men and women can ever become a community will be by "bringing their freedom to us and laying it humbly at our feet." Once this is done, the trinity of "miracle, mystery and authority" will bind them together like glue.

The Inquisitor explains, to a resurrected Jesus whom he holds prisoner, that "nothing has ever been more insupportable for a man or a human society than freedom." In asking for a free communion freely arrived at, "You asked too much. By showing man so much respect, you acted as though you'd ceased to have compassion. . . . You should have asked less of him. That would have been more like love." The argument here is that the ideal of a fusion of liberty and solidarity is an impossible dream. Better to strive for something less quixotic: why not community *without* liberty? Solidarity and mutuality will be infinitely easier to attain if only we learn to leave our obdurate desire for freedom at the door.

Jean Bethke Elshtain's essay, "Feminism, Family and Community," rings out with the old inquisitorial note. She unfolds a wholly negative vision of the modern world, worthy of a de Maistre or a Bonald. All the ideals that have animated the liberal movements and revolutions of modern times—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the rights of man and citizen—are thrown into a huge bin, marked POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM, to be discounted and thrown away. All the forces that these movements and revolutions fought against are thrown into another box, marked TRADITION, where they are lovingly cultivated and uncritically embraced. She claims that "My aim is to contest, not to abandon, the grounds of tradition. . . ." But in fact she offers no contest, because she presents no critical standards that might enable us to condemn some religious, political, or social traditions, while approving others. And there is no way to develop any critical standards for the scrutiny of traditions, so long as she goes on expending her spirit in casting a rosy glow over them all.

Elshtain's attacks on feminists need to be seen in a broader context, as just one part of a much larger agenda. When she proclaims, right at the start, that "there is no way to create real communities out of an aggregation of 'freely' choosing individuals," her target is not only the current movement for reproductive rights—in which women's free choice is a central theme—but the whole modern idea and dream of freedom itself. Thus it isn't merely women's freedom that Elshtain fears: it's freedom for anyone and everyone.

Doestoevsky's Inquisitor believes that the great mass of mankind doesn't want to be free

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and, even if they did want it, couldn't bear it; he and his fellows generously offer to bear the burden for them. Elshtain is apparently willing to do the same for womankind. This emerges in her discussion of work. Apparently there are two kinds of work, and two kinds of working women. There is proletarian labor, low-paying, dead-end, mechanical and/or brutal. The women who work at these jobs do so only because they are forced to, "just to make ends meet"; in a better society, "an economy that [could] provide decently for its families" would return these women to the domestic circle of love, where they really want to be and ultimately belong. As for the forms of work that are better-paying, that offer advancement, and that appear interesting to the women who engage in them, Elshtain uses a number of phrases to stigmatize both work and workers: "possessive individualism," "narcissistic self-absorption," "'getting yours,'" "middle-class careerism," "the norms of market society," and so on. The fact that many women want this work, and even undertake legal and political campaigns to get it, only shows how thoroughly corrupted they are, how inwardly hollow, devoid of heart or soul.

It is interesting that Elshtain applies none of these strictures to herself: she has made a career as a writer and professor, edited magazines, attended conferences, given speeches, traveled all over the world, *and* been a wife and mother, bringing up four children, without evidently abandoning her nearest and dearest or losing the capacity to love and care. What has Elshtain got that other women supposedly lack, that makes a fusion of work and love, dedication both to herself and to others, possible for her alone? Maybe she believes that she is bearing the burden of freedom for all; but I suspect that most women will prefer to bear it by and for themselves.

Elshtain says repeatedly that we need to be guided not by theory but by actual life. But the totalism of her thought, with its abstract negations of freedom and modernity *en bloc*, acts as a lead shield that keeps her from hearing what women really are saying. For instance, much of my work goes on in a liberal arts program that is run jointly by the City College of New York and a number of labor unions: we give courses in union halls at night, on the CCNY campus on Saturdays, leading eventually to a B.A. degree. Most of my students in this program are working women, from 30 to 60 years old; all are or have been married, and have children of all ages. These women are secretaries, maintenance people, computer operators, child care workers, teachers' assistants, bookkeepers, hospital cooks and nutritionists, and so on. Most of their jobs are low-paying, and many of them are dead-ended; the women who do them are chronically frustrated, always exploited, often oppressed.

If Elshtain's vision of work and working women were right, they would hate their work, and dream only of windfalls that would allow them to get back to the shelter of their homes. In fact, they don't. For the most part these women feel that the work they do is valuable, and they are proud of doing it well—just as they are proud of bringing up their children well. They want more pay and better working conditions, more power and responsibility on the job—along with support services for their families, for instance, day care. But they are damn glad to be out there, and they would not go home for good, even if they could. They feel their work has made them more alive, fuller and freer human beings. Is Elshtain really certain that they are wrong?

ELSHTAIN'S DISCUSSION of the theme of community exudes a similar sense of unreality. She paints a picture of blood-and-soil *Gemeinschaften* as palpable and immutable as the rocks, the sea, the sky: everyone out there belongs to these communities, and loves them, except where they are undermined by feminists and the left, whose seductive dreams and promises of freedom destroy this primordial life.

In the real world, however, nothing is more precarious and vulnerable than communities and communal bonds. The U.S. Census Bureau tells us that the average American family moves once every five years. This is not necessarily because people and families want to move, but, very often, because they have to move, because the neighborhood or the city or the countryside around them is changing swiftly and drastically under their feet. To keep any sort of community together in the modern world—whether a family, a neighborhood, a town, a church, a school, a labor union—requires enormous dedication and tenacity. But these admirable human qualities presuppose a force that Elshtain seems to deplore: *free choice*. She sees individual freedom as a corrosive force that dissolves all community. In fact, no old community could ever survive, and no new one could ever be formed,

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without it. Freedom is the only medium in which communal life can live and move and be.

Elshtain's grandmother, of sainted memory, probably understood this better than she does. "For my grandmother, the 'I' of the self was always a 'we,' located within a dense web of human ties. She could no more think of herself outside the tissue of '*unsere Leute*' than she could fly." But the crucial point, which Elshtain somehow manages to miss, is that she *did* fly: born in the Volga German colony of the old Russian Empire, she decided to leave the Volga, leave the Germans, leap ten thousand miles into the American West—and a lucky thing she did, for the Volga Germans were to suffer a dreadful fate. Once here, she had to decide who *unsere Leute* were going to be. Whatever identifications she eventually made, her new identity couldn't flow from her blood or grow from her soil: it had to emerge from her decisions and choices. Forced to be free, she used her freedom in ways that modern men and women have always used it: to form new families and build new communities. And I bet Elshtain's grandmother hoped, as mine did, that her children and grandchildren would enjoy still more freedom and a wider range of life options than her own. It is hard to imagine this wise old lady disparaging the very idea of freedom, or lamenting the modern world as nothing but a nihilistic void, as her granddaughter does today.

Even as Elshtain exalts the value of community, she seems to be indifferent to the needs and welfare of the community she lives in, the community of radical intellectuals. Its fortunes have risen and fallen mercurially over the years. At times this community has all but disappeared from public view; but it has had a continuous existence, going back at least two centuries, and it has a body of traditions and a sense of honor all its own. It has incubated both the socialist and the feminist movements, and many more.

It is in this community that Elshtain emerged as a thinker and a writer; it has given her tools, jobs, opportunities, comrades, audiences (including the readers of *Dissent*), a sense of agenda and vocation. And yet, in the bleak polarities of her current view of the world, it is as if this community, its ideas, its hopes did not exist. (As I read, I kept wanting to yell: Hey, Jean, remember us?) Moreover, in any community that depends on its members' active commitment, one of the basic human bonds is speech: the forms and tones in which people talk to each other. Alas, in recent years Elshtain's voice has become accusatory and vindictive, eliciting anger, bitterness, and polarization in the people she aims at. This voice sounds less concerned with defending families than with attacking feminists, demanding that they defend themselves against her charges of subverting and sabotaging "the family."

There are two things I want to say in response. First, there are a great many of us out there who would die for our families, and yet who would die before we would submit to a loyalty oath to "the family." Second, as for the intimations of guilt, blame, and purge that echo throughout Elshtain's recent writing—feminists are morally responsible for Reaganism, the Moral Majority, etc.; the left had better get rid of these types if it wants to be acceptable to "ordinary Americans"*—if this mentality ever got translated into policy, there would be few surer ways for the left to destroy itself. I know this is a free country, and Elshtain has the right to speak in any voice she likes. But she has no right to kid us—or herself—about her love of community: that voice serves not to sustain community, but to shatter it, as surely as Oskar Mazerath's scream breaks glass.

IT IS HARD, and often dispiriting, to be a democratic socialist: fighting for liberal values more seriously than do the liberals themselves, keeping alive the dream of a truly free community that never was on sea or land. Maybe it makes sense, as the Grand Inquisitor and his many successors have said, to simply strike freedom off the radical agenda; it would certainly lighten our load. But most of us are not yet willing to kiss the libertarian dimension of socialism goodbye. There is a real nobility in this quixotic quest; besides, as Irving Howe suggested some years back, it's steady work. I have been arguing that we must affirm feminism as a vital part of our work, and defend women against those who would protect them from themselves. If we forget that their fight is ours, we will be forgetting, or worse, forsaking, who we are. □

* Recent election returns suggest that this view of the folks out there is already out of date, and that "ordinary Americans" have increasingly come to reject the New Right for many of the reasons that feminists have condemned it all along.

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Jean Elshtain Replies

An Open Letter to Marshall Berman

Dear Marshall,

Your impassioned attack on "Feminism, Family, and Community" is a defense of your deeply held democratic socialist faith and another of those paeons to modernity we have come to expect from you. Your title—"Feminism, Socialism, Freedom" —promises no coy defense, no half-hearted celebration. Because you have come to regard me as a born-again foe of freedom, and no friend to either feminism or socialism for that matter, you relegate me from the start to a political netherworld. I find myself in the company of the Grand Inquisitor and those hoary arbiters of autocracy and royalism, Maistre and Bonald. Although I was stunned to find myself linked up with these characters, fictional and historic, my first response was an ironic sigh. "At least," I mused, "he has ranked me with 'heavy' defenders of views he finds anathema rather than insisting that I pack my ideological bags and ship them, and myself, off to Phyllis Schlafly and the Eagle Forum," a course urged on me by several less formidable critics than yourself. But this momentary relief at being spared the embrace of the radical right gave way to a disheartening recognition that you had got my argument so wrong. Your well-turned-out prose creates a hall of mirrors that distorts my views and reflects your own images and ideals, doubly enhanced, back into your already bedazzled eyes.

"Feminism, Socialism, Freedom," you proclaim. The words, as you reverently and repeatedly evoke them, are chiseled out of democratic granite, three conceptual profiles in courage none but the faint-hearted, the cynical, or the mean-spirited can, or would, deny. But all this comes too easily; it flows too readily from your primed pen. You never really respond to my essay because you cannot see it for what it is. A powerful picture, grounded in your language of reflection and critique, holds you captive. This language reproduces the same image over and over. Your triad becomes the prima facie embodiment of all social good.

"Feminism, Socialism, and Freedom" are the stars that illumine our gropings toward the future and the repository of hopes that captivate you and to which you are captive. One day, you hope, these terms will aptly characterize our collective attainment of a "new kind of community." Until that moment of historic epiphany, your secular trinity serves as a modernist's version of Plato's *Republic*, an ideal city "in speech."

Outside this "ideal city" there is no truth to be found, no "good" to be embraced, no practice to be rescued or remembered. Those who are not "with" your freedom are clearly against it and they—including myself in your estimation—produce, at best, murky negatives that should be allowed to rot in the dark room of unfreedom.

The debate here, as you know, is not over what a crude empiricist, failing to understand that language structures and helps us to imagine forms of life, might call "mere semantics." No, the differences go deep; the stakes are high. You claim that I fear freedom, want to "save" other women from it, and deplore free choice. You argue that I extol the past uncritically, seeing history through a misty golden haze. You find me a hater of the present and, in a rather murky turn of the argument, you imply that I favor striking freedom off the socialist agenda. You thereby hint that I adhere to *some* version of a socialist agenda that would seem not to fit me for drinks and dinner with Maistre and Bonald. But this is a rather trivial point. More important are your broad charges. *Each is false but interestingly so.* I shall attempt to bridge the gulf between us, not so much to convince you, for you are too locked into the dance of modernity to trip the light fantastic to some different tune, but in order to clarify for myself and others *how* it is that two scholars of the left, each concerned with feminism and socialism, could reach such an impasse.

What is striking about your piece is what you leave out. You omit any discussion of the tension between authority and freedom, or between the dual claims of individual liberty and community obligation. You ignore perhaps the most striking and important feature of modernity—the growth of bureaucratic rationalism and antidemocratic social engineering. You evince no apparent concern with the power of the State—any state but most especially a socialist state, which *must* centralize authority in order to plan and control—in the matter of freedom. You do not even consider the possibility that some modern forms of feminist protest may embody, as the French feminist Julia Kristeva has suggested, not a radical dissent from capitalist rationalism but the completion of its project. You grant no weight to tradition. You give no force or credence to any form of antimodernist critique. Declaring or assuming the full, untroubled compatibility of liberty, socialism, and feminism—

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as if each were of a piece and each, in turn, supportive of the other—you allow yourself an uncharacteristic moment of self-pity. It is sometimes dispiriting, you say, to be a "social democrat," a dreamer of "a truly free form of community that never was on sea or land." That ideal city in speech again.

If I were discussing these matters with you face-to-face I might very well give in to my own moment of self-pity along these lines: "There are times when offering a critique of current understandings of feminism, socialism, and freedom *within* a left tradition we broadly share—or did until I was sent to join the ghosts of authoritarianism past—is more dispiriting yet." You evoke, uncritically, all the talismans of the faith. But your evocations are increasingly out of touch with current social reality, including, among others, the self-understanding of those working-class and underclass communities and neighborhoods in whose behalf your dream of socialist freedom is being dreamed. Yes, they want "freedom": freedom to have a steady, decent job; to own a home; to provide for their children; to live in a safe neighborhood; to send their kids to a decent public school; to enjoy moments of leisure. They hold onto a fragile thread of belief in this country and themselves in order to *preserve* important values, including the images of family and community of which I wrote.

Yet you write of moving toward a "free covenant," creating a "network of free institutions." Marshall, what *does* this mean? You offer no concrete and convincing image of your alternative reality; you provide no notion of how such "free institutions" ("never before seen on sea or land") will differ from what we know or have known. How, and why, should men and women struggling to preserve what they have freely covenanted give birth to your new world? Your use of "men" is instructive here, not as some egregious sexist slip, but because, historically, theories of social contract portray adult males "freely" contracting to create political society without acknowledging the parasitism of their new order, and its "freedom," upon older forms of community, including families.

Yet we all, even freely covenanting men, are born into a world of prior social determination, into a language community. We are part of a "we" before we become language-using "I's." We do not choose this community and we cannot, at some later point, simply shed it as a snake does its skin. We may leave; we may move on; but we do not slough off previous identities, nor should we. Besides, isn't it a bit late in the day to speak of "free covenants" as if somehow the conditions for their creation will emerge if modernity just keeps on modernizing? Surely, the task we should be up to, a task rather more sober, less buoyantly romantic than yours, is determining how the left can offer a critique of the present and an alternative other than the "taking over" of current structures of institutional power by "good guys" or a fall into simplistic Rousseauism that promises, as an article of faith, that once we freely recreate the political community, this community will generate abundant supplies of "mutuality" and "solidarity" as its automatic, uncoerced effluence. We shall be completely communitarian and totally free: it is this vision that parts company with current realities.

As our society moves into newer forms of social discipline, plainly visible in proposals for "reindustrialization," in entrenched forms of bureaucratic behavior, you dream of a world of automatic—or nearly so—goodness, all our free choices and ends harmonizable with those of others *and* with socialism and freedom to boot. You charge me with nostalgia as I look back. But you sentimentalize the future and stigmatize in the present any suspected recrudescence of antimodernism as a threat to your project of freedom. Surely, Marshall, a more insidious foe is the grand total of celebrants of our future "freedom" as more of what we've already got—consumer goods, social engineering, technological wizardry, a "satisfied" populace.

THIS BRINGS ME to your version of "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor." You read Dostoevsky's tale as "the most trenchant" argument *against* democratic socialism. The once revolutionary Dostoevsky, having become an apostate from freedom, has his Inquisitor trounce his own early dream, declaring the fusion of liberty and solidarity, in your words, "impossible." It follows, for you, that *any* thinker who expresses anything less than your own boundless faith slides toward the Inquisitor, toward apostasy. But there is an alternative reading that casts the Inquisitor's peroration as a cautionary fable of a rather different sort.

In *No Place for Grace*, Jackson Lears suggests that Dostoevsky envisions "the coming triumph of modern bureaucratic authority" as he pictures a world of false comforts and a glutted mass who have "exchanged spiritual freedom and moral responsibility for economic and psychic security." Read this way, your claim that the Inquisitor's is an argument that there is either community *or* liberty, or that solidarity and mutuality can be attained at the cost of freedom, is a setup to make your case at the expense of mine. Instead, in the Inquisitor's

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world, there is *neither* freedom *nor* community. It is not that one has been thrown overboard to attain the other. Dostoesvky's mass are "pitiful" and "childlike" in the worst sense—hardly a community, hardly exemplars of mutuality. They have security but the price they pay is the loss of *both* community and liberty. You skew Dostoevsky in order to set up an antinomy between freedom and community that you say is my own and then insist that I have opted against freedom, for community. With this segue you evade the pressure the Inquisitor puts on your faith: can individuals sustain a sense of moral responsibility and nurture spiritual freedom if all their needs are supplied by some benevolent order? Such a bureaucratic "welfare state" bears no relationship—none—to my vision of community. That vision is grounded in moral particularity as the basis for the education of the heart and the mulch for our fundamental humanity.

Ignoring my discussion of community, you go on to set up another antinomy, claiming that it is mine, this time between "possessive individualism" (bad) and "tradition" (good). But this is your dualism, not mine. I make it clear that it is the prevailing terms of market society that have a corrosive effect on nobler ideals of the free, morally autonomous individual, a person, in my words, "mindful of higher duties as a member of a political community." My attack on the free-market model of "civil society" did not involve a repudiation of richer notions of autonomy, the rights-bearing citizen, and democracy. The latter are a far cry from what passes for citizenship now—a groupie promoting his or her narrow interests, getting a "piece of the pie." Has your picture blinded you to the many powerful critiques of interest-group politics and the privatizing, self-absorbed individualism it encourages, thereby derailing possibilities of reaching for a common good? A gallery of many of our most important social critics, including some who have written in these pages, have marked this dynamic. Possessive individualism of the sort I decry erodes the "space" within which the morally autonomous individual may emerge, squeezes out the terms for disinterested political action, deflects glimmerings of civic virtue.

"Tradition," you say, is what I want—solid and rocklike. You are right that those of us who would contest the ground of tradition must think carefully about the ideals, practices, institutions, and virtues we would rescue and resituate in the present in order to carry them forward, transformed, into the future. The development of critical standards in the assessment of tradition is an important task—I grant you that—so important, indeed, that I cannot understand why you find the creation of such standards unnecessary in extolling freedom "for anyone and everyone." Does freedom require no critical standards? We live in a society in which a few adults defend sexual relations with young children on the grounds of "free choice," theirs and the child's, and because such "freedom" is an attack on "the hideous institution of the authoritarian family." Presumably you find, as I do, such "freedom" a self-serving rationalization to justify the exploitation of the vulnerable. As a defender of freedom, and a person of conscience, where would you begin to make some critical assessments here?

I do not seek a return to the good old days.

Rather, I see *some* good in the *old* days. My essay was specific concerning those aspects of traditional belief and practice I claimed as one locus for the creation and sustenance of moral and social values and as a necessary foundation for any ongoing way of life. This is the core of my defense of a certain image of the family, a defense I will not repeat here. But I would remind you that this world was, historically, one importantly defined by women and suffused with values sustained by women. I challenged the devaluation of that world and its values under terms of male-dominant society. You are silent concerning this devaluation. The bind I pose that you ignore, perhaps because it poses a tough challenge, is one noted by several other feminist thinkers: if we find that the private sphere, at its best, nurtured a morality that emphasized concern and responsibility for others, and we find these values worthy of sustaining, perhaps even extending, then we must think long and hard about what would be lost if the private realm were abandoned in the name of an abstract ideal of liberation.

YOU CHARGE ME WITH STIGMATIZING WORK and workers, including women who "have to" work as well as those who "want to" work. This is way off the mark. My point was to question a culture of productivity (and, by implication, any future vision that requires—as socialism traditionally has—mobilizing its people around the goal of future growth) that measures worth by the market, a world in which everyone has a price but fewer and fewer have a dignity. You suggest that I believe all women in working-class or so-called pink-collar jobs would and should, if given the chance, race for home and stay there. I challenge you to find textual support for this claim. Instead, I condemned a system that *compels* female wage labor at ill-paying, dead-end jobs, forcing women into the

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market out of economic necessity. Somehow your hallowed freedom of choice recedes when the question at hand is the woman who prefers not to go out and work but must. I would never tell any women who claimed such work made her life fuller that she was wrong-headed. But I would also never tell a harassed, exploited woman worker that labor outside the home was her freedom, whether she wanted it or not.

In the matter of "career" women, you charge me with hypocrisy or, at best, self-serving blindness, wondering why I exempt myself from charges I level at others. Let me sort this out. It comes as no surprise to me that many women want what men (or elite males) have had—success, power, glamour, entrée to board-rooms, all the rest. Certainly, any woman who wants to go that route has the right. In your terms, she is pursuing her freedom. But so, then, is the woman who works full-time, at a subsistence level, as an ecological activist; or the woman who puts in long hours teaching handicapped children; or the woman who sits alone all day parsing out a poem. Faced with this diversity of ways of being and social roles, can we not, following Hannah Arendt, "think what we are doing?" You cannot do this, it seems, for in your world all "freedom" is created equal—the freedom of the female corporate officer to evade public regulation and fix prices with the best of them and to rise to the top perhaps in the name of "feminism," along with the freedom of the political activist traveling and organizing for the nuclear freeze, perhaps also in the name of feminism.

Do you really mean to suggest that I—or you, for that matter, given your socialist ethos—should cheer uncritically from the sidelines every time a woman does anything she wants to or finds "fulfilling"? I challenged, remember, "the terms of entry" into the public world if they are those of a rapacious civil society embraced as one's "freedom." I seek a democratic alternative, one that requires a revitalized public-political sphere, and I hope to make some modest contribution to its achievement. Many a monster can march about flying the banner of "freedom" or "feminism." We require critical standards, Marshall, to distinguish between the monstrous and the wonderful, to the extent we still can.

Finally, you administer the *coup de grace*, the (apparent) knock-down argument, which culminates in pitting my grandmother against her reactionary granddaughter. You begin by declaring that I pine away for a return to *Gemeinschaft*, to communities fixed in the cement of blood and authority. But your defense of this accusation serves, instead, to make my point. You discuss the ways in which the trajectory of capitalism has rendered community bonds—as I have stressed—precarious and vulnerable. In my words, we live in a society that makes it more and more difficult for people to be connected, to have the sense of caring and responsibility that goes with a commitment to "*these people*," to "*this place*." Neighborhoods are savaged by developers; communities are threatened by illegal dumping; intimate lives buckle under pressures generated by the structure of work life. You note all this and then, remarkably, turn matters inside out and upside down. Rather than condemning the society that makes it more and more difficult for people to sustain intergenerational bonds, you celebrate the tenacity of heroic individuals striving to fend off decay and disaster —because they have *freely* chosen to do so.

But, Marshall, this is perverse. Why should they exhaust themselves in rear-guard actions against irresponsible corporate power? Do you really believe that a daily battle against powerful outside forces enriches and sustains community life in the long haul? This flies in the face of all community studies with which I am familiar. And it makes a mockery of freedom. "I am *free* to try to stop the state from building a superhighway through my family farm," a farmer says. But his "freedom" to struggle to hold on is coupled with the freedom of the state, or the corporation, to "take away." Don't they, too, demonstrate a human capacity of free choice when they dump toxic canisters and buy up choice land? You see only freedom's magic wand being waved in the fact that overpowered victims are free to fight the bastards in court. Yes, this is a precious legal freedom but it emerges from the dire necessities of a social situation that should be remedied in order that such desperate "freedom" is no longer so widely required.

YOU END on a piece of puffery—freedom, you declare, is "the vital force that generates and sustains all communal life." Anthropologists might be interested in this bit of news. So might the Amish. Or the Navaho Indians. Or citizens of Rousseau's just republic. As you well know, most forms of communal life, past and present, are complex systems of freedom *with* constraint, liberty *and* authority. Your butterfly definition of freedom flits all over the place but, lighting nowhere, is likely to be blown away by the first strong breeze. Freedom requires roots and roots involve communities and no community has ever existed without constraints of some kind.

You close by evoking my grandmother—fortu-

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nately she is not a woman of "sainted memory" as you rather sarcastically describe her. But you are all wrong in your fantasy of her life. She, like thousands of others, had no *choice* at all about leaving her home country and journeying to America. She was a nine-year-old girl and her parents were compelled, in sorrow and reluctance, to emigrate given Czarist crackdowns on the autonomy of the Volga German communities. They, with so many others, intended to return and, with so many others, they came as groups—whole extended families, sometimes entire villages. You turn my grandmother into a latter-day Sartrian existentialist: "Oh, let's see, *who* shall *I* be today?" The imperious, self-defining, unconstrained self. This is sheer silliness. She and many people of her and neighboring villages settled in the sugar-beet fields of northern Colorado. There was, and is, no doubt about who "unsere Leute" were—though there are not many left. Holding on to the old notion of "our people," some refused to learn English or to become citizens. My grandmother did learn the new language—her children were being taught it in the public school—but her "American identity" is not the result of conscious decisions or an intentional choice of your "freedom." No, her new identity grew on her, willy-nilly, as she lived life each day in a strange, new world. That world is no longer new or strange but the old identity is neither gone nor forgotten. Of course, she wanted a "better life" for her children, her grandchildren, and her great-grandchildren. But my grandmother isn't nearly so cocksure as you are, Marshall, about what constitutes a "better life."

You are right—she would never disparage "the *very idea* of freedom." She could neither affirm nor deny this idea for she would find it senseless. Freedom to do or become what? She has never severed freedom from responsibility; individual autonomy from social obligation. As she remarked last summer, "Ach, so much of this self-self-self business. Nobody seems to be neighborly no more." Why cannot the publicists for "the very idea of" freedom, most importantly yourself, accept the possibility that we might use "freedom" to gain the whole world and, in the process, lose our souls, defeat the better angels of our nature?

If you mean for us to share your dream of a "truly free form of community" you must be more candid. For example: you claim that "we must grasp and affirm the ongoing struggle of feminism . . . " as part and parcel of our march toward the free future. But this is empty rhetoric. There *is* no ongoing struggle of feminism *as such*. At the moment, feminists are divided along a number of serious lines of cleavage: Women Against Pornography vs. defenders of "sexual freedom," including consensual "s and m" and pornography; separatists vs. nonseparatists; "cultural" feminists, including many ecological and pacifist feminists vs. (some) Marxist and liberal feminists who see cultural feminists as conservative "essentialists"; right-to-fight feminists vs. antimilitarist feminists, on and on. If one adds to this the fact that these "feminisms" exist in a complex relationship to the majority of American women who do not self-consciously define themselves as feminist, and whose attitude toward feminism as they understand it ranges from partially supportive to ambivalent to downright hostile, you find a densely textured social question that will not be wished away by celebrations of "feminism." Which version of feminism would you have us embrace? Why are you unwilling to distinguish between forms of feminism and to make some judgments?

Finally, what constraints would be operable in your "truly free" society? Unless it is to be the big rock candy mountain, there will be forms of social authority, rules, norms, practices, evaluative judgments, and appraisals. Unless you can take one tentative step outside the picture that holds you captive, you may find yourself in the circumstance of that Kafka bird, the one who found the cage for which he searched. That you call this cage "freedom" doesn't make it any less a conceptual prison. To persist in proclaiming what Hegel would call an "absolute" hence hollow and abstract freedom as your end and means; to repeat it interminably means your defense must wear thin, the chimes of your freedom flashing will sound tinny in our ears. Freedom in our time requires a more mordant, less frothy defense—one that tackles questions of authority, liberty, and community rather than blinking them away in the presumption that by waving the rhetorical magic wand, one can (poof!) create a synthesis of all good and decent things. I hope we can join together in this effort.

Regards,
Jean

P. S. My letter was written in response to the first version of your comment; the second, containing additional accusations that I have betrayed feminism and the left, arrived after this letter was sent off. So I shall add this brief afterthought. You claim that there is "a community of radicals" and that I have, in some way, treated this "community" with contempt, betraying all it has done for me (nearly everything if you are to be believed). But,

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Marshall, as you have often pointed out, no modern community can long survive without space for internal dissent. Do you really think it better for those of us who have strong feelings to quash them, for us to silence our misgivings if some official "line" is going in a direction with which we disagree? My claim, over the past years, is that certain radicals and feminists, on certain issues, have lost touch with some of the deepest aspirations among their own (putative) constituencies. There is more to this country, and its people, than a radical community centered in New York City—your reference point. I prefer not to lose touch with my own moral location, nor will I treat it contemptuously. I am not aiming at a "community" of the already convinced who are unreflective about their beliefs and claims. Instead, I am trying to bring what I believe to be widespread misgivings and ambivalence to the surface so that more open debate on key questions can take place—among those open to debate. That you seem to think this treason saddens me. □

AT FIRST GLANCE *(Continued from page 132)*

start collecting food parcels for its jobless members who have used up their unemployment insurance? Isn't it shameful that we should again be living with the specter of foreclosed farms and homes?

Even without "all the answers," there might be some point in a little noise, a little protest. Perhaps of the *undignified* kind?

□

Reading Irwin Stark's essay in this *Dissent* brought back memories of the late 1960s. In those days the problems of illegitimate ties between American universities and the Pentagon became a big issue on the campus. SDS and other New Left groups objected, rightly enough, to universities working closely with the military. But under the influence of a somewhat undigested Marxism they argued that the university *had* to be politicized, one way or another, and that to speak of the "autonomy" of academic life was a liberal illusion. Without denying that it's hard to maintain the autonomy of the university (or any other institution), socialists argued that it was very much worth trying to.

In those years many nonpolitical professors, who until then had cared mostly about their publications and gardens, grew frightened of the student insurgency and discovered that, yes, they too were strongly attached to the idea of academic autonomy. This became for them a convenient shield for warding off student criticism.

Now Irwin Stark offers graphic evidence that there is a trend toward annexing segments of the American university to profit-making corporations (known in genteel circles as "the private sector"). And so I find myself wondering whether some of the same professors who grew so devoted to the autonomy of the university when they were being pressed by New Left students will be as fervent in coping with the corporate intrusions Stark describes.

□

To mark the 50th year since Hitler took power, the *New Republic* ran an excellent article by Walter Laqueur this past February in which he remarked on the common tendency both on the right and the left to dismiss Hitler as a mere passing adventurer. Even after Hitler became chancellor, the German Social Democrats and Communists were issuing statements that "Berlin remains red," etc., betraying a lamentable underestimation of the Nazis' power.

There was, it should be said, one analyst on the left who foresaw at least part of the horror that Hitler would bring, and that was Trotsky. In 1932 he wrote in an appeal to the German workers: "Should fascism come to power, it will ride over your skulls and spines like a terrific tank. . . ." Trotsky was utterly wrong about many things, but he wasn't one of those who thought the rise of nazism a mere small discomfort in the life of Europe. □

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Joseph Clark

Why Did They Stay?

WHICH SIDE WERE YOU ON? THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR, by Maurice Isserman. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. 305 pp. $19.95.

A tall, craggy, white-bearded gentleman who looks like and is the small-town publisher of a weekly newspaper has an intriguing comment about his past. Born of an antebellum family in Mississippi, his past includes Phi Beta Kappa at Columbia University; organizing investigative trips to the Harlan County, Kentucky, coal-mining areas when the deputy sheriffs were stomping on the Bill of Rights; editing the *Student Review*, magazine of the Communist-led National Student League in the early 1930s; organizer of sharecroppers and the Communist party in Alabama; Washington correspondent of the *Daily Worker*. Some time ago he burst out: "I know why I joined the Communist party. I know why I quit the party. But I'll be damned if I know why I stayed in the party."

That plaintive comment came to mind on reading Maurice Isserman's book. When a historian in his early thirties, who was an active participant in the radical politics of the 1960s, writes a book with meticulous regard for Ranke's admonition to tell it *wie es eigentlich gewesen*, it's worth our notice. Maurice Isserman's subject is timely and useful to new and old leftists, indeed to anyone who wonders how in the world American Communists managed to become mainstream radicals for a decade or so. For under Earl Browder that's just what happened to the CP in the years 1935-45.

Joseph Lash, the noted biographer, has told me how difficult it is to explain to people of this generation that there was a time when thousands of idealistic young people joined the Communsits in order to challenge economic depression at home and the march of fascism aborad. Lash himself had joined the Lincoln Brigade, organized by the CP to fight fascism in Spain. Lash adds that many today don't know that the political witch-hunters and policemen who were crusading against communism managed to turn young people toward, not against, communism. In his most recent book,[1] Lash brings to light documents he got from the government under the Freedom of Information Act that are truly mind-boggling. They reveal, for example, that the FBI and Army intelligence concocted "a gigantic conspiracy participated in by not only subject [Joseph Lash] and Trude Pratt [soon thereafter to be Trude Lash] but also by E.R. [Mrs. Roosevelt], Wallace, Morgenthau, etc." Small wonder that many young people found it attractive to go along with a radical movement that opposed fascism, upheld the New Deal, helped organize workers into unions, helped win the war against the Axis—and all this in a "conspiracy" with Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt!

ISSERMAN'S HISTORY presents a lively account of Communists participating in sometimes exhilarating struggles ("Make Madrid the tomb of fascism! ") and sometimes sordid efforts ("The Yanks Are Not Coming! "). In his preface Isserman takes sharp issue with Theodore Draper's view, conveyed in Draper's two volumes on the first ten years of the

[1] *Love, Eleanor: Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Friends*, by Joseph P. Lash (New York: Doubleday, 1982).

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American CP,[2] that American communism "has corresponded to the fluctuations of Russian policy" and that "it has not obeyed a compelling need within the American Communists themselves."

Oddly, Isserman confines this disagreement mainly to his preface. In the body of his book Isserman, a careful historian, does not contradict the thesis that American communism "has corresponded to the fluctuations of Russian policy." Quite the contrary, Isserman's documented record of the party's gyrations shows that American Communists made persistent and amazingly speedy accommodation to the peremptory demands of the Soviet dictatorship.

The conflict between Isserman's preface and the rest of his book arises in part from the fundamental opposition between the human (some would say class) needs of the people who make up Communist movements and the inhuman, reprobate requirements of the Soviet fatherland. American Communists, like people of other persuasions, did have compelling needs and were obviously at their best when responding to these needs. When the Soviets finally apprehended the menace of German fascism *to them*, it was pleasant for American Communists to join the fight against fascism. Nay, it was downright enjoyable to support democracy (even when called "bourgeois" democracy), to advocate collective security, to support your own country's national interests, to oppose the betrayal at Munich, and to praise such fighters against the fascist Axis as Roosevelt and Churchill. But the CP record, as Isserman unravels it, moves blithely from a program for "a Soviet America" in the early '30s to "Communism Is Twentieth Century Americanism" in the late '30s, then from collective security against fascist aggression to a fight against the "imperialist war"; from "The Yanks Are *Not* Coming" to "Open Up the Second Front NOW." And that record also managed to move from "Browder is our leader, we shall not be moved" to unanimous support for the expulsion of Browder.

So, clearly, American Communists were not always allowed to obey compelling needs within themselves. Why then did they stay in the party?

In his preface Isserman defines what he considers the major flaw of Draper's volumes. Draper's interpretation, Isserman writes,

> makes it hard to understand why anyone with intelligence and integrity would have remained in such a movement for more than a few days or weeks required to discover its gross inadequacies. Yet many serious, intelligent, committed men and women did join the party in the 1930s and 1940s, remained in it for years . . . apparently convinced that they were contributing to the success of the causes of anti-fascism and socialism.

Having posed this challenge, it must be said that Isserman does not answer his own question. His book explains why people remained in the party when the fight *was* against fascism. But after Molotov had explained that fascism "was a matter of taste," and after Stalin proceeded to provide the Nazis with the sinews of war, and when he surpassed his quota of collaboration with the Nazis by shipping German Communist exiles of Jewish origin back to Hitler—why then did people of "intelligence and integrity" remain in the party?

Before answering that question it's important to know why people joined, and Isserman makes a signal contribution to answering that and describing those activities that did correspond to their "compelling needs." He is right when he says that "Browder became an innovator" and tried to move in the direction of leading an American movement and—for the period when it was "allowed"—defending democracy not only as a means but as an end. In this respect Isserman does well in reminding socialists that their movement originated as a means of realizing democracy in all, including the economic, phases of life.

Communist movements in Europe, and certainly in this country, were getting nowhere before the epoch of the Popular Front. Associating the Communist parties with antifascism and, equally important, with democracy (the Blum government in France), along with patriotic, pronational assertions, moved the Communist movements out of sectarian isolation into whatever successes they attained. It seems to have escaped the notice of many students of communism that Stalin knew in his very bones that it could never succeed in any indigenous fashion in the democratic countries. When he imposed outrageously antidemocratic and antinational policies on the world's Communist parties after World War II, he knew that they couldn't get to first base. But he was showing the Western powers what havoc he could wreak in their own backyard. It was no accident, as the Communists loved to say, that Stalin titled the Cominform paper "For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy." Stalin knew what people wanted. There were some who wondered about the "odd" speech he made, his last at a party congress, in 1952. He addressed the foreign Communists and told them there were two ingredients to success for the Com-

[2] *The Roots of American Communism* (New York: Viking, 1957) and *American Communism and Soviet Russia* (Viking, 1960), both by Theodore Draper.

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munist parties of the world. One was to defend democracy, the other to advance the national interest. That Caligula in politics indeed knew what it would take to succeed.

SMALL THOUGH IT WAS, the American CP attained a greater measure of influence than ever before, or since, during the Browder decade. This didn't mean success for "communism" any more than the Socialist party under Eugene Victor Debs brought America close to socialism. The highest point of socialist support, 6 percent of the presidential vote, was reached by Debs in 1912. Foster and then Browder as CP presidential candidates received about 0.10 percent of the vote.

On the other hand, Communists played a relatively important part in the organizing drives of the CIO. In the struggles of the auto workers to build the UAW, especially at General Motors and Ford, the Communists were often in leading positions. This was especially true in the crucial sitdown strike at GM's Fischer body plant in Flint in 1937. Isserman estimates the influence of the CP as considerable, but he also points out: "Communist strength in the union movement lay in control of office rather than in mass constituencies. . . ." How ephemeral such control can be was brought home to me during the McCarthy years. After Mike Quill had broken with his former CP comrades, the witch hunt descended to the only "underground" a certain CP member of the Transport Workers Union had ever known, the subways of New York. His job was probably the worst in that system—he cleaned subway toilets. He was fired for being a Communist and there wasn't a peep, let alone protest, from a union in which the pioneer organizers had been the New York Communists.

Perhaps the most important contribution Browder made is the development of a coalition concept for radical participation in the politics of the country. The idea was to bring together labor and the liberals, blacks and other minorities, and all who had to be enlisted to defeat right-wing Republicans and move the New Deal forward through the Democratic party. Of course, Browder was preceded in this strategy by Sidney Hillman and David Dubinsky, who surely had a lot more to contribute to coalition politics than the CP. Nor would there be any danger that the social democrats might jump ship as the Communists did in 1940 when the Nazi-Soviet Pact brought them back to the anti-Roosevelt camp.

It's instructive to compare the attitudes of archsectarian CP leader William Z. Foster with Browder's during the Landon-Roosevelt contest of 1936. True, along with Browder, Foster had accepted the popular-front idea of supporting FDR. But Foster said the CP should be open about it, withdraw its own candidates, and campaign for Roosevelt. Apparently a student of Machiavelli, Browder knew nothing would delight the far right more than Communist endorsement of FDR. He insisted on his own candidacy for the Communist ticket. But never had the party been more active, more thorough, more diligent in getting others to canvass for the Democrats and to get out the vote to defeat Landon "at all cost."

Isserman is on target when he recounts the contributions Browder made in getting radicals to participate in something more than protest politics. Other historians have shown that whatever the failures of radical parties and movements in this country, they made an impact to the extent that they helped win reforms.

To this day there are hundreds, perhaps thousands of people participating in political campaigns who learned the ABC of politics during the Browder decade. They learned not only from Browder, but from Jim Farley, for whom the whole country was a sum of its election districts. They learned how to organize voter-registration drives, especially among those people who had been neglected in politics, among the poor and the exploited, those who would be more likely to vote for liberal candidates. They learned how to canvass potential voters, and they learned how to get out the vote. They also learned that there are single issues that often motivate political choice; so they learned how to combine efforts on these special issues with the overall campaign. They learned political action that went far beyond the soap-boxing of traditional radical movements; they learned how important the trade unions were in the political scheme, especially in registering and getting out the vote. They organized and participated in Political Action Committees long before these became the fashion; and they knew how important a local political club could be if its members were fired with something more than the pap of traditional politics, by highlighting the issues and slogans that Roosevelt had made popular. Communists were getting Puerto Ricans to register for voting, hours after they arrived from their homeland. They mastered the nuts and bolts of political action but they also learned that what the workers won or tried to win in the shops they could lose without proper legislation. Above all they learned about the idea of a great coalition, of bringing together the entire productive part of the nation, to win social legislation through the Democratic party.

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People of differing backgrounds could win a niche in the American CP's version of the Popular Front, some of it almost a parody of that concept, as when screenwriters would be praised for inserting a single "socially significant line" in a grade B movie, or for writing Charlie Chaplin's final speech in "The Great Dictator." Some wrote speeches to elect Frank Murphy governor of Michigan and still others organized New Theater groups or another Jewish Workers children's school. Communists under Browder seemed to have found a vision that included the here and now while looking toward a utopia in the future.

Many will still be dubious and wonder what it was that brought people into a movement that was so clearly identified with Stalin's terror regime. And they may also wonder why many who finally did quit in disgust, especially after the Khrushchev revelations and the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, still bristle at the notion that they participated in an unworthy movement. A conversation with an acquaintance who had been a fur union activist for many years is pertinent. He knew, belatedly, about the evils of Stalin. He quit when he saw no future for the CP. But he had no regrets for the years he spent in the party. His union, under Communist leadership, won conditions twice as good as those of the women's and men's garment industries. He had fought against Franco in Spain. He had fought against Hitler in World War II. Try telling him all this was wrong.

In his declining years Earl Browder nurtured the illusion that his role in the leadership of the CP was separate and apart from allegiance to Russia and Stalin. He said he was a Togliatti-type of Communist—not subordinate to control by the Soviet Union. This, of course, was no more true of Browder than of Togliatti. Even the Italian CP leaders in their Eurocommunist phase admitted that Togliatti, when a member of the ECCI (Executive Committee of the Communist International), had concurred in the death penalty for Bela Kun, the old Hungarian Bolshevik who had been a leader of the short-lived Hungarian Communist regime after World War I. Then, after World War II, when Stalin demanded that every Communist party declare openly that it would not support its own country in the event of a war with Russia, Togliatti made his obeisance. Browder was spared that ignominy, but only because he had already been expelled from the CP. Only then could he develop true independence of mind. It so happened that during the Browder decade Moscow *was* concerned about fascism (with the horrible exception of the period of Nazi-Soviet collaboration when Browder went along wholeheartedly with Stalin's profascist policies) and did allow, even nurtured, popular-front and democratic-front policies. After Browder was expelled, by way of the Moscow-sponsored Duclos article, the Soviets still put out a welcome mat for Browder. They even gave him some work! Though this was unusual, Stalin often encouraged antithetical policies and competing CP leaders simultaneously in various countries. He played cat and mouse with them and finally made a sudden choice.

WE'RE LEFT with Isserman's unanswered question. Here I think he would have done better to delve into the answers that Theodore Draper provides. Both Draper's volumes deal in great detail with intelligent, capable, and utterly sincere revolutionaries who violate conscience and understanding to accept changes in their own party's policies with which they disagree. Two reasons for this sort of behavior stand out:

(1) Marxist-Leninist ideology that embraces a doctrine of inevitable revolutionary change from capitalism to socialism; this change is imposed by "natural law" as Marx put it in his preface to *Capital*.

(2) A world Communist leadership, located in Moscow and headed by the Comintern, controlled by the Soviet CP from its inception, which is the heart and soul of the world revolutionary movement and without which the "natural law" could not operate as speedily.

These two factors operated when Lenin and Trotsky "corrected" the sectarianism of the newly born Communist party of the U.S.A. in 1919 and subsequently. Early American CP leaders, including John Reed, favored Russian-type policies, eschewing the established trade union movements or even a broad labor party. Lenin and Trotsky told their American comrades that this was stuff and nonsense. At the close of his first volume, *The Roots of American Communism*, Draper notes that the American Communist movement had

> a difficult birth and an unhappy childhood. . . . But something crucially important did happen to this movement in its infancy. It was transformed from a new expression of American radicalism to the American appendage of a Russian revolutionary power. Nothing else so important ever happened to it again.

Parties in dozens of countries around the world accepted the seniority and "collective wisdom" of the party that had carried out the first successful

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revolution (or, more correctly, seizure of power). Even Trotsky, early in his opposition to the epigones, had admitted that no one could be right *against* the party. Communists who were later to dissent and break with the party—such men as James P. Cannon and Jay Lovestone—had accepted the notion of the Soviet party's world leadership for many years.

Draper describes how Stalin rode herd on the American party leaders in 1929 when he ordered the removal of Lovestone from leadership and scotched the idea that America might be "exceptional" among the nations of the world. Max Bedacht, one of the party's founders and leaders who was then in Moscow, could see neither logic nor justice in Stalin's decision. Bedacht's mind told him it was wrong but nevertheless he wrote:

> After we have argued the matter out with the Comintern and after the argument is settled by a definite decision, we not only accept the decision as a matter of discipline but we accept the correctness of the decision as a matter of recognizing the international and ideological superiority of the Comintern over ourselves. . . .

Draper portrays the various psychological devices and rationalizations that party leaders used when they couldn't "press a button in one's mind and believe today what one had rejected for months past." Perhaps he left out one device that worked for me for a long time—before it failed. In essence, it meant that there is a prior and basic Marxist ideology—call it dogma—whose explanations of capitalist development remain cogent and transcend all other political considerations, including all the crimes and shortcomings of the Soviet, Chinese, or other Communist revolutions.

Etched in my mind is the first day I spent in the Soviet Union. I was on a train trip from the Polish border to Moscow. The vistas were so bleak, the country was so poor, the peasants who clustered at the train doors selling decrepit-looking foodstuffs were so little related to the image of "socialist man," and the conversations with Soviet army officers were so unenlightening, my disillusionment commenced forthwith. It must have been reflected on my face because a TASS correspondent, who had been a fellow reporter at the United Nations, came over, put a friendly arm around my shoulder and said, "Wait till we're in Moscow; it's a great place, you'll like it." Well, the ice-skating in Gorky Park was marvelous; the Bolshoi and Kirov ballet theaters were splendid. But my TASS friend was wrong; Moscow deepened my gloom about the Soviets. Still I remained loyal till called home shortly after Stalin died; and for two years more I remained loyal. I can explain it only because "the law of motion of capitalist society" was still valid for me; ideology still had me in thrall, if shaken.

Even then nothing irritated me or any true believer in Marxism-Leninism more than the suggestion that it was faith, not science, that glued us to the doctrine and the movement. But the stubborn facts of the real world and the monumental immorality of Communist regimes have a way of evoking disaffection among the most devout.

A rather small development in 1955 created a new situation for me and there were no more buttons anywhere to press. Khrushchev had flown to Belgrade and admitted that the attacks against Tito had been slanderous, that all the trials of traitors in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria were complete concoctions; the dead were innocent. "But it was all the fault of Beria," Khrushchev explained. Dubious was hardly the word for Tito's reaction. But at least my mind was on the road to freedom. With it came a discovery that there is no greater joy than that of the sovereign mind. . .

A HISTORY of Communist movements the world over is a history of adherence to a dream of a bright and future transformation, interrupted by a nightmare that comes with every Kronstadt lurking within every Communist as individual and every Communist movement. On the difficulty of breaking with the dream of future transformation, Ignazio Silone has written in *The God That Failed*:

> The increasing degeneration of the Communist International into a tyranny and a bureaucracy filled me with repulsion and disgust, but there were some compelling reasons which made me hesitate to break with it: solidarity with comrades who were dead or in prison, the non-existence at that time of any other organized anti-fascist force in Italy, the rapid political, and in some cases also moral, degeneration of many who had already left Communism, and finally the illusion that the International might be made healthy again by the proletariat of the West, in the event of some crisis occurring within the Soviet regime.

Silone reasserted his adherence to socialist ideals after he broke with the party and he expressed "a need for effective brotherhood, an affirmation of the superiority of the human person over all the economic and social mechanisms which oppress him." Silone added another insight: "The more socialist theories claim to be 'scientific,' the more transitory they are; but socialist values are permanent." □

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Peter Gay

The Past Recaptured

WEIMAR ETUDES, by Henry Pachter. Introduction by Walter Laqueur. Illustrated. New York: Columbia University Press. 387 pp. $19.95.

For all its short and in the end unhappy life, the Weimar Republic has commanded, and continues to command, an astonishing amount of public attention. Not a month goes by without a monograph on the Nazi voter in the 1920s, another picture album of Berlin in the same decade, or yet another portentous article pointing to the glittering decay of the German Republic as a cautionary tale. The rash of unhelpful, downright irrelevant comparisons between the United States and Weimar Germany has mercifully died down, but Weimar retains its vogue as a foreboding symbol. And now and again, some survivor publishes his memories and reflections for posterity. The ranks of these witnesses are growing thinner every year, as they leave the stage one by one, and the record they are continuing to compile for those who remain is thus all the more valuable. It is sobering to reflect that in two or three decades the Weimar Republic will be a matter of pure history, kept alive not by living testimony but by printed or archival materials alone. Part of our lives—for Weimar is part of our lives whether we were ever in Germany or not—is rapidly receding into the past.

Henry Pachter, who died in 1980 before he could give final shape to his Weimar etudes, had long been one of the most articulate and respected voices in that chorus of intelligent, cultivated (and when all is said surprisingly adaptable) men and women whom Hitler drove from their homeland to make new lives. Pachter, teacher and writer, was always worth listening to, and this ample gathering of essays and reflections will only serve to confirm his stature. Pachter knew so many and knew so much, but beyond that, his judgment, always pungently expressed, rarely faltered. He was as impatient with unregenerate admirers of Stalin as with sentimental apologists for Heidegger. One always knew where Pachter stood, and these pages are not marked by doubt. Hannah Arendt was "a gifted philosopher with little talent for politics"; Bertolt Brecht, that great ironist, had "the habit of using people"; Hermann Hesse, the "poet of *our* youth," proves on rereading a "poor writer."

These verdicts are terse, confident, and, I think, generally right on target. They are also honest, looking back on earlier, sometimes rather different views. Had Hesse, Pachter asks, after all not been a great favorite some decades earlier? But now? Hesse neither thought clearly nor wrote well. "Can one really write and read, taste and understand, in our day and age, a sentence like 'Oh, how sharp was the bitter taste of spring on my tongue?' It was corny even when it was first written, and I am angry at myself to discover that I was not aware then how corny it was." Pachter is not posturing for his readers—though the slangy term "corny" suggests a kind of deliberate, muscular Americanism that is absent from most of these pages; he is thinking afresh and, as his rumination on Hesse clearly shows, willing to learn from his mistakes.

The alchemy of character is always something of a mystery, but it is plausible to assume that Pachter's pleasant childhood, spent in a relatively secure culture, provided the psychological and intellectual foundations for his untiring, adventurous inquisitiveness and his hard-won political independence. In a long, briskly written and informative autobiographical fragment with which *Weimar Etudes* opens, Pachter draws an appealing portrait of the world into which he was born in 1907 and which changed forever after the suicidal world war began in 1914. He applies the most poignant bit of nostalgia ever voiced to his own life: "It has been said that those who did not experience French society before the Great Revolution never knew how beautiful life could be, while those who were born after the first world war never knew how secure life could be." He accepts this verdict without question.

Pachter recognized that the world before 1914 was far from perfect or wholly serene. But before the Great War, most people believed that they could cope with their problems, a belief—or illusion—that did not survive Armageddon. "My own recollection of the prewar days is that of a well-protected childhood in the midst of an expanding empire, a recollection of well-being and of a trustworthy world. I do not think that many Europeans who were born after the war have similar reminiscences: that sense of security never returned."

There are some recent studies of the years before 1914, and of the ravages that the war itself wrought upon the mind of Europe. But we need to know

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more than we do about that period, especially in view of the cultural pessimism that had infected Germany (and not only Germany) from the 1880s on, and that had coined some persuasive, gloomy slogans. In this context, the informal testimony of a survivor like Henry Pachter is particularly pertinent. Did 1914 really change the world of Western civilization out of all recognition forever? Pachter thought so, and he may well be right.

In any event, this sudden shift from security to insecurity held true of Pachter himself and of those with whom he consorted in his young years. He was, almost from the beginning, a political man—almost, one might say, a political boy: at the age of thirteen he began working for the liberal Democratic party, which alone of all parties lost votes with every election during the Weimar period.

Pachter also, as was almost inevitable, joined the Communists for a while and the youth movement and offers some fascinating reminiscences, candid as always, about that experience. He was unimpressed by their "mock-naive folk dances and the childish folk songs," their "romantic quest for quaint old buildings and smelly back alleys," and their "love for patriotic songs and blood-thirsty ballads about mercenaries in the Thirty Years' War." But he enjoyed the "long hikes," the "overnight sojourns in barns or youth hostels," the rituals and the comradeship. And, looking back, he recognizes the rather unsavory " 'folkish' slant" to it all, and the "homoerotic" attachments that the movement fostered and to which Pachter, as an impressionable young man, seems to have paid fleeting homage.

All this is revealing and interesting, but perhaps the most moving memory of this opening chapter is of his relations to the Christian family into which he was to marry, the Röslers. He visited Pastor Rösler in the late 1920s. A Jew, unmistakably, a Communist, very opinionated, and as unbourgeois in appearance as he could manage to be—"I wore a provocative shock of unruly hair, shorts, and a Russian-type shirt"—he made himself most unwelcome, and was asked to leave, his girl in tow. Pachter never saw Pastor Rösler again, but on April 1, 1933, the day the Nazis had organized a "spontaneous" boycott of Jewish stores, he received a letter from Rösler that he here transcribes from memory, and that deserves full quotation:

> Dear Mr. Pachter:
>
> I have to undergo surgery which will deprive me of my remaining eye and I am using this last occasion to write a few letters I have meant to write for some time and which I cannot leave unwritten. I remember the day when you came to my house and I behaved very badly. Please understand that I was quite unprepared to see a Jew and a Communist. It was too much for me then, but now I feel ashamed, especially on this day of shame for Germany. I know how you must feel, and I am afraid that I must assume my share of responsibility for this. I hope that you can forgive me, and I pray that you come again to my house. You will receive a warm welcome.
>
> Yours very sincerely,
>
> Pastor Nathanael Rösler.

Five and a half years later, on another German day that shall live in infamy, November 9, 1938, *Kristallnacht*, Frau Rösler sent the Pachters, then in exile in Paris, another letter of the same import, horrified, appalled, and deeply ashamed. These letters are part of the record that Pachter's fellow Germans made in the Nazi days, and it is right that he has seen to it that they are not forgotten.

WEIMAR ETUDES is embedded in autobiography; it closes with an illuminating—and, as always, frank—memoir of what it meant to be an exile in our century, ranging beyond Pachter's personal odyssey to the fates of others. But the articles, reviews, and essays that these self-portraits frame are quite as interesting, and no less intimate. There are short, thoughtful pieces on irrationality in politics; a remarkable piece on Walther Rathenau rescuing him from the novelist Robert Musil's caricature; a persuasive consideration of Heidegger's thought concluding (justly enough, I believe) that Heidegger's support of the Nazis in 1933 was not a casual flirtation or a momentary aberration but implicit in his thought; a long, discriminating and affectionate essay on Friedrich Meinecke, the celebrated intellectual historian with whom Pachter studied and whose work he is in a good position to appraise.

There are, as there must be, moments in which these essays moved me to disagreement. There is at least one mistake of fact, a minor one: Hajo Holborn, that distinguished refugee from Nazi Germany and historian of his country, taught not at Harvard but at Yale. And Pachter's view of Meinecke, however nuanced, strikes too positive a note for my taste. Meinecke, Pachter insists, was no anti-Semite, and he regrets that the charge has been made. Pachter may be literally right, but he did not consider in his essay an unfortunate paragraph that mars Meinecke's last work, *The German Catastrophe*, that slim post-1945 volume in which the aged historian attempted to come to terms with what he called "the monstrous experiences" of the Third Reich. Reflecting on the anti-Semitic movement of the 1880s, Meinecke thought

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that the Jews of Germany had done their bit to contribute to it:

> The Jews, who were inclined to enjoy indiscreetly the favorable economic situation now smiling upon them [as if there had been no gentiles who had been quite as indiscreet], had since their full emancipation aroused resentments of various sorts. They contributed much to that gradual depreciation and discrediting of the liberal world of ideas that set in after the end of the nineteenth century [as if that world did not have other enemies and some distinguished Jewish friends]. The fact that besides their negative and disintegrating influence they also achieved a great deal that was positive in the cultural and economic life of Germany was forgotten by the mass of those who now attacked the damage done by the Jewish character.

The passage does not merit serious exegesis: Pachter, had he recalled it, would have had some trenchant things to say about a distinguished historian of ideas who used the vulgar and aggressive clichés of the anti-Semitic movement in his apology for the German catastrophe, pilloried the indiscretion of Jews in prosperity, their "negative and disintegrating influence," and their unfortunate "Jewish character."

But these are small cavils; it is only to be expected that as lively and argumentative a look back as *Weimar Etudes* would produce them. I did not have the pleasure of knowing Henry Pachter well, though I valued his work as (I am happy to record) he did mine. But I am confident that, were he alive, he would be only too happy to engage me in that ongoing debate about the history of modern Germany to which his posthumous volume is such a lively contribution. □

Re: Letters

- Dissent *welcomes letters, but we must ask that they be kept within bounds, about 225 words. They must be typed, double-spaced, and carry the full address and name of the sender. We reserve the right to edit letters down to fit our space and to choose which shall be printed. Letters will not be returned to senders unless they are accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.*
- *Thank you for your kind cooperation.* □

Murray Hausknecht

Shall We Go MAD or NUTS?

WITH ENOUGH SHOVELS: REAGAN, BUSH AND NUCLEAR WAR, by Robert Scheer. New York: Random House. 285 pp. $14.95.

INDEFENSIBLE WEAPONS: THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE AGAINST NUCLEARISM, by Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk. New York: Basic Books. 301 pp. Paper, $6.95.

BEYOND THE COLD WAR, by E. P. Thompson. New York: Pantheon Books. 198 pp. $15.00.

EXTERMINISM AND COLD WAR, by E. P. Thompson et al. London: Verso. 358 pp. Paper, £5.50.

THE NUCLEAR DELUSION, by George F. Kennan. New York: Pantheon Books. 207 pp. $13.95.

The specter of nuclear war has given rise to a small world of its own. It is a subcultural universe of scientists and engineers, bureaucrats, and ideologues concerned with the theory and practice of nuclear destruction. Their creeds and language have diffused into the surrounding culture and have helped weave terror into the texture of everyday life. But the specter has not been thoroughly domesticated; periodically it sweeps into the forefront of consciousness as a constant reminder of the fragility of our world. At such times we eagerly seek further knowledge of the apparition, and so pay more attention to events in the subculture.

One of the first things we learn is that our terror is not shared by some within that subculture. They think of nuclear destruction in conventional terms and not as a phenomenon that is qualitatively different from the conflicts of the past. Robert Scheer quotes Colin Gray, "now a top arms-control adviser to the Reagan government":

> . . . victory or defeat in nuclear war is possible, and such a war may have to be waged to that point; and, the clearer the vision of successful war termination, the more likely war can be waged intelligently at earlier stages.

Such an intelligently waged war depends on "targeting flexibility and selectivity," technically

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known as "nuclear utilization target selection" (NUTS).[1] Of course, even in an intelligently managed nuclear exchange there would be casualties, but the former head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene V. Rostow, finds "ghoulish" estimates of "ten million casualties on one side and one hundred million on another" not unacceptable. It is, after all, "not the whole of the population."

This school of thought, like more profound ones, falls prey to its vulgarizing epigones. One of these, T. K. Jones, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, has provided Scheer with a meaty quote and the title of his book. " 'Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw three feet of dirt on top. . . . It's the dirt that does it . . . if there are enough shovels to go around, everybody's going to make it.' " Although Jones is an obvious embarrassment, his views are not too far from Edward Luttwak's, which grace the pages of *Commentary*. He argues for the use of "theater nuclear forces" as part of the strategy for opposing Russian aggression in Europe, and says that no army "could withstand such terror as nuclear weapons would cause—even if at the end of the day it were to be discovered that the dead on all sides were surprisingly few."[2] These opinions, whether in the vulgar or sophisticated mode, do not go uncontested. Prevailing subcultural opinion, both military and nonmilitary, concludes that nuclear exchanges cannot be limited to a specific theater; once nuclear weapons are brought into play there is an inevitable "escalation."

The significance of the limited-war and NUTS enthusiasts is less that they exist than that their perspective has been adopted as official policy. Building on a directive from the Carter days, the present Administration has adopted a position that not only is a limited war possible but in such a war we can "prevail." Reagan's own view of the Soviet Union and communism is a throwback to the most frigid days of the Cold War—Russia is a morally evil, "godless" society. Nor is this reductionist perspective limited to the White House. In a letter to the Catholic bishops, a group of predominantly Republican congressmen wrote, "No true peace is possible unless human dignity is upheld. The crisis we face today does not involve two morally equal forces, but the contention of human freedom against totalitarianism."[3] If the world is understood in these terms then it is not far to a felt moral obligation that we take arms against these evils.

THIS VISION IS PART of what Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk label "nuclearism . . . a psychological, political, and military dependence on nuclear weapons, the embrace of the weapons as a solution to a wide variety of human dilemmas, most ironically that of 'security.' " Nuclearism is a "fundamental deformation of *attitude* toward the weapons as well as their immediate danger. . . . Nuclearism, then, is the disease." From the Administration's view the problem is communism's uncontrolled tendency toward expansion, while for Lifton and Falk the problem is precisely the Administration's perceptions and predispositions. They focus on "the American situation" with relatively little attention to the Soviets. In a characteristic passage they note that once the Soviet Union acquired nuclear missiles "no sane meaning can be attached to the notion of nuclear advantage. Indeed the political sickness of our time may center on this desperado official effort to be misled and mislead on this crucial point, an effort that may go on in Moscow as well as Washington, for all we know."

To explain our situation in terms of "disease" and "sickness" has the advantage of cultural familiarity; Lifton and Falk are easy to grasp in an age of psychological paradigms and psychiatric metaphors. Their language is the speech of middle-class consciousness: "The end of war implies, in effect, the displacement of Machiavellianism by a holistic world picture." While the rhetoric sounds like Jonathan Schell at his worst, on the level of action Lifton and Falk stress the need for an antinuclear movement "tactically focused on obtainable goals" such as freezing the arms race and a ban on nuclear testing.

On the other hand, if those in power are all suffering from a "disease" or "political sickness" then one tends to discount their perceptions as merely symptoms of the illness. Lifton and Falk cite two studies that question the Administration's premise that the Soviets possess superiority in conventional weapons. A few sentences later the Administration's assumption becomes "the myth of conventional inferiority." What begins as a valid questioning of a premise is converted to a certainty that it is invalid. Lifton and Falk overlook the possibility, as folk wisdom has it, that even paranoids can have enemies.

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[1] Spurgeon M. Keeney, Jr. and Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, "MAD Versus NUTS," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1981-1982.

[2] "How to Think About Nuclear War," *Commentary*, August 1982.

[3] *New York Times*, December 23, 1982.

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OVERTONES of "nuclearism" define it as distinctively American. It should come as no surprise that Europeans have a different angle of vision. E. P. Thompson, the noted historian and leader of the European Nuclear Disarmament movement (END), prefers the term "exterminism." It "designates those characteristics of a society—expressed, in differing degrees, within its economy, its polity, and its ideology—which thrust it in the direction whose outcome must be the extermination of multitudes."

As with militarism and imperialism, exterminism is founded on a specific "institutional base" that influences the system as a whole. In the case of exterminism the base is "the weapons-system, and the entire economic, scientific, political, and ideological support system to that weapons-system—the social system that researches it, 'chooses it,' produces it, polices it, justifies it, and maintains it in being." Like the later stages of imperialism, which "at a certain point assumed an autonomous self-generating thrust in its own right," exterminism cannot be understood simply in terms of rational self-interest.

The key terms are "autonomous self-generating thrust" and its synonym, "inertial thrust." The significant implication is that the push toward war does not come from a given stratum or group within the society. That is, the United States and the Soviet Union "do not *have* military-industrial complexes; they *are* such complexes." At work here is isomorphism, the identity or similarity of form and function among structures. The requirements of "the leading sector" of a society, its weapons-system, "stamp its priorities on the society as a whole." In each society

> . . . the ruling groups come to *need* perpetual war crises, to legitimate their rule, their privileges and their priorities; to silence dissent; to exercise social discipline; and to distract from the manifest irrationality of the operation. They have become so habituated to this mode that they know no other way to govern.

The inertial thrust of each system puts it on a collision course with the other.

The development of new weapons in each system is "self-generating" and the result of a steady, inexorable incremental pressure. It is true that in the United States there are profits to be made from the arms race, but the profit motive alone does not "bring us to exterminism, although it helps. Ideology and a general bureaucratic thrust help more." The same "ideological and bureaucratic forces" are at work in Russia, and there too is an "incremental thrust" toward exterminism that "has acquired an autonomous inertia, embedded in the structure of Soviet society, and can no longer be ascribed to reaction in the face of Western extremism."

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? A mass movement like END must aim at averting the coming collision between the superpowers.

> It strikes directly at that confrontation, by initiating a counter-thrust, a logic of process leading towards the dissolution of both blocs . . . permitting nations in both Eastern and Western Europe to resume autonomy and mobility . . . it must engage in dedicated and non-provocative work to form alliances between the peace movement in the West and constructive elements in the Communist world (in the Soviet Union and East Europe) which confront the exterminist structures and ideology of their own nations.

As an ideology for a mass movement Thompson's has its uses. There is a powerful seductiveness to the idea that the superpowers are in the grip of inertial forces; there is a ring of intuitive truth to it. One of the more dispiriting aspects of modern life is the belief that political and economic forces are beyond the control of individuals and groups whose lives they affect. But more than this: there is also the strong suspicion that those formally endowed with power also have little or no control over events. Even George Kennan, who comes from an entirely different intellectual and political tradition, sees the present situation as the result of "the inner momentum, the independent momentum, of the weapons race itself."

Much of European political thought is rooted in one variety or other of Marxism, and Thompson's roots also are in that tradition. To the extent that seeing oneself as a Marxist is important to many potential activists, Thompson's analysis, while clearly unconventional, has its attractions. To be sure, it does not protect him from the ire of the more orthodox. Mike Davis, an editor of *New Left Review*, which sponsored the commentaries on Thompson that appear in *Exterminism and Cold War*, writes that to understand our present dangers we must "reinstate the revolutionary Marxist conception of the modern epoch as an age of violent, protracted transition from capitalism to socialism." But Thompson's blurring of the distinctions between "capitalism" and "communism" has its advantages, for it can also attract non-Marxists critical of both societies. At the same time, equating the two systems helps avoid the difficult intellectual and political problem of making the necessary

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distinctions between them—a task that can undermine the unity of a movement that has as one of its goals "a nuclear free zone from Portugal to Poland."

Distinctions, though, must be made. While Thompson obviously appreciates that the "suppression of internal dissent" in Russia and the United States are different phenomena, he tends to see something like McCarthyism as being isomorphic with the persecution of the Russian dissidents. The differences between the two societies have significant consequences for the objectives of the disarmament movement. While the chances of mounting an effective antinuclear movement here and in Western Europe are quite good, they are practically nil in Eastern Europe and Russia. A European mass movement that embraces Thompson's vision becomes, in effect, a movement for unilateral disarmament.

The difference between the two types of societies has a bearing on another aspect of the problem. Roy and Zhores Medvedev, in the essay they contributed to *Exterminism and Cold War*, strongly reject Thompson's "functional equivalence between the 'deep structures of the Cold War' within both sides." They argue instead that "the role of successive U.S. administrations has been, and continues to be, more provocative and less predictable in the global interrelationship between East and West." If the Medvedevs see the world in this way, how does it appear to the average Soviet citizen continuously assaulted by only one definition of reality? And how does it affect his motivation "to confront the exterminist structure . . . of his own nation?"

THE MEDVEDEVS' STRESS on American belligerence and Russia's justified suspicion of American intentions finds something of an echo in George Kennan's view of Soviet-American relations. It is a perspective of a prototypical Establishment type who is contemptuous of those who view the world ideologically.

Kennan believes that the Soviet Union today behaves "*in the main* as a normal great power, the traditional concerns and ambitions of Russian rulers taking precedence over ideological ones in the minds of the Soviet leaders." The present generation of leaders, he says, are not predisposed to "adventurist policies"; their primary focus is the internal problems of the society and holding on to their own power. This entails a fundamental concern with "maintaining the integrity of Soviet hegemony" in Central Europe and preserving the perception of the regime as a revolutionary force in the world. Since that belief is a major part of their claim to legitimacy in Russia itself, it is not a "quest for world domination" but a vital part of an essentially defensive posture. Thus, the move into Afghanistan is not symptomatic of an expansionist policy fueled by revolutionary fervor but rather a reflex of defensive nervousness.

When the world is viewed through Russian eyes, says Kennan, it is easy to understand their apprehensiveness. They see influential people inside and outside government "who would like to see American policy directed, not to an accommodation of Soviet power as it is, but to the changing of the very nature of the Soviet regime." From the time of the Korean War the U.S. and NATO are taken to be—not unreasonably in Kennan's estimation—threats to the security of the Soviet Union. Even American attitudes toward the Soviet dissidents he sees as an attempt to subvert the regime. Russian nuclear arms have always been a reaction to the Western deployment of atomic weapons, and Kennan finds it intolerable that there are Americans who believe that Russians wish "to wreak destruction for the sake of destruction"; they are as sensitive to the appalling consequences of nuclear war as anyone else.

Although Leon Wieseltier is a bit unfair in saying that Kennan is a man "unnerved by a nightmare,"[4] Kennan can be a little unnerving himself. Shortly after the imposition of martial law in Poland he wrote, "Had Solidarity been willing to pause . . . to rest for a while on its laurels" and allow Moscow time to see that its existence "did not mean the immediate collapse of the heavens," martial law might have been averted. "But this, of course, was not the road that Solidarity, or at least part of Solidarity, took." In his eagerness to counter the ideological thrust of Reagan's foreign policy, Kennan falls all too easily into the trap of blaming the victims and those who try to support and aid them.

NONE OF THESE REPORTS from and about the subculture of nuclear destruction, either singly or together, persuades us that we now know enough to drive a stake through the heart of the specter. But that, after all, is the ultimate end and not the task facing us here and now. *That* task is keeping the specter at bay, and these reports show us, no matter how determinedly we may try to put it out of mind, how necessary and immediate a task it is. □

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[4] "Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace," *The New Republic*, January 10 and 17, 1983.

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Cynthia Fuchs Epstein

Women Who Work

OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES, by Alice Kessler-Harris. New York: Oxford University Press. 400 pp. $19.95.

No person in any society, male or female, gets through life without working. Some work less, others more; some at dirty or distasteful tasks, others at interesting and pleasant ones; some for money and some for honor, some work at play, and others for survival. Everywhere, social order is imposed through two kinds of social structures: a kinship system and a division of labor, and the two tend to be intertwined. The norms of division of labor allocate work according to age, race, ethnicity, sex, and family status, and in most societies some notice is taken of individual talents; the gifted often may do creative work. But on balance, what people do has more to do with their social background and other ascribed characteristics than with their particular gifts; talent can be suppressed or encouraged according to the social will.

In this book, Alice Kessler-Harris provides evidence that women in the United States have been assigned important but unvalued work. She traces women's progress from doing the unpaid work in the home into the paid labor force, and she demonstrates how ideological forces have consistently undermined their role as workers, even when society was in sore need of their labor power. For the prevailing ideology has proclaimed—at odds with that of free access to the marketplace—that women's first priority is the home. And there has always been the fear—this problem is one of the book's constant themes—that if women were to receive unrestricted wages, the balance of power would be upset in the family, and ultimately in the whole society. Therefore, as Kessler-Harris reports, government, employers, and even labor unions have tried to make sure that this would not happen. She makes clear that no one, however, objects to women doing work. And she illustrates this as she traces the course of the history of women's work—beginning with their industriousness in colonial days, when most goods used by the family were produced in the home (often with the assistance of men) to the present, when women make up half of the paid work force. Still, when they work for wages in competition with men, a public sentiment questions their ability or right to equality in the marketplace.

THIS BOOK IS RICH in data and examples of the interplay between the workings of our economy and the power structure that defines women's work. Definition is malleable, Kessler-Harris points out. With the decline of home production of the family's various needs and the growth of the factory system, public evaluation of women as workers changed, together with women's perceptions of themselves.

In the early years of the 19th century, with the rise of the industrial revolution, women were called upon to enter the wage-earning labor force, and appeals were made to their sense of responsibility to both family and community. Yet it was one thing for young women to work at home, under supervision—and quite another to go out to work in the factories. The job in the factory offered them a salary that enabled them to save for their trousseau, help pay off a family mortgage, or send a brother through trade school or even college. Factory owners assured parents that the mill would prove a suitable environment and supervision for their daughters, exacting discipline, and preparing them to become better wives and mothers. But, as Rose Coser points out,[1] geographic mobility and a degree of economic independence permit individuals to establish new relationships in new networks —a freedom objected to by the defenders of the status quo. Indeed, these staunch guardians now recognized that the well-paid and respectable work offered in those years by the mills led women to anticipate a measure of mobility and economic independence—and that such independence threatened to undermine women's subordinate position in the society.

To forestall such dreadful developments, mill owners resorted to paternalistic regulations that curtailed women's exercise of a new freedom. The New England mills were set up as "total institutions," with boarding houses for women workers, according to a plan initiated at Waltham, Massachusetts, by Francis Cabot Lowell. These boarding houses exacted stringent standards of behavior from their residents. No one could be out after 10

[1] Rose Laub Coser, "Stay Home, Little Sheba: On Placement, Displacement, and Social Change," in *Women and Work*, Rachel Kahn-Hut, Arlene Kaplan Daniels, and Richard Colvard, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 153–59.

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P.M. and, on Sundays, church attendance was required.

There was a trade-off between the decent wages and respectability and the paternalism offered. But that balance was upset in the 1830s when mill owners, hard-pressed to repay debts for machinery and to reduce prices in order to compete with newer mills, began to pressure workers to speed up production and accept lower real wages. Workdays became longer and living conditions worse, and those who complained were penalized. Problems of recruitment and turnover resulted, and the strikes began.

And so the women organized, under most difficult conditions. In 1831 the United Tailoresses' Society in New York City submitted a list of prices for their work to an employers' association and then struck to reinforce its demands. In 1833 Philadelphia seamstresses banded together and struck, to be followed by women shoe binders, umbrella sewers, and bookbinders. The strikes they organized reflected a high level of community among the women. This might have been expected in Lowell, where women worked and lived together, but it also held true in Patterson and Philadelphia, where they lived with their own families. They collected dues to support strikes organized by working women with whom they had little personal contact.

Elements of female solidarity were everywhere. Indeed, Kessler-Harris explains that women had higher expectations in the 19th century than in the early 20th. In the 19th century, wage-earning women were fighting not for gains but against an erosion of privileges they had enjoyed in earlier years. Thus the Factory Girls Association in 1836, some 1,500 strong, marched through the streets of Dover, New Hampshire, singing:

> Oh, isn't it a pity that such a pretty girl as I
> Should be sent to the factory to pine away and die.
> Oh! I cannot be a slave,
> I will not be a slave,
> For I'm so fond of liberty
> That I cannot be a slave.

Kessler-Harris tells us that the depression of 1837–38 was the turning point. From then on women's wage labor was not to be so much in demand as it had been in a developing economy, and the growing immigration began to supply the labor pool. She is a bit fuzzy about the transition between conditions in the late 19th century when women were still encouraged to engage in wage labor, and those in the early 20th century, when a domestic code idealizing women as the purer sex had taken hold, proposing their retreat from the workplace, and calling upon them to provide havens for the men in a heartless world. This ideology (described by Barbara Welter as "The Cult of True Womanhood"[2]) justified the limitation of opportunities and created a false picture of women as creatures outside the market economy. Though married women were not counted as part of the labor force, tens of thousands, nevertheless, had worked at home as shoe binders or seamstresses.

During this period, the concept of "Motherhood as a career" was developed, an ideology appealing to middle-class women despite the fact that they were denied a broad range of social and economic options. Were these the same women who had worked in the mills hoping for freedom? Probably not, although Kessler-Harris does not tell us. But she documents the growing popular and official sentiment that the way to make husbands sober and industrious was to keep wives dependent—a message warmed over today by George Gilder (author of *Wealth and Poverty*, Basic Books, 1981), a favorite of the Reagan White House.

For immigrant and other poor women in those days, much as for economically needy women today, the necessity for doing wage work clashed with the ideology that the proper place for a woman was in the home. Kessler-Harris points out that this sharpened the class distinctions among women—those who could afford not to work matched their life style to ideology, and those who did work could not do so and felt bad about it. One might argue, however, that the ideology mandating woman's place in the home pervaded women's consciousness at all class levels and that even today it undercuts their commitment to labor-force mobility.

THE INTERPLAY between women's actual participation in the work force and the ideology discrediting it is a constant theme in this book. Kessler-Harris demonstrates how the division of labor by sex has reinforced the restrictions placed on women's work in the United States, limiting their opportunities, curtailing their freedoms, and restricting their incomes, so that they would not compete with men and stayed dependent on male support. Among other harassments, some women faced charges of immorality for doing "men's work."

On the other hand, Kessler-Harris points out, employers felt free to experiment with changes in the sexual division of labor when it proved to be beneficial. New technology was often the impetus

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[2] Barbara Welter, "The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820–1826," *American Quarterly, Summer 1966.*

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for substituting cheaper female labor for male labor and for redefining the sex-typing of a job.

This created much male hostility toward women workers. Although some union leaders, such as Samuel Gompers, advocated the organizing of women workers, most unions excluded women by a variety of measures—both formally, by refusing to grant them membership, and informally, by holding the meetings in saloons (the preserve of men) or scheduling them at late hours, or by ridiculing women who dared to speak up. We have long been told how union men feared that women might undercut their effectiveness. Yet enticing examples of "union maids," unafraid to hold out even when their male counterparts gave in, are to be found in Kessler-Harris's historical account. In 1909, for instance, following in the footsteps of the New Hampshire Factory Girls Association, 20,000 women walked out of New York City's garment shops over the objections of male union leaders, and Polish "spool girls" in Chicopee, Massachusetts, won a victory against a rate cut by striking when their union pressed them to settle.

Kessler-Harris also documents the changing shape of the American family, effected by birth control and a developing sentiment that women ought to have more rights in the work force. World War II provided legitimacy for women working for the first time in many a decade. Even during the Depression they had to apologize for working, but the war defined women's work as a contribution to preserving freedom. Active recruiting of women was illustrated by a new image, as extolled in the song of *Rosie the Riveter*:

> Sitting up there on the fuselage
> That little frail can do
> More than a male can do. . . .

But, Kessler-Harris argues, the war did not bring a sharp departure from a developing pattern. It was inevitable that women eventually would enter the labor force because of economic necessity, and wartime figures may be interpreted as reflecting the tendency of women to seek wage work when there is a need to earn money and social pressures to stay at home are removed. Furthermore, the war opened opportunities for better jobs. For black women the change was most dramatic. About 20 percent of those who had worked at domestic jobs moved into areas where they had been snubbed before. Not that doors opened magically. But now black women did get help from some unions (the UAW in particular), some civic agencies, and the government in gaining factory jobs.

Nevertheless, there still were mixed messages in the society about women in the labor force. Concern was expressed that "too many mothers of families are working in war plants," and when the Senate Subcommittee on Education and Labor held hearings on juvenile delinquency in the winter of 1943 the blame was put on working mothers.

THE POSTWAR YEARS are covered only in the book's last 20 pages. To the extent that these decades are given little attention, this "history of wage-earning women" is limited. Inexplicably, only a few sentences are devoted to the women's movement. This inattention to what has been the most dramatic era of change in women's history is a surprise, given the author's acknowledgment of the influence of the women's movement on her thinking.

Missing is the story of women's spectacular entry into the male-dominated professions of law and medicine and into the business world; the landmark consent decree entered into by AT&T through efforts of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and some visionary women lawyers that set off a chain of important suits in other industries; women's professional work in lobbying and in the study and evaluation of women's position; their use of the judicial process to argue important constitutional cases up to the Supreme Court; and the role of affirmative action programs and class action suits. This is especially regrettable given the "theory" behind this book that improvement in the role of women has come about *gradually* as a result of their growing participation in the labor force. I don't believe that the evidence supports this view. Nothing much was happening to institutionalize women's gains in the labor force, as Kessler-Harris herself points out, in the first two decades of the postwar era, preceding the late 1960s and 1970s. Only then did a combination of factors—the civil rights activism of the '60s, the women's movement, and the change in the law—make for a great leap forward.

It is certainly true that women's increasing participation in the labor force facilitated improvement in their status. But I believe that change (dramatic change) would not have come about without the concerted action of women in the late '60s and '70s, without raised consciousness, and without the use of the new legal machinery made available to them.

If one views this book as less than a complete history—rather, as an account of the interplay between ideology, job opportunity, and economic conditions as it has affected women from colonial times to World War II—this book is an important contribution to labor history and the history of women in the American work force. □

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LETTERS

Defense Policies

Editors:

In order to help move the United States "toward a sane defense policy," Bogdan Denitch [in *Dissent*, Summer 1982] calls for "a fundamental examination" by the democratic left of "the assumption behind U.S. defense policy."

Denitch characterizes U.S. society as a "democracy," and not as a capitalist class society. . . . Accordingly, he asks us to consider what sort of "defense policy" it is that "we" need, and never mentions the U.S. ruling class, which decides policy. . . .

Denitch does not recognize the capitalist, imperialist nature of the U.S., [but] . . . notes that our government defines "U.S. interests in a way that ties us to unpopular and repressive regimes," as if U.S. imperialist interests could be defined, and defended, in any other way. He describes the extensive paramilitary and military involvements of the U.S. government in the Third World as "adventures"; finds it "remarkable how little the present administration, and even many of its mainline critics, have learned from the past"; is not willing, once and for all, to "completely write off the possibility that a different Administration might move toward a democratic foreign policy and thus have alliances that are not only defensible but worth defending"; and he is concerned to suggest an alternative policy aimed at the "reasonable defense of legitimate U.S. interests . . . " even though to speak of the U.S. (state) today is to speak of the most far-flung and rapacious empire in the history of the world.

Denitch observes correctly that neither Soviet foreign policy nor the Soviet military has been "the major cause" for the decline in the power of the U.S. and its allies. But he does not say why these capitalist states are in decline: they are in decline because of the basic contradictions in their socioeconomic systems. . . . One need not be a "Marxist" to know that this is so.

Denitch also correctly observes that there is "broad bipartisan agreement" (that is, consensus within the ruling class) that "a major increase in military spending is necessary for the U.S. and its allies." Yet he is astonished by the Administration that deems war inevitable unless the Soviet "regime" changes (actually, the position, which is public, is that if the Soviets don't change their social *system*, they face annihilation) and he is astounded that the Administration . . . [is] inclined to "fight and win" full-scale nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Contrary to Denitch's assertions, the historical record shows plainly that, since the early '70s, it has been *our government alone* that has undermined the post-SALT I "rough parity" in U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear forces. . . .

I fail to understand why Denitch directs his "argument" against U.S. development of first-strike weaponry to the U.S. left and why he feels he has to point out, to us, that security requires that "we" stop being confrontational with the Soviet Union. It seems to me to be equally without point to state that "we must . . . insist upon substantial negotiations with the Soviets toward a drastic scaling-back of existing nuclear systems," and that "a beginning could be the ratification of SALT II," since our left does "insist"—though in vain—that our government seriously negotiate, and since both our left and the Soviets are in favor of SALT II (*they* have ratified).

The point is that the U.S. government, as we have known it historically, acts to serve the interests of the U.S. capitalist system and ruling class.

BRIAN GUERRE
New York City

BOGDAN DENITCH Replies

The trouble with Mr. Guerre is that he cannot read. That in itself would not be a fatal barrier to reasonable debate if he did not combine that defect with sectarian rigidity. Thus he finds that I "in effect" characterize U.S. society as a "democracy" and not as a "capitalist class society." He deduces this heresy from the question I asked in the *Dissent* article: "what kind of a defense establishment is appropriate for a democracy?" But this question is not merely directed at the capitalist democracy the U.S. is today; it would also be relevant even for a socialist democracy. Were the U.S. to reach that happy state, it still would have to deal with such unpleasant questions as defense and military hardware—unless the Soviet state and all other major authoritarian states were also blessed with the same transformation simultaneously.

I argue that the democratic left, which is not a synonym for socialists, has to be concerned with problems of defense in the here and now, even if the U.S. remains regrettably a capitalist and, yes, imperialist democracy. I also argue that it is possible to have a sane, that is, noninterventionist and nonconfrontational foreign and defense policy, even in a nonsocialist America. This means that we must explore the possibility of developing some immediate demands in the field of defense and foreign policy that can be supported by both the socialist and the nonsocialist democratic left.

An example of that approach is the bill regarding defense that was introduced by Congressman Dellums. While not proposing to abolish either capitalism or imperialism (at least not in this bill), he proposes to get rid of: the MX, the cruise missile, the Pershing II, the Trident II system, the new proposed carriers, and the

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Rapid Deployment Force. Although the proposals in Dellums's bill are well short of socialism, I support it as a way of furthering a debate regarding assumptions about defense and foreign policy that the present Administration and, unfortunately, most Democrats share. Dellums proposed this bill from a nonunilaterist and nonpacifist point of view that is shared by most U.S. voters. Close to 50 members of Congress supported the bill.

What Mr. Guerre seems unable to grasp is that just as there is a legitimate interest in a sane defense policy, in a world where the other military bloc is also armed to the teeth, so there are legitimate U.S. interests. And I do not identify U.S. interests with the interests of the country's ruling class.

It may come as a surprise to Mr. Guerre, but most of the broad liberal left in the United States does not share his assumption that the U.S. *alone* is responsible for the present state of military confrontation between the superpowers. For that matter, although I sometimes choose to stress my relative orthodoxy as a Marxist, neither do I. □

"Feminism, Family & Community" — Some Last Words

Editors:

I must write a letter on Jean Bethke Elshtain's attempt to defend the family from its leftist critics (Fall 1982). I write as someone who sees much in the nuclear family worth defending but is appalled at what passes for serious analysis in her piece. There are minor examples of rhetorical gimmicks and posturing as well as major conceptual problems, but I'll content myself with a few representative issues.

(1) After a few paragraphs of defending women's "distinctive moral 'voice' " and opposing "women's full absorption within the market society," Elshtain offers this: "Right-wing defenses of the family can only be countered by a feminism that agrees that the family is a prerequisite for any form of social life and that a particular ideal of the family is imperative to create a more humane society." The reader looks back at what preceded this apparent non sequitur, searching in vain for justification. Elshtain assumes precisely what must be demonstrated: that this account of what women should embrace must include the family as well.

(2) After a long (and distorted) summary of radical criticisms of the family, Elshtain remarks: "What oozed into the vacuum created by the breakup of community and the breakdown of families were the forces of right-wing reaction and a bewildering smorgasbord of cults. . . ." In a contrived effort to pin the blame on radicals with whom she disagrees, Elshtain skips from rehearsing their criticism to assuming most Americans agreed with it and acted accordingly. When did this putative renunciation of the family take place in numbers significant enough to be a plausible explanation for the rise of the right?

(3) In a stunning display of ideology before reason, Elshtain compares radical critics of the family to cultists such as Jim Jones. This parallel is drawn without even a perfunctory acknowledgment that it is *at best* appropriate to a tiny fraction of the critics. Anticipating objections to the analogy, she imperiously upbraids "those who can't find *any* analytic comparison" between the two [her emphasis]. This move cleverly serves to depict any skeptic as unreasonable and inflexible, saving her the trouble of defending what is a grotesque comparison. (A moment's thought reveals the disanalogy: most radical critics are interested in identifying the respects in which the family supports and recapitulates a repressive social order. They do not attack it, as a cultist would, for competing with a surrogate family.)

(4) R. D. Laing is ripped out of context. Laing was concerned to make psychosis intelligible from the perspective of the family system. He demonstrated that a good deal of violence masquerades as love, that there is more to patterns of familial interaction than meets the eye. To see his analysis as "mocking the efforts of parents to provide security for their children" appears a willful misreading—and one flavored by defensiveness. If Laing spent more time exposing the pathogenic tendencies of many contemporary Western families than reassuring us of the family's potential, that seems a reasonable emphasis. Let us not forget, after all, that critics of the family are challenging perhaps the single most sacrosanct institution we have. If anyone may be characterized as a courageous challenger here, it is the radical critic, not someone like Elshtain who dares to defend the family.

(5) In her introduction, Elshtain promises us she will show that "things that exist [things that exist??]—such as the family—incorporate values that implicitly challenge corporate power and anti-democratic, managerial elites." I'll be damned if I can see where she has even come close to doing this. She does illuminate the tension between commitments to individual freedom and community on the part of critics who tried to defend both, but this is actually an *ad hominem* attack on those who did so. The fundamental argument that the family is an agent of the status quo is never answered, and her piece ends only with a ringing endorsement of children. Even this rather safe position, moreover, is simply asserted rather than defended—and it leaves no room for people who don't want any.

Happily for fans of the family, a better case can be made than is contained in this essay—else the radical and feminist critics Elshtain identifies would win by default.

Alfie Kohn
Cambridge, Mass.

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JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN Replies

Here we go again. Critics of the family of the sort I criticize, in turn, are a "tiny fraction." They cannot be blamed in any way for the widespread conviction that one predominant force of much radical and feminist rhetoric was couched in such reductive language that the possibility that individual men and women, parents and children might have relations with one another not dominated totally by crude power manipulations was squeezed out altogether. What underlay these attacks —and what Kohn misses entirely—is an atomistic vision of the human person and an instrumental picture of human society. This vision, at its deepest roots, confirms rather than challenges market society.

In a short essay one cannot, of course, go over the ground built upon moral philosophy, anthropology, social history and political theory that one draws upon to make one's case. Contrary to Kohn, however, I did give specific suggestions of the way in which the image of a social compact (as opposed to contract) can serve as a source of radical dissent from technocratic managerialism.

Finally, Kohn is less than candid about her own position. She claims, on the one hand, that there is a "fundamental argument that the family is an agent of the status quo"—seeming to concur with this "fundamental argument." But then she ends on a jaunty note to "fans of the family" (as if what was going on was a spectator sport) indicating that a better case for such "fans" can be made than "contained" in my essay. O.K., Ms. Kohn: let's hear it. Or is this final riposte purely rhetorical? Is your own position, instead, one shared with the "fundamental argument" to which you refer, which insists that what people are doing when they create and sustain families is shoring up a given order in whatever its current form? It might be interesting to try to make that case to young draft resisters who have stated, explicitly, that the source of their dissent lies in values they were inculcated with in their homes and churches. There is more. □

□ *This discussion is now closed.* — EDS.

The *New Yorker*

Editors:

"Form follows function," is the basis not only of art but also of politics and every other aspect of life. What Josephine Hendin [in "The *New Yorker* as Cultural Ideal," *Dissent*, Fall 1982] neglected to mention is that this holds true for the *New Yorker*. Whatever the literary, aesthetic, or political pretensions of the editors, the purpose of a magazine (and of newspapers, radio, television) is *to purvey advertising*. All is subordinated to this concern.

Since the *New Yorker* purveys its advertising to the upwardly mobile, and especially those who wish to regard themselves as such, its content is often a triumph. Reading about the tribulations of a welfare mother, for instance, the peruser can feel at once socially concerned and socially superior—a subtle and seductive experience. One can then turn to the ads for diamond bracelets and Hawaiian vacations with a soothed and receptive mind.

Regarding Jonathan Schell's thoughtful work [responding to "Waiting for the End?" by Murray Hausknecht, *Dissent*, Summer 1982], I, too, was disappointed that his conclusion was only "we must love one another or die." He did *not* go on to say "and we must create a world in which it is more possible to love one another." If he had said so, and even presented a discussion of *how*, I doubt it would have been published in the *New Yorker*, provoking worldwide discussion and (we hope) some raising of consciousness.

I also cannot agree that the "detached, minutae" approach to human experience is *always* "voyeurism or even hostility." Schell points out the near impossibility of thinking about nuclear holocaust: John Hersey's *Hiroshima*, published in the *New Yorker* in 1946, for example, precisely because it details six lives with such unforgettable precision, creates an impact far greater than any pontification.

The *New Yorker*, then, like many of our cultural artifacts, presents contradictions.

JOANNE FORMAN
Taos, New Mexico □

"A Path for America"

Editors:

Michael Harrington's "A Path for America" (*Dissent*, Fall 1982), attributes the crisis of the welfare state to three processes—the growth of corporate monopoly power, the internationalization of capital, and technological change. This ignores the principle that undergirds those processes—*corporate America's attempt to undermine our partial welfare state.*

In the heady days of the American Celebration of the 1950s, end-of-ideologists proclaimed the solution to the class struggle: in a welfare state financed by high taxes, high corporate profits and high workers' wages would be compatible. But as Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison demonstrate in *The Deindustrialization of America*, corporate leaders did not follow the optimists' game plan. Instead, they began moving their capital and facilities out of unionized, high-wage, high-tax

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(LETTERS *continued*)

regions, in search of high profits in the Sunbelt and overseas. Seen in this context, the crisis of the welfare state represents the triumph of transnational corporations.

If this analysis is correct—and it is compatible with Harrington's argument—socialists designing the "third stage" of the welfare state have a difficult task ahead of them. No longer is it possible for French, Dutch, Swedish, or U.S. socialists to design investment or labor-market programs within a national frame-work. The corporations' new abilities to shift capital, plan operations, and coordinate production and sales in multiple sites throughout the world makes it imperative for us to think in global terms as well.

Harrington's "Proposals from the Democratic Left" to democratize corporate power do not fully take into account the new rules of the game. He calls for a national commitment to full employment, to be implemented by national planning of new industries such as "renewable source energy systems" and modern railroads. He also advocates containing inflation through price controls, opening the corporate books to public scrutiny, and creation of a national health service. Finally, Harrington proposes radical tax reform to finance new social expenditures.

All these proposals are sound. But they do not address the fact that corporate America has been warring with the welfare state for 35 years, and has developed increasingly powerful weapons to fight it. Taxation provides the clearest example. Over the years, transnational corporations have developed the ability to shift their profits to nations that tax least. How would an American "democratic left" program bring this under control? How could we achieve full employment by planning new industries when corporate America keeps swelling the "reserve army of the unemployed" by confronting ever greater numbers of workers with the global labor market?

Here Richard Barnet's *The Lean Years: Politics in the Age of Scarcity* is relevant. Barnet argues persuasively that no progress to achieve social welfare in the United States, or in any other nation, can be achieved so long as the structural inequalities of the "Global Factory" persist undiminished. At the moment, it appears that if the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are not changed, the collapse of Third World economies could drag down social democratic programs in the West.

A program to address these international problems requires an international focus. The democratic left needs to address international investment and trade flows, and reform GATT; the problem of capital flight that France under Mitterrand has experienced must be controlled; and problems of world currency and world finance require attention.

Harrington does propose planning, but planning too will have to be global. At present, every industrial nation and some developing ones are protecting their steel industries for political reasons. The result is a worldwide crisis of overcapacity, which makes protection doubly expensive. A U.S. plan to modernize steel is probably in order, but if it is not coordinated with the plans of our trade partners/competitors, no plan will succeed.

Planning not only must be coordinated on a worldwide scale, it must be comprehensive. As Reich and Magaziner argued in *Minding America's Business*, mini-plans can be self-defeating. For example, if the government saves the steel industry at the same time that conglomerates continue to disinvest in metal-working businesses, we will have a very expensive lemon on our hands.

Saving the steel industry will require nationalization, the unfashionable program that was once socialists' panacea. Without nationalization, there will be no U.S. steel industry, for private corporations will not invest billions to modernize domestic steel production when greater profits are to be made in overseas investment, speculation, high technology, and the service sector. Nationalization is also necessary in the banking sector; without it, how will we gain control of credit creation and capital flows? The same holds true in the energy sector, where, as Robert Engler has shown, U.S. energy corporations are exploitative, oligopolistic, and extremely difficult to regulate or control. As long as they remain private, a planner's hands are tightly tied.

In sum, the global economy is undergoing structural transformation. The welfare state model prevalent among social democrats and liberals is inadequate to the challenge posed by transnational corporations. The democratic left must do more than nod to the Third World; it must embrace its problems as ours. And our programs to plan economic growth and control corporate behavior must be international in scope, coordinated with the programs of democratic left governments throughout the world.

These programmatic tasks are immense; they are further complicated by the politics of nationalism. Americans have a hard enough time taking seriously and understanding what is going on in the United States—in cities, suburbs, and rural areas, in New England, the deep South, and the Pacific Northwest. How much more difficult is it for us to understand our own stake in the uneven development of Latin American economies, in the widening rural poverty of East Asia, in the aging industrial regions of Europe! Up until now, the trauma of America's deindustrialization has caused even progressives to turn their backs on the problems of foreign peoples with whom we are inextricably linked. How much harder it will be to fashion a political strategy to mobilize the mass of American workers to a program for a "new international economic order." It won't be done in a day; or a decade. But in a new ball game, we have to develop a new game plan.

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